Just as a matter of topic, not all of the L & E papers interest me, and the same of course is true in the other direction as well, but there are cases running both ways in which the organizers of one would have liked to attend the other.
Good example next Tuesday, when we will have a very interesting paper on the optimal taxation of housing consumption by David Albouy. Meanwhile, the Law & Economics Colloquium will have a paper by Rob Daines (formerly NYU, now Stanford) on options and executive compensation.
Here's the abstract:
"In the wake of the backdating scandal, many firms began awarding options at scheduled times each year. Scheduling option grants eliminates backdating, but creates other agency problems. CEOs that know the dates of upcoming scheduled option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock prices before the grant dates to obtain options with lower strike prices. We provide evidence that in recent years some CEOs manipulate stock prices to increase option compensation. We document negative abnormal returns before scheduled option grants and positive abnormal returns after the grants. These returns are explained by measures of a CEO's incentive and ability to influence stock price. We document several mechanisms CEOs use to lower the strike price, including changing the substance and timing of the firm’s disclosures."
Nice stuff, huh? I am glad these CEOs are working so hard; it's just too bad for whom they're working.