Matt Yglesias, in a
generally excellent column about the sorts of federal income tax changes that the
Administration and Republican Congressional leadership may seek in the next
couple of months, rightly notes that tax reform, in common usage, means “reducing tax rates without massively reducing federal tax revenue
because the losses from the rate cuts are offset by closing loopholes and
eliminating or curbing deductions.” He
also rightly notes that the Republicans are unlikely actually to attempt this,
since base-broadening sufficient to offset the revenue loss is no fun
politically. He then asks why, on policy
grounds, one might favor bona fide tax reform:
“What’s good about
tax reform?
“The official wonky case for tax reform stems
from a divergence in the way that a normal person thinks about taxes from the
way that an economist [does] ....
“To a normal person, taxes are a necessary
evil. The evil thing about them is that after you pay taxes you have less money
than you had before. Most people like money, so they like the idea of getting a
tax cut, and they don’t like the idea of getting a tax hike, primarily because
they are focused on the impact of tax changes on their after-tax income. If
Congress changed the law to cut my taxes by $500, I’d be pretty happy about
that. And I wouldn’t care whether they did that by tweaking the individual
exemption, tweaking the dependent exemption for my 2-year-old, making his
preschool tuition tax-deductible, or cutting my marginal income tax rate. At
the end of the day, the point would be to get the $500.
“But from a supply-side viewpoint, these are
very different policies. Making the individual exemption a little bit bigger
puts $500 in my pocket but it doesn’t give me any new incentives to work harder
and earn more money. If anything, by making me a little more economically
comfortable it reduces my
incentive to work harder and earn more money. By contrast, cutting my marginal
income tax rate doesn’t just put $500 in my pocket. It makes it more worth my while to try to go
out and hustle up some paid speaking appearances or otherwise find ways to earn
a bit more.
“Tax reform is good, on this view, because it’s
a way to greatly improve incentives without costing the government much in the
way of revenue. The 1986 tax reform bill, for example, eliminated enough
loopholes to pay for a cut in the top marginal income tax rate from 50 percent
all the way down to 33 percent — drastically increasing the incentive of rich
people to go out and try to become even richer.”
In the above text, Yglesias offers a generally useful
explanation. However, he may overstate (or, at least, slightly misstate) the main
character of the economist’s case for tax reform. To show this, let’s make two tweaks to his
illustration. First, let’s suppose that
I’d get $500 via Congress’s newly making preschool tuition tax-deductible,
rather than by its either (a) raising personal or dependent exemptions or (b)
lowering marginal tax rates. Second, let’s
suppose that I would decide to work and earn more if I were sending my child to
a costly preschool than if I were keeping the child at home.
Now, with the tax treatment of preschool
tuition tax being an input to my labor supply choice, it lines up more the marginal
tax rate change, and less with changing the individual and/or dependent
exemption. So, if we already had preschool tuition tax-deductibility as a
feature of current tax law, and we were thinking of repealing it to fund a
lower marginal tax rate, the “tax reform” might end up, at a first
approximation, not increasing my incentive to earn. E.g., suppose that, when I was
thinking of working more so I could send my child to preschool, the combination
of (a) an increased after-tax return from my work and (b) an increased
after-tax cost to the preschool, left me in the same place as I was before.
To make this a more plausible revision of the hypothetical,
suppose that both decisions are scalable. E.g., I can work just a little bit
more or a lot more; I can send my child to a cheaper preschool or a more expensive
one. The bottom line may still be a lot less change than might otherwise have
been expected to my labor supply incentives. I work to earn money to spend on
things I want, and the base-broadening makes it costlier than it was before to
buy the things I happen to most want.
Why point this out? In the 1986 tax reform, at
least some studies found afterwards that work incentives hadn’t really changed
much, by reason of the base-broadening. E.g., suppose I previously hadn’t
minded the 50% top rate because tax shelters would prevent me from actually
having to pay it. Now the rate was lower but the tax shelters were gone, so I would
actually have to pay the headline rate. This may have been a good policy change
for other reasons that I’ll get to in a moment. But it could mean that my
incentive to earn more $$ wouldn’t actually have increased.
Now let’s turn to contemporary thought
experiments in which, say, state and local tax deductions, home mortgage
interest deductions, and/or 401(k) deductions are repealed to fund lower
rates. (In the 401(k) example, even if
the current deduction is replaced by a future exclusion that’s slated to apply when
I withdraw the money, suppose that I’m either myopic or else don’t trust future
Congresses to retain the exclusion.) If I’m paying about as much tax on balance
as I was before, it’s plausible, depending on the details and on my level of understanding,
that my view of my after-tax incentive to work will also remain about where it
was before, given the changes to the tax treatment of some of my earnings’
possible uses.
With that in mind, let’s re-ask Yglesias’s
question: “What’s good about tax reform?” The answer, if any, is that, even if
we haven’t substantially changed my incentive to work and earn, we have done so
with respect to how I spend my earnings.
In terms of the 1986 example, it’s presumably
good that I’m no longer investing in tax shelters (assuming that their tax
benefits were socially undesirable), since I will now seek opportunities that
offer greater expected pretax profitability. But it’s my inter-asset choices
that are now less tax-distorted than previously, rather than my incentive to
work and earn.
Likewise, for the 2017 scenario, suppose we see
no relevant social difference between my spending my $$ on (a) preschool
tuition or (b) fancy vacations. Then eliminating the distortion to my choice
that resulted from the hypothetical tuition deduction is a good thing here,
albeit by express stipulation. But if we don’t
think the deduction was bad, e.g., because we see positive externalities to
people’s sending their kids to preschool instead of spending the $$ on own
consumption, then so much the worse for the case for “tax reform” here.
I myself tend to like the inter-asset
efficiency consequences of a revenue-neutral tax rate cut plus reduction to the
home mortgage interest deduction. But that’s because I don’t like the deduction,
or more precisely what I take to be its main effects. The state and local tax
deduction example is potentially quite different. So is the 401(k) deduction
repeal, although there we would need to specify a lot more about what people
expect, how they make savings choices, how we should think about socially
optimal savings choices, etcetera.
Returning to Yglesias’s main point about tax
reform, we’ve now both (a) made the economist’s argument wonkier still – by relating
it to distortions in asset or activity or consumption choice, rather than to
labor supply as such, and (b) shown that it needs to be evaluated case-by-case,
in terms of the arguments for a particular tax benefit that would be eliminated
to pay for tax reform.
Of course, as I agreed with Yglesias at the
start, the Republicans appear unlikely to attempt bona fide “tax reform” (with
significant base-broadening) anyway. But just in case anyone should ever
attempt it in the future, I hope it’s useful to clarify the nature of the main
argument for it.