A short article of mine, "Internationalization of Income Measures and the U.S. Book–Tax Relationship," just came out in the National Tax Journal. Not available on-line (other than the abstract), and I don't seem to have posted it on SSRN, but the cite is 62 N.T.J. 155-67 (March 2009).
The abstract is as follows:
Taxable income and financial accounting income are measures that use the same name but serve different purposes, leading to some differences in how they might ideally be defined. However, concern about managerial incentive problems may support integrating them, either to increase the accuracy of amounts reported or to reduce the resources that managers expend on reducing taxable income and increasing reported earnings. Political incentive problems, on the other hand, arguably support separating the measures, so that legislative eagerness to control the tax base need not promote politicization of accounting standards. The case for a largely one–book system may grow stronger, however, if pressures for international convergence in defining income on both the tax and accounting fronts lead to reduced politicization of both.
Thursday, May 28, 2009
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
Doug Holtz-Eakin talks up new conservative think tank
I admit to having been hard occasionally on Doug Holtz-Eakin during the 2008 presidential campaign. I had three reasons for this: (1) at times he deserved it, (2) I expected better from him, and (3) he risked harming his entire profession's public reputation through egregious flacking that should have been left to others in the McCain campaign. The strangest thing about his flacking was its inconsistency - one day he'd spout a silly talking point that was beneath his station (so to speak), and the next day he'd make a responsible comment about the long-term fiscal situation (which of course neither candidate wanted to highlight).
Anyway, Doug has now resurfaced via his statement that he's developing a proposal for a new think tank that he calls a “Center for American Progress for the right.”
This in turn prompts Paul Krugman and Matt Yglesias to note the already large supply of conservative think-tanks (such as AEI and Heritage) with exceptionally deep funding. They posit that, since the Republican Party and the conservative movement have gone stark raving mad, institutions that align with them, in Yglesias' words, must "not [be] prepared to accept anything other than 'tax cuts' as a solution to anything. Consequently, they’re not really even prepared to accept the premise that other problems exist. Tax cuts can’t solve climate change, so there must be no such thing! Tax cuts can’t curb inequality, so there must not be a problem with growing inequality."
This is a bit unfair. AEI, for example, is a mixed bag. On the one hand, it was the venue the other day for the Cheney speech, about which the less said the better. But it also still features intelligent and responsible commentary, such as (just to give one example without prejudice to others) this.
The problem is that, when an institution gets too deep in bed with really bad apples (or demanding funders), the good people doing good work there suffer a labeling or guilt by association problem. Or they may need to watch what they say and avoid pursuing some ideas too far. Thus, Holtz-Eakin could accomplish something by creating an institution that stuck to the high road. But the tricky part is getting the funding and prominence needed to pick off the good people from compromised institutions. Making this all the harder, those institutions have good reason to treat a few high-minded people very well. The labeling confusion goes both ways - the institutions gain luster from good and honest work done there, just as the people doing that work risk losing a bit of their own luster.
In discussing his initiative, Holtz-Eakin talks a bit too much for my taste in terms of reviving the Republican Party. It's certainly extremely important for our national welfare - as numerous people on the left have noted - that the Republicans return to planet Earth and to our country's traditions (not to mention those of the Enlightenment). It's also true that hypothetical Republicans who had returned to sanity and decency would be the natural constituency for a policy shop lying on the side of the spectrum that is more pro-market and less focused on inequality. But I would say that the smarter and safer way of getting to that end state would be to utterly ignore the Republicans for now, and wait for them to come calling in 2014 or so. As I would have hoped Holtz-Eakin had already learned, engaging with them now is a recipe for debasing oneself without improving them.
Possible early hire, if Doug is serious: Bruce Bartlett.
Anyway, Doug has now resurfaced via his statement that he's developing a proposal for a new think tank that he calls a “Center for American Progress for the right.”
This in turn prompts Paul Krugman and Matt Yglesias to note the already large supply of conservative think-tanks (such as AEI and Heritage) with exceptionally deep funding. They posit that, since the Republican Party and the conservative movement have gone stark raving mad, institutions that align with them, in Yglesias' words, must "not [be] prepared to accept anything other than 'tax cuts' as a solution to anything. Consequently, they’re not really even prepared to accept the premise that other problems exist. Tax cuts can’t solve climate change, so there must be no such thing! Tax cuts can’t curb inequality, so there must not be a problem with growing inequality."
This is a bit unfair. AEI, for example, is a mixed bag. On the one hand, it was the venue the other day for the Cheney speech, about which the less said the better. But it also still features intelligent and responsible commentary, such as (just to give one example without prejudice to others) this.
The problem is that, when an institution gets too deep in bed with really bad apples (or demanding funders), the good people doing good work there suffer a labeling or guilt by association problem. Or they may need to watch what they say and avoid pursuing some ideas too far. Thus, Holtz-Eakin could accomplish something by creating an institution that stuck to the high road. But the tricky part is getting the funding and prominence needed to pick off the good people from compromised institutions. Making this all the harder, those institutions have good reason to treat a few high-minded people very well. The labeling confusion goes both ways - the institutions gain luster from good and honest work done there, just as the people doing that work risk losing a bit of their own luster.
In discussing his initiative, Holtz-Eakin talks a bit too much for my taste in terms of reviving the Republican Party. It's certainly extremely important for our national welfare - as numerous people on the left have noted - that the Republicans return to planet Earth and to our country's traditions (not to mention those of the Enlightenment). It's also true that hypothetical Republicans who had returned to sanity and decency would be the natural constituency for a policy shop lying on the side of the spectrum that is more pro-market and less focused on inequality. But I would say that the smarter and safer way of getting to that end state would be to utterly ignore the Republicans for now, and wait for them to come calling in 2014 or so. As I would have hoped Holtz-Eakin had already learned, engaging with them now is a recipe for debasing oneself without improving them.
Possible early hire, if Doug is serious: Bruce Bartlett.
Saturday, May 16, 2009
Summer's here and ...
So far I've written a 1,000 word piece on tax reform ideas for a U.S. publication, another of 5,000 words on the Administration's international tax proposals for a U.K. publication (the U.K. is preparing international tax changes in the opposite direction), and better nailed down my plans for an as yet untitled but perhaps 15% written book on U.S. international tax policy.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Cheney
I've been following the man's antics with amazement. He's obviously a very disturbed individual. I've heard privately from people who worked in national security in the Bush Administration that he had a fascination with torture and would keep after it even when begged by his associates to give it a rest. Obviously it serves deep psychological needs for him. His daughter is right - torture truly is his cause, in the same sense that global warming is Al Gore's.
Of course, I don't wish to discount Cheney's rational motive, from his perspective, to fabricate evidence in support of invading Iraq.
Of course, I don't wish to discount Cheney's rational motive, from his perspective, to fabricate evidence in support of invading Iraq.
Monday, May 11, 2009
Charming show
Yesterday, to celebrate Mother's Day plus certain household members' birthdays, a close fambly group of us went to see Coraline at the Lucille Lortel Theater - this being the stage musical version, with songs by Magnetic Fields / 69 Love Songs genius (if I may say so) Stephin Merritt, rather than the movie that I have thus far avoided (based on my perhaps unjustly suspecting it of being Disneyesquely cloying). The show was delightful and the music extremely inventive, one person being enough orchestra here to outdo the typical Broadway theater pit.
UPDATE: A few days later, as part of an end-of-year school event, we saw the Broadway adaptation of Schiller's Mary Stuart. Very different genre. The acting was good, but MY GOD what a flurry of over-long bombast.
UPDATE: A few days later, as part of an end-of-year school event, we saw the Broadway adaptation of Schiller's Mary Stuart. Very different genre. The acting was good, but MY GOD what a flurry of over-long bombast.
Tuesday, May 05, 2009
Radio appearance off the usual circuit for me
Today I discussed the Obama Administration's international tax plan on a Jamaican radio show, Evening Edition Newstalk 93 FM. I assume the interest over there lies in concern that Jamaica is one of the tax-friendly locations being targeted by the plan. My fellow commentator was someone from the Tax Foundation, who I assume was more anti-plan than I was (though you can guess my largely skeptical content from my prior post), but through my phone connection I could not hear more than one word out of every 10 that he spoke. Luckily he didn't try to cross-talk me (or if he did, I never realized) as it's hard to respond when you don't know what they're saying.
Silliest moment came when the host asked me if the Administration's tax plan was socialistic. After half-snorting, half-laughing (you had to be there), I noted that JFK's international tax plan went a lot further than Obama's (repealing deferral altogether) and also involved a higher rate than 35%, but no one seemed to think that was socialistic.
I suggested that the part of the plan aimed at U.S. companies, if not quite DOA, is likely at a minimum to be cut back substantially by Congress, but that the part aimed at tax-evading individuals seems feasible both politically and administratively.
Silliest moment came when the host asked me if the Administration's tax plan was socialistic. After half-snorting, half-laughing (you had to be there), I noted that JFK's international tax plan went a lot further than Obama's (repealing deferral altogether) and also involved a higher rate than 35%, but no one seemed to think that was socialistic.
I suggested that the part of the plan aimed at U.S. companies, if not quite DOA, is likely at a minimum to be cut back substantially by Congress, but that the part aimed at tax-evading individuals seems feasible both politically and administratively.
Monday, May 04, 2009
The Obama Administration's new international tax proposals
I'm still trying to get a preliminary handle on the Obama Administration's international tax proposals. The fullest description I've yet been able to find, from a White House fact sheet, is available here.
The fact sheet opens by stating that the White House's key concern is about jobs fleeing the U.S. However, recent empirical literature about U.S. international taxation on balance supports skepticism that jobs really "flee" the U.S., on a net basis, when U.S. companies invest abroad due in part to the lower tax rates available there. The two main reasons for doubt are (a) at the firm level, complementarity rather than substitution as between home and overseas investments; (b) what I call the "musical chairs" point. If there are good slots for business investment in the US (e.g., available workers, nearby resources & consumer markets, etc.), then one prospective user's deciding against using a particular slot may induce someone else to go there.
I thus think of it as more of an efficiency and revenue issue. Raising taxes on outbound investment to be closer to those on domestic investment has the potential - subject to the problems discussed below - to be more attractive on efficiency grounds than alternative means of raising the same revenue.
The efficiency gains from equalizing domestic and foreign tax rates faced by U.S. taxpayers might verge on being a slam dunk argument for the Administration's general position if not for one further problem. When we impose business taxes on legal entities such as corporations, rather than directly on individuals, we can only impose the U.S. tax rate, for investment abroad, on companies that are classified as U.S. residents. Unfortunately, corporate residence is an extremely weak reed for the imposition of U.S.-level rather than tax haven-level taxes. For new investments (as distinct from those already out there, which are hard to shift without paying a tax price), it is quite easy for investors to use non-U.S. entities.
Anyway, onto the Administration's proposals after one last bit of background. The Administration is proposing to use legislation even for changes that it could accomplish purely by revising Treasury regulations. This, in turn, may be an artifact of budget rules that only permit it to claim credit for extra revenues when achieved through legislative changes. That's really too bad insofar as changes that one deems desirable end up being blocked by the vociferous opposition that clearly will emerge in the legislative process.
And fight the opponents will. Herewith a quote from a newly posted article by Ryan Donmoyer at Bloomberg:
“'This is bad stuff,'” Kenneth Kies, a tax lobbyist at the Washington firm Federal Policy Group, said of Obama’s plans. “'This is going to be the biggest fight for the corporate community in the next two years.'” Kies represents General Electric Co., Anheuser-Busch Cos. and Microsoft Corp., among others."
But don't worry about Ken, who I'm sure will find the fight lucrative as well as stimulating. Think of all the other corporate lobbyists in different areas who wish they could say with a straight face that THEIR issues are the biggest ones.
Anyway, back to the White House press release, which opens with the following fun facts:
--In 2004, U.S. multinationals paid $16 billion of tax on $700 billion of foreign active earnings, an effective U.S. tax rate of 2.3%. Comment: Given foreign tax credits, this would be true even without the benefits of deferral and their enhancement by tax planning, if foreign rates were close enough to U.S. ones. It would be interesting to see the pre-credit "gross" tax liability, although that requires a grain or two of salt as well given foreign tax credit planning games. Note, however, that if we can't do much better than this (and I'll suggest below that perhaps we can't even with aggressive anti-tax planning rules), one wonders if the game is worth the candle. Lots of tax planning, compliance, and administrative costs relative to the revenue that's being raised.
--83 of the 100 largest U.S. corporations have subsidiaries in tax havens. Comment: What could possibly be holding back the other 17? Are their operations purely domestic?
--One address in the Cayman Islands hosts 18,857 corporations. Comment: I've always wanted to visit that building, especially if there are nice beaches nearby.
--Nearly one-third of all foreign profits reported by U.S. corporations in 2003 came from Bermuda, the Netherlands, and Ireland. Comment: One dismaying fact one learns from this is that, of the two pillars of international taxation, residence and source, BOTH lack fundamental economic meaning and thus invite extensive game-playing. This helps explain why there are no really good answers in U.S. international taxation. Disposing of the corporate residence concept and taxing income based purely on source (e.g., via an exemption system) would be far more clearly correct if source were a less slippery and manipulable concept.
Anyway, on to the Administration's proposals with very brief comments based on what I understand so far:
1) DENY DEDUCTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH UNTAXED OVERSEAS INVESTMENT UNTIL THE INCOME IS REPATRIATED TO THE U.S. - This amounts to a partial repeal of deferral, just as denying home mortgage interest deductions would amount to a partial repeal of the imputed rent exclusion. Note also that allowing the deductions (as under present law) arguably goes beyond putting U.S. and foreign companies on a level playing field. Suppose a U.S. company deducts domestic expenses at 35 percent so it can earn abroad at 10 percent. This is a better outcome than a company that was purely in the source jurisdiction would get from both deducting and earning at 10 percent.
Deferral creates massive distortions in tax planning by U.S. companies. A burden-neutral repeal of deferral (as proposed by Rosanne Altshuler and Harry Grubert) therefore strikes me as all to the good. They propose to get there by lowering the rate to offset the effective base-broadening. But non-burden-neutral, revenue-raising repeals of deferral run into the problem that companies may simply respond by reallocating their investments so that companies classified as U.S. residents aren't the ones doing these things. Over the long run, certainly, it's not going to be very sustainable to impose a worldwide tax on U.S. companies that exceeds the taxes owed if the same owners invest through non-U.S. companies.
Since it's really a transition issue, involving revenues from taxing existing profits that we might be able to get while companies are in the process of shifting around to beat the rules, my preferred proposal, which I realize is politically unrealistic, is to impose a one-time transition tax on the unrepatriated earnings of U.S. multinationals, accompanied by a change in regime to show that we don't plan to do it again. If credible, this would avoid affecting incentives regarding whether new investments starting tomorrow should be made through U.S. companies or foreign ones.
2) CLOSING FOREIGN TAX CREDIT LOOPHOLES - According to the White House fact sheet, "current rules and tax planning strategies make it possible to claim foreign tax credits for taxes paid on foreign income that is not subject to current U.S. tax." Agreed that this is not supposed to happen under the current rules, though I'm not surprised to hear that it does. Offhand, I'm not up on exactly what sort of tax planning strategies they have in mind. The Administration proposes to respond by changing the rules so as to determine allowable FTCs based on the ratio of total foreign tax to total foreign earnings. If I understand this correctly, it's a pretty big shift from basing FTCs purely on the income brought home this year and the foreign taxes associated therewith. This one is pretty interesting, and, like proposal (1), sounds like it's potentially a big structural improvement, only, subject to the same concern that, in the long run, the optimal U.S. tax burden on outbound investment by our multinationals is greatly lowered by the ease of investing through non-U.S. entities. Hence, same comment about preferring a transition tax to increasing the tax burden on outbound investments that might be made tomorrow.
FTCs are a really lousy instrument design, and I'd support extending Altshuler-Grubert to include burden-neutral repeal of FTCs as well as deferral. This idea couldn't be done the Altshuler-Grubert way, however, since they propose lowering the domestic corporate tax rate to match their burden-neutral reduced foreign rate. Doing this for FTCs would lower the burden-neutral rate too much for it to apply domestically as well as on outbound.
3) USE THE REVENUES RAISED ABOVE TO MAKE THE RESEARCH & EXPERIMENTATION CREDIT PERMANENT - Companies are going to laugh at this one, since they expect to have the credit extended anyway. (It's always ticketed for phase-out in a couple of years but is always extended again.) That said, extending the credit arguably gets some support from R&E's positive externalities - though I suspect that, in practice, the credit also covers a lot of junk. Making it permanent has additional virtues in that it adds certainty and reduces the need for ongoing lobbying expenses by the companies that want it, and financing the extension is a step in the right direction given the U.S. fiscal gap.
4) PREVENT U.S. COMPANIES FROM USING THE "CHECK-THE-BOX" REGULATIONS TO SHIFT INCOME TO TAX HAVENS WITHOUT BEING SUBJECT TO U.S. TAXATION UNDER SUBPART F - This recoups a blunder that the Treasury made during the Clinton Administration when it adopted "check the box" without thinking through the international ramifications. I'd think they could do this through regulations alone, apart from the budgetary scoring problem I noted above (though companies might complain and try to get Congress involved). Main problem is simply that the subpart F rules that companies evade by using check-the-box are subject to the same concern that I keep repeating here, i.e., limited ability to keep on imposing higher taxes based on U.S. corporate residence.
The remaining Administration proposals in the press release mainly pertain to individuals and compliance problems using tax havens. In general, I'm strongly in favor - these often involve fraud, and taxing resident individuals on outbound investment lacks the fundamental conceptual problem of doing so for legal entities such as corporations, since it's actually economically meaningful (and hence less tax-elastic) to live in the U.S. and/or be a citizen.
The fact sheet opens by stating that the White House's key concern is about jobs fleeing the U.S. However, recent empirical literature about U.S. international taxation on balance supports skepticism that jobs really "flee" the U.S., on a net basis, when U.S. companies invest abroad due in part to the lower tax rates available there. The two main reasons for doubt are (a) at the firm level, complementarity rather than substitution as between home and overseas investments; (b) what I call the "musical chairs" point. If there are good slots for business investment in the US (e.g., available workers, nearby resources & consumer markets, etc.), then one prospective user's deciding against using a particular slot may induce someone else to go there.
I thus think of it as more of an efficiency and revenue issue. Raising taxes on outbound investment to be closer to those on domestic investment has the potential - subject to the problems discussed below - to be more attractive on efficiency grounds than alternative means of raising the same revenue.
The efficiency gains from equalizing domestic and foreign tax rates faced by U.S. taxpayers might verge on being a slam dunk argument for the Administration's general position if not for one further problem. When we impose business taxes on legal entities such as corporations, rather than directly on individuals, we can only impose the U.S. tax rate, for investment abroad, on companies that are classified as U.S. residents. Unfortunately, corporate residence is an extremely weak reed for the imposition of U.S.-level rather than tax haven-level taxes. For new investments (as distinct from those already out there, which are hard to shift without paying a tax price), it is quite easy for investors to use non-U.S. entities.
Anyway, onto the Administration's proposals after one last bit of background. The Administration is proposing to use legislation even for changes that it could accomplish purely by revising Treasury regulations. This, in turn, may be an artifact of budget rules that only permit it to claim credit for extra revenues when achieved through legislative changes. That's really too bad insofar as changes that one deems desirable end up being blocked by the vociferous opposition that clearly will emerge in the legislative process.
And fight the opponents will. Herewith a quote from a newly posted article by Ryan Donmoyer at Bloomberg:
“'This is bad stuff,'” Kenneth Kies, a tax lobbyist at the Washington firm Federal Policy Group, said of Obama’s plans. “'This is going to be the biggest fight for the corporate community in the next two years.'” Kies represents General Electric Co., Anheuser-Busch Cos. and Microsoft Corp., among others."
But don't worry about Ken, who I'm sure will find the fight lucrative as well as stimulating. Think of all the other corporate lobbyists in different areas who wish they could say with a straight face that THEIR issues are the biggest ones.
Anyway, back to the White House press release, which opens with the following fun facts:
--In 2004, U.S. multinationals paid $16 billion of tax on $700 billion of foreign active earnings, an effective U.S. tax rate of 2.3%. Comment: Given foreign tax credits, this would be true even without the benefits of deferral and their enhancement by tax planning, if foreign rates were close enough to U.S. ones. It would be interesting to see the pre-credit "gross" tax liability, although that requires a grain or two of salt as well given foreign tax credit planning games. Note, however, that if we can't do much better than this (and I'll suggest below that perhaps we can't even with aggressive anti-tax planning rules), one wonders if the game is worth the candle. Lots of tax planning, compliance, and administrative costs relative to the revenue that's being raised.
--83 of the 100 largest U.S. corporations have subsidiaries in tax havens. Comment: What could possibly be holding back the other 17? Are their operations purely domestic?
--One address in the Cayman Islands hosts 18,857 corporations. Comment: I've always wanted to visit that building, especially if there are nice beaches nearby.
--Nearly one-third of all foreign profits reported by U.S. corporations in 2003 came from Bermuda, the Netherlands, and Ireland. Comment: One dismaying fact one learns from this is that, of the two pillars of international taxation, residence and source, BOTH lack fundamental economic meaning and thus invite extensive game-playing. This helps explain why there are no really good answers in U.S. international taxation. Disposing of the corporate residence concept and taxing income based purely on source (e.g., via an exemption system) would be far more clearly correct if source were a less slippery and manipulable concept.
Anyway, on to the Administration's proposals with very brief comments based on what I understand so far:
1) DENY DEDUCTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH UNTAXED OVERSEAS INVESTMENT UNTIL THE INCOME IS REPATRIATED TO THE U.S. - This amounts to a partial repeal of deferral, just as denying home mortgage interest deductions would amount to a partial repeal of the imputed rent exclusion. Note also that allowing the deductions (as under present law) arguably goes beyond putting U.S. and foreign companies on a level playing field. Suppose a U.S. company deducts domestic expenses at 35 percent so it can earn abroad at 10 percent. This is a better outcome than a company that was purely in the source jurisdiction would get from both deducting and earning at 10 percent.
Deferral creates massive distortions in tax planning by U.S. companies. A burden-neutral repeal of deferral (as proposed by Rosanne Altshuler and Harry Grubert) therefore strikes me as all to the good. They propose to get there by lowering the rate to offset the effective base-broadening. But non-burden-neutral, revenue-raising repeals of deferral run into the problem that companies may simply respond by reallocating their investments so that companies classified as U.S. residents aren't the ones doing these things. Over the long run, certainly, it's not going to be very sustainable to impose a worldwide tax on U.S. companies that exceeds the taxes owed if the same owners invest through non-U.S. companies.
Since it's really a transition issue, involving revenues from taxing existing profits that we might be able to get while companies are in the process of shifting around to beat the rules, my preferred proposal, which I realize is politically unrealistic, is to impose a one-time transition tax on the unrepatriated earnings of U.S. multinationals, accompanied by a change in regime to show that we don't plan to do it again. If credible, this would avoid affecting incentives regarding whether new investments starting tomorrow should be made through U.S. companies or foreign ones.
2) CLOSING FOREIGN TAX CREDIT LOOPHOLES - According to the White House fact sheet, "current rules and tax planning strategies make it possible to claim foreign tax credits for taxes paid on foreign income that is not subject to current U.S. tax." Agreed that this is not supposed to happen under the current rules, though I'm not surprised to hear that it does. Offhand, I'm not up on exactly what sort of tax planning strategies they have in mind. The Administration proposes to respond by changing the rules so as to determine allowable FTCs based on the ratio of total foreign tax to total foreign earnings. If I understand this correctly, it's a pretty big shift from basing FTCs purely on the income brought home this year and the foreign taxes associated therewith. This one is pretty interesting, and, like proposal (1), sounds like it's potentially a big structural improvement, only, subject to the same concern that, in the long run, the optimal U.S. tax burden on outbound investment by our multinationals is greatly lowered by the ease of investing through non-U.S. entities. Hence, same comment about preferring a transition tax to increasing the tax burden on outbound investments that might be made tomorrow.
FTCs are a really lousy instrument design, and I'd support extending Altshuler-Grubert to include burden-neutral repeal of FTCs as well as deferral. This idea couldn't be done the Altshuler-Grubert way, however, since they propose lowering the domestic corporate tax rate to match their burden-neutral reduced foreign rate. Doing this for FTCs would lower the burden-neutral rate too much for it to apply domestically as well as on outbound.
3) USE THE REVENUES RAISED ABOVE TO MAKE THE RESEARCH & EXPERIMENTATION CREDIT PERMANENT - Companies are going to laugh at this one, since they expect to have the credit extended anyway. (It's always ticketed for phase-out in a couple of years but is always extended again.) That said, extending the credit arguably gets some support from R&E's positive externalities - though I suspect that, in practice, the credit also covers a lot of junk. Making it permanent has additional virtues in that it adds certainty and reduces the need for ongoing lobbying expenses by the companies that want it, and financing the extension is a step in the right direction given the U.S. fiscal gap.
4) PREVENT U.S. COMPANIES FROM USING THE "CHECK-THE-BOX" REGULATIONS TO SHIFT INCOME TO TAX HAVENS WITHOUT BEING SUBJECT TO U.S. TAXATION UNDER SUBPART F - This recoups a blunder that the Treasury made during the Clinton Administration when it adopted "check the box" without thinking through the international ramifications. I'd think they could do this through regulations alone, apart from the budgetary scoring problem I noted above (though companies might complain and try to get Congress involved). Main problem is simply that the subpart F rules that companies evade by using check-the-box are subject to the same concern that I keep repeating here, i.e., limited ability to keep on imposing higher taxes based on U.S. corporate residence.
The remaining Administration proposals in the press release mainly pertain to individuals and compliance problems using tax havens. In general, I'm strongly in favor - these often involve fraud, and taxing resident individuals on outbound investment lacks the fundamental conceptual problem of doing so for legal entities such as corporations, since it's actually economically meaningful (and hence less tax-elastic) to live in the U.S. and/or be a citizen.
Friday, May 01, 2009
The New York Mets
I'm a Mets fan, not by choice, but because I have no choice. The affliction first struck me before my 7th birthday, and there's really nothing I can do about it now.
Queue here the Macbeth quote:
MACBETH: Canst thou not minister to a mind diseas'd;
Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow;
Raze out the written troubles of the brain;
And with some sweet oblivious antidote,
Cleanse the stuff'd bosom of that perilous stuff
Which weighs upon the heart?
DOCTOR: Therein the patient
Must minister to himself.
Unfortunately, accomplishing that is a bit above my pay grade. But at least a Mets site that I saw today (while struggling with the start-up to a new section of my U.S. international tax book-in-progress) offered two appropriate photos, one capturing my sense of the Mets front office and the other of the team itself.
Queue here the Macbeth quote:
MACBETH: Canst thou not minister to a mind diseas'd;
Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow;
Raze out the written troubles of the brain;
And with some sweet oblivious antidote,
Cleanse the stuff'd bosom of that perilous stuff
Which weighs upon the heart?
DOCTOR: Therein the patient
Must minister to himself.
Unfortunately, accomplishing that is a bit above my pay grade. But at least a Mets site that I saw today (while struggling with the start-up to a new section of my U.S. international tax book-in-progress) offered two appropriate photos, one capturing my sense of the Mets front office and the other of the team itself.
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