Anyway, here is an approximate reconstruction of my comments:
Assigning me to
comment on this paper is a great example of the NTA at either its best or its worst. That’s for all of you to judge, depending on
how much value you think I add.
Reflecting the
NTA’s interdisciplinary aspirations, we have here a lawyer – that would be me –
commenting on an economics paper that is full of math, including numerous
propositions and proofs. In the words of
Martin Short, playing a Hollywood agent in a movie called The Big Picture with respect to a stack of scripts that his client
was naïvely hoping he had fully evaluated, “I read almost all of them almost
all the way through.” But perhaps I can
try to add value in a different way. In
particular, I’d like to offer six quick comments in the 5 minutes that I have
available today.
First, the paper
is interesting and important because the question it examines – how optimal tax
analysis might be affected if the incidence of a personal income tax may be
shifted, such as through effects on pre-tax wage levels – clearly matters, yet
has often been ignored. But it’s a shame
that the paper is interesting and important!
Life would certainly be easier if we could simply assume away any such
effects. The paper is convincing,
however, when it argues that we cannot necessarily do this.
Two areas in which
the literature has wrestled with
income tax incidence are the taxation of saving, and corporate income
taxation. As to the first, if the
overall level of saving doesn’t respond much to the taxation of saving – which some
evidence, admittedly not entirely conclusive, suggests – then
incidence-shifting would presumably be slight.
As to the latter, the reason we need to worry about the incidence of the
corporate tax is not that it’s paid by a legal entity – pretty clearly, that
makes it a tax on the shareholders who own the residual – but rather that its
being shifted is highly plausible, especially when national-level corporate taxes
are operating within an integrated global economy.
Second, in a
sense that the paper nicely explains, incidence-shifting with respect to
high-end wages makes the tax on them what I will call “as if lower.” If pre-tax wages at the top of the income
distribution rise in response to highly graduated rates, that partly reverses
both the intended distributional effects and the tax’s dampening effect on
labor supply. So in some respects it is
as if the tax rate were lower than if there were no incidence-shifting through
wage effects.
This causes me to
entertain the intuition that perhaps the optimal rate might turn out to be
higher, rather than lower, in the presence of wage effects, so as to get back
to approximately the same place. But in
the paper’s model it comes out the other way.
This presumably is due to how things work out with respect to the lower
99 percent of the wage distribution. It
would be nice for the paper to explain more fully what gives rise to its
result, in which wage-shifting lowers, rather than raises, the optimal rate.
Third, a question
of interest is how robust the paper’s finding would be to other inputs into the
determination of optimal tax rates.
Suppose, for example, that optimal high-end rates reflect the
policymaker’s belief that extreme high-end income or wealth inequality imposes
negative distributional externalities on other in the society. It seems plausible to me that the pattern of
effect would be similar (lowering the optimal rate relative to the case of no
wage-shifting). But given my prior
comment, I suppose I shouldn’t assume that my intuitions about how the model
works are correct.
Fourth, the paper
assumes competitive high-end wage markets, while noting that a desirable extension
might be to test the consequences of changing this assumption. Clearly, this could be important, given that
there may in fact be non-competitive wage markets at the top of the
distribution. However, one challenge in
incorporating this extension is that we don’t necessarily understand how
noncompetitive wage markets actually operate.
Suppose initially that one is extracting the maximum available rent, and
that changing the high-end tax rate won’t affect this. That’s a pretty simple case to evaluate (the
optimal rate presumably should be higher than otherwise if the pre-tax wage is
fixed), but it is only one possibility.
But suppose
instead that, say, CEO salaries set by sweetheart boards of directors are more
responsive than this. Might it
conceivably go in either direction? One
scenario is that the board restores the CEO’s after-tax position by raising the
pre-tax wage. But for an opposite
scenario, consider the claim (made, for example, by Thomas Piketty) that
lowering high-end individual marginal tax rates led to higher pretax wages for
CEOs, as it was now more worthwhile playing the entire over-compensation
game. Whether one agrees with that claim
or not, it’s a real world claim about how CEO wages respond to marginal tax
rates that might actually come out predicting that the pretax wage is lower,
not higher, if the tax rate on the CEO goes up.
But my main point here is simply that we have to understand how
particular noncompetitive wage markets work in order to be confident about how
best to extend the paper’s analysis to such settings.
Fifth, the paper
assumes away special sectoral taxes in response to noncompetitive wages in
particular settings, noting that these would present both administrative and
political economy challenges. But at
least as a political economy matter, it’s unclear if setting high wages in
particular settings where the markets aren’t functioning well would be harder
or easier than raising high rates generally.
For example, you might avoid needing to fight with the entire high-wage
sector if only some of them are having their taxes raised. My point here, however, is just to note that
political economy effects can be complicated, hard to model, and can go in
various directions.
Finally, a quick
point about the earned income tax credit or EITC. As the paper notes, if it bids down pretax
wages at the bottom of the distribution, that would partly undo the intended
distributional effects of the EITC.
Depending on one’s reasons for having the EITC, this might not be all
bad. For example, suppose that reduced
pretax wages trigger expanded low-wage employment through their supply side
effects, and that this would be desirable for other reasons (e.g., building the
workforce affiliation, skills, and habits of low-wage potential workers, in
ways those individuals have not anticipated).
This might further the EITC’s aim of increasing low-wage
employment. Then again, there might be
lots of other ripple effects on wages in the low end of the distribution that
one would want to think about. (For
example, suppose it also drove down other low-end wages.)
Again, my point
here is simply that the paper’s unavoidable embrace of new areas of
complication points the way to yet more complications that we may want to try
to add to the analysis.
In sum, this is a
good paper that should stimulate extensions and further thought.
No comments:
Post a Comment