Yesterday at the Law and Economics Colloquium at University of Virginia Law School, I presented the article on Piketty, coauthored with Joe Bankman, that we earlier had presented at the NYU-UCLA Symposium. This time around, as a solo act, I revised the slides, which you can see here, and talked extemporaneously rather than having prepared remarks like those which I had previously posted here.
On Slide 3, standing at the far right, you can see the alter ego or stand-in for Joe and myself, as we thought of it when writing the paper.
Friday, October 17, 2014
Tax Notes article on the Boston College conference on reforming entity taxation
In my
last post, I linked to Amy Elliott's Tax Notes article from this past Monday,
entitled "Academics Dismiss Corporate Tax Reform Consensus as
Superficial." But for some readers it may behind a paywall. So
here are the parts most pertinent to the topic highlighted in the article
title:
"Bipartisan talk of corporate tax reform is easy to come by
in the halls of Congress, but it's merely talk, agreed a group of academics
gathered in Newton, Massachusetts, on October 10.
"'The big consensus about corporate tax reform is
really a superficial consensus,' said Daniel N. Shaviro of the New York
University School of Law, speaking at a conference on entity taxation hosted by
Boston College Law School and cosponsored by Tax Analysts. 'There's no
obviously good way of doing it and that means that any proposal you put forth,
. . . even if it would be an improvement, is going to have serious
objections.'
"Harvard Law School professor Stephen E. Shay indicated he
has lost hope for major tax reform in the near term. 'I don't view
fundamental tax reform or any major piece of reform as remotely plausible for
the next couple of years -- at least until some event-changing election,'
he said. 'Any tax reform has to win a majority. The practical problem that
we face today is we have -- unlike in [1986] -- a vastly more disparate set of
objectives with respect to tax.'
"Shay added that the consensus that really needs to be built
is between House and Senate Republicans. The party that controls the Senate
'is actually much less important for this issue than some people put
credence on,' he said, adding that Congress is still struggling with the
core structural problem presented by corporate tax reform: how to ameliorate
its negative effect on owners of passthroughs.
….
"Brian
Galle of Boston College Law School said he's not convinced that the passthrough
model is the right way to tax corporate income. He said he thinks the U.S. tax
system should increase the number of available rate structures and the nuance
within those structures, providing for different rates for different kinds of
business income.
"'The
elasticity of salary can be very different from the elasticity of business
income, [and] within business income, you can have very different elasticities
between old-and-cold businesses,' entrepreneurial businesses, domestic
versus foreign-owned businesses, and real-property-heavy businesses, Galle
said.
A couple of quick comments in response to Galle's interesting points, which I didn't get a chance to say anything about at the session. His first point about the elasticities of different types of income I agree with, except that it doesn't necessarily weigh against thinking that the passthrough model would be best if (counterfactually) it were feasible. Rather, to me it suggests that, even when you are taxing individuals directly, the tax rate you want to apply may depend both on who it is and on what type of income it is.
His second point is a great one, and I think especially applicable to international taxation, in which the multinationals that have greatly reduced their tax burdens through aggressive planning might now be happy to lock in the end result by a different mechanism. There is a legitimate issue of whether and how much their tax burdens, depending in part on elasticity, U.S. market power (or ability to coordinate effectively with other countries if this increases the collective market power that the cooperating governments can deploy). But the fact that they have succeeded in lowering it so much does not establish that the right level is so low. This is a problem for proponents of "burden-neutral" international tax reform, as much as for Congress if it wants to put on a 1986-style tax reform hat for the international area in particular.
Wednesday, October 15, 2014
Odds and ends
Today I head to Charlottesville, in order to present (tomorrow) the article on Piketty's Capital in the 21st Century that I recently coauthored with Joe Bankman, at the U Va Law School's law and economics seminar. Joe and l will probably post the article on SSRN soon. Later this week, when I'm back in NYC, I'll post my slides for the talk.
Bill Gates - yes, him - has posted a short piece responding to Piketty that, whether one agrees with it or not, is actually interesting and worth reading. I may respond to it briefly on this blog when I get the chance.
Also,. Tax Notes published a short piece on Monday describing the conference at Boston College that I attended, addressing tax reform and entity taxation. The piece's title, "Academics Dismiss Corporate Tax Reform Consensus as Superficial," accurately conveys not the point of view in my paper but what appeared to me to be a broader consensus in the room. More on that to come, shortly as well.
Bill Gates - yes, him - has posted a short piece responding to Piketty that, whether one agrees with it or not, is actually interesting and worth reading. I may respond to it briefly on this blog when I get the chance.
Also,. Tax Notes published a short piece on Monday describing the conference at Boston College that I attended, addressing tax reform and entity taxation. The piece's title, "Academics Dismiss Corporate Tax Reform Consensus as Superficial," accurately conveys not the point of view in my paper but what appeared to me to be a broader consensus in the room. More on that to come, shortly as well.
Monday, October 13, 2014
Slides for my talk at the Boston College - Tax Analysts Conference on Reforming Entity Taxation
Last Friday, at the conference in Boston that I mentioned in my prior post, I presented a short (just under 10,000 words) paper entitled "Not So Fast? Evaluating the Case for 1986-Style Corporate Tax Reform."
Along with other papers from the conference, it should be appearing in Tax Notes within the next few weeks. But you can click here to view a PDF version of the slides I used in presenting the paper.
Along with other papers from the conference, it should be appearing in Tax Notes within the next few weeks. But you can click here to view a PDF version of the slides I used in presenting the paper.
Saturday, October 11, 2014
Frontiers of quasi-tax fraud
Pleasant day at the Boston College - Tax Analysts conference yesterday; I'll post the slides from my talk in a couple of days, and perhaps post the paper on SSRN not long after that. One nice thing about the "biz" is that you keep periodically seeing old friends and making new ones on the talks & conference circuit.
The conference had 3 sections. The first, at which I spoke, was on corporate tax reform. My paper expresses great skepticism about (though a hair short of outright opposition to) the mania among DC policymaker types these days for 1986-style corporate tax reform, via a cut in the rates that's financed by broadening the base but without otherwise significantly changing the existing US federal income tax system. Although nothing like this view appears to be heard within the DC policymaker echo chambers, plenty of people at the conference were quite inclined to take a similar view. It would be nice to think that I talked them into it, but in fact I got the sense that they already felt similarly about it.
The second session was on partnership taxation, and the third on international taxation. Because I am so much more familiar with the latter, I found the former more eye-opening.
Talks and papers by Karen Burke, Andrea Monroe, and Greg Polsky suggested something that I gather is well-known in partnership tax circles, and that I must admit to finding a bit shocking. Because (a) partnership tax rules are so complex that only a handful of people really understand them - perhaps a thousand across the entire country? - and (b) people at the IRS generally don't understand them, and (c) the audit rate for partnership tax returns is below 1%, compliance with partnership tax rules that are meant to block abusive tax planning that contradicts the actual tenor of the rules has pretty much completely collapsed. Wildly unsupportable tax return positions, backed by the issuance of dishonest tax opinions or no tax opinions, are taken routinely, costing the US government billions of dollars per year. These mainly involve (a) claiming capital gains treatment for what is clearly ordinary income under the existing rules (even taking as given the capital gains character of certain "carried interests" under existing law, (b) trumping up and specially allocating losses, without regard to economic substance type rules regarding transactions and allocations, and (c) similar game-playing to avoid income or gain recognition and/or assign it to the wrong people, including tax-indifferent parties.
The basic problem is that you have esoteric, complicated rules, understood by few and verging on never being audited, so that the lack of transparency means one can give dishonest and clearly false opinions that meet the standard of a "reporting position." This is all taxpayers need if they are not publicly traded companies (which may need to meet "more likely than not" for accounting reasons). And if you are a partnership expert, even if you understand the dishonesty of the opinions you are writing and signing, (a) there's no risk, (b) you wreck your career if you won't write these opinions and get large billings if you do, (c) everyone else is doing it, (d) the IRS isn't enforcing the rules anyway, so maybe you can persuade yourself that the rules don't actually mean what they clearly say?, and (e) even though the positions you endorse, at least to the "reporting position" level, are clearly wrong, they are not so wrong that you'd go to jail for tax fraud if it came to light.
Someone compared this to the Son-of-BOSS style scam tax shelter opinions of 10+ years ago, and said this means not much has really changed, despite people's congratulating themselves that the abusive tax shelter era is over. So why couldn't people go to jail for this, as they did in Son-of-BOSS? The answer is that, in Son-of-BOSS, they went to jail for fraudulently backdating documents, providing false information to the IRS, etc. They didn't go to jail for the opinions themselves, which were ludicrously erroneous (I have read some, and even critiqued them as an expert witness in an administrative proceeding), because bad though the opinions were the author could pretend to just be stupid, wrong-headed, or dense - they weren't quite wrong enough to lead to a jail term, even if wrong enough (as many courts found) to suggest that clients could not in good faith rely on them.
This is certainly an area where a lot can be done. And one of the panelists suggested that, whereas the IRS typically makes $10 in underpaid taxes per $1 spent on audits, here the yield would be far higher. But it would take IRS resources, and might also risk complaint from members of Congress on behalf of well-connected taxpayers who have benefited from the quasi-fraud.
The conference had 3 sections. The first, at which I spoke, was on corporate tax reform. My paper expresses great skepticism about (though a hair short of outright opposition to) the mania among DC policymaker types these days for 1986-style corporate tax reform, via a cut in the rates that's financed by broadening the base but without otherwise significantly changing the existing US federal income tax system. Although nothing like this view appears to be heard within the DC policymaker echo chambers, plenty of people at the conference were quite inclined to take a similar view. It would be nice to think that I talked them into it, but in fact I got the sense that they already felt similarly about it.
The second session was on partnership taxation, and the third on international taxation. Because I am so much more familiar with the latter, I found the former more eye-opening.
Talks and papers by Karen Burke, Andrea Monroe, and Greg Polsky suggested something that I gather is well-known in partnership tax circles, and that I must admit to finding a bit shocking. Because (a) partnership tax rules are so complex that only a handful of people really understand them - perhaps a thousand across the entire country? - and (b) people at the IRS generally don't understand them, and (c) the audit rate for partnership tax returns is below 1%, compliance with partnership tax rules that are meant to block abusive tax planning that contradicts the actual tenor of the rules has pretty much completely collapsed. Wildly unsupportable tax return positions, backed by the issuance of dishonest tax opinions or no tax opinions, are taken routinely, costing the US government billions of dollars per year. These mainly involve (a) claiming capital gains treatment for what is clearly ordinary income under the existing rules (even taking as given the capital gains character of certain "carried interests" under existing law, (b) trumping up and specially allocating losses, without regard to economic substance type rules regarding transactions and allocations, and (c) similar game-playing to avoid income or gain recognition and/or assign it to the wrong people, including tax-indifferent parties.
The basic problem is that you have esoteric, complicated rules, understood by few and verging on never being audited, so that the lack of transparency means one can give dishonest and clearly false opinions that meet the standard of a "reporting position." This is all taxpayers need if they are not publicly traded companies (which may need to meet "more likely than not" for accounting reasons). And if you are a partnership expert, even if you understand the dishonesty of the opinions you are writing and signing, (a) there's no risk, (b) you wreck your career if you won't write these opinions and get large billings if you do, (c) everyone else is doing it, (d) the IRS isn't enforcing the rules anyway, so maybe you can persuade yourself that the rules don't actually mean what they clearly say?, and (e) even though the positions you endorse, at least to the "reporting position" level, are clearly wrong, they are not so wrong that you'd go to jail for tax fraud if it came to light.
Someone compared this to the Son-of-BOSS style scam tax shelter opinions of 10+ years ago, and said this means not much has really changed, despite people's congratulating themselves that the abusive tax shelter era is over. So why couldn't people go to jail for this, as they did in Son-of-BOSS? The answer is that, in Son-of-BOSS, they went to jail for fraudulently backdating documents, providing false information to the IRS, etc. They didn't go to jail for the opinions themselves, which were ludicrously erroneous (I have read some, and even critiqued them as an expert witness in an administrative proceeding), because bad though the opinions were the author could pretend to just be stupid, wrong-headed, or dense - they weren't quite wrong enough to lead to a jail term, even if wrong enough (as many courts found) to suggest that clients could not in good faith rely on them.
This is certainly an area where a lot can be done. And one of the panelists suggested that, whereas the IRS typically makes $10 in underpaid taxes per $1 spent on audits, here the yield would be far higher. But it would take IRS resources, and might also risk complaint from members of Congress on behalf of well-connected taxpayers who have benefited from the quasi-fraud.
Thursday, October 09, 2014
Another week, another conference
Later today I am flying to Boston to participate in a Boston College Law School - Tax Analysts conference (to be held tomorrow) on reforming entity taxation. I will present a short (about 9,000 words) paper entitled "Not So Fast? Evaluating the Case for 1986-Style Corporate Tax Reform," in which I argue that, essentially because the corporate tax is such a multifaceted mess, it's not incredibly clear how much we would improve things via the apparent consensus package in which the corporate rate would be lowered, and the revenue cost offset through income tax-style base-broadening, without significant broader tax reform.
I have slides for the talk that I will probably post early next week. My article, along with all the rest for the conference, should be appearing in Tax Notes, perhaps some time in November. I will also post the article on SSRN pre-publication, absent any objection from the conference organizers and Tax Analysts folks.
Next week I go to the University of Virginia Law School to present my paper (coauthored with Joe Bankman) responding to Piketty. I'll post the slides afterwards - they and my remarks are different than those for the conference we just had at NYU Law School, although the paper is the same.
I'll also be presenting the Piketty paper in Vancouver at the end of October and again at USC in late November, and my paper on behavioral economics and retirement saving at the National Tax Association conference in Santa Fe in mid-November.
I have slides for the talk that I will probably post early next week. My article, along with all the rest for the conference, should be appearing in Tax Notes, perhaps some time in November. I will also post the article on SSRN pre-publication, absent any objection from the conference organizers and Tax Analysts folks.
Next week I go to the University of Virginia Law School to present my paper (coauthored with Joe Bankman) responding to Piketty. I'll post the slides afterwards - they and my remarks are different than those for the conference we just had at NYU Law School, although the paper is the same.
I'll also be presenting the Piketty paper in Vancouver at the end of October and again at USC in late November, and my paper on behavioral economics and retirement saving at the National Tax Association conference in Santa Fe in mid-November.
Wednesday, October 08, 2014
Article and video for last week's Piketty symposium at NYU
The NYU Law School website now has an article here describing last week's Piketty symposium.
It also contains video of all of the sessions. Scroll about three-quarters of the way down, and you can find the video for the talk that Joe Bankman and I gave. Piketty's response to Wojciech Kopszuk and us is right below.
A couple of quotes from the article:
Stanford’s Joseph Bankman and NYU’s Daniel Shaviro were the day’s oxymoron: a comedic duo of welfarist tax scholars. But they were serious about their topic, praising Piketty’s critique of the undue moralizing of “ability” as an explanation for high-end wealth concentration and exploring the constitutionality of a national wealth tax in the United States. (Piketty’s response to the latter: “I realize that this is unconstitutional, but constitutions have been changed throughout history. That shouldn’t be the end of the discussion.”)
Later on Piketty is quoted, from a post-event interview with the article's writer, saying the following:
“By and large, the problem you run into when economists or law professors study inequality is that they’ve benefited from rising inequality. They’re not in the top 1 percent, but they’re surely in the top 2 or 3 percent. I’m not going to say that determines their entire view, but you can’t say it has no impact. That makes them generally positive about the US economy, how it rewards talent, and what they think of wages.”
Now now, not very nice of him, eh? Actually, it's fine. Indeed, I very much agree with what he says here, and so indicated in my talk. Joe and I also make a similar point in our article.
UPDATE: Having watched the video of my remarks (listed under "Bankman," but I go first), I can only say: my gawd but I talk fast. It's kind of different when you're doing it, rather than watching it. But I think it can be followed aurally, and it's reasonably coherent because I wrote it out in advance.
It also contains video of all of the sessions. Scroll about three-quarters of the way down, and you can find the video for the talk that Joe Bankman and I gave. Piketty's response to Wojciech Kopszuk and us is right below.
A couple of quotes from the article:
Stanford’s Joseph Bankman and NYU’s Daniel Shaviro were the day’s oxymoron: a comedic duo of welfarist tax scholars. But they were serious about their topic, praising Piketty’s critique of the undue moralizing of “ability” as an explanation for high-end wealth concentration and exploring the constitutionality of a national wealth tax in the United States. (Piketty’s response to the latter: “I realize that this is unconstitutional, but constitutions have been changed throughout history. That shouldn’t be the end of the discussion.”)
Later on Piketty is quoted, from a post-event interview with the article's writer, saying the following:
“By and large, the problem you run into when economists or law professors study inequality is that they’ve benefited from rising inequality. They’re not in the top 1 percent, but they’re surely in the top 2 or 3 percent. I’m not going to say that determines their entire view, but you can’t say it has no impact. That makes them generally positive about the US economy, how it rewards talent, and what they think of wages.”
Now now, not very nice of him, eh? Actually, it's fine. Indeed, I very much agree with what he says here, and so indicated in my talk. Joe and I also make a similar point in our article.
UPDATE: Having watched the video of my remarks (listed under "Bankman," but I go first), I can only say: my gawd but I talk fast. It's kind of different when you're doing it, rather than watching it. But I think it can be followed aurally, and it's reasonably coherent because I wrote it out in advance.
Friday, October 03, 2014
Piketty's response to the Bankman-Shaviro paper
Points that he made in his comments included the following:
--While Bankman and I discuss the seeming gap between the book's approach and that of tax policy literatures such as optimal income taxation, his 2013 article, co-authored with Emmanuel Saez, addresses optimal capital taxation in light of the inequality issues. But he sees only so much value in these sorts of mathematical workings out of underlying objectives.
--He sees a wealth tax as not a very radical idea given the widespread use, including by U.S. state and local governments, of real property taxes. He doesn't see those taxes as meaningfully related to local amenities. A real property tax becomes a wealth tax if you broaden it to all property and make it a tax on net rather than gross wealth. But he seemed to agree that, given these differences, existing real property taxes are a very different instrument than wealth taxes.
--He favors moderate use of lots of different tax instruments, rather than primary reliance on just one. E.g., given the shortcomings in practice of capital income taxes, inheritance taxes, and wealth taxes, why not have some of each rather than just one. (David Gamage, who gave an NYU Tax Policy Colloquium paper this past year taking such a stance will no doubt be pleased to hear this.)
--As effectively a Rawlsian, his main normative concern is with the worst-off individuals, so he might not greatly object to extreme high-end inequality per se, except for its leading to capture of the political system by the wealthy, with the result that popular control is undermined and policy just serves their interests.
My remarks at the Piketty symposium today
This is a hard paper to present. I’m tempted to say: Why don’t you all just
spend 20 minutes looking through it yourself, and then we’d be happy to take
questions. But instead Joe [Bankman] and I will
offer a few highlights.
The paper’s motivation is that we were struck by the large
intellectual gap between Capital in the
21st Century and a bunch of literatures that influence our work
– for example, those on optimal income taxation, fundamental tax reform, and a
lot of mainstream public economics. Obviously,
Thomas knows this literature well. But he
has written a popular book, and one that’s engaged in a very different sort of
project than most of the literature.
Plus, he objects to certain of the literature’s standards and practices.
We were both bothered and stimulated by the disconnect. We aim to adjudicate it to a degree, and to examine
how each undermines or enriches the other. But this makes the paper hard to present. Just discussing any one aspect among many –
say, the theory of lifecycle saving, or “ability” in the optimal income tax
literature – could take 20 minutes all by itself.
So, what’s the bottom line?
Let’s start with the tax policy literature. Logically and analytically, it does fine, at
least granting assumptions that are useful and reasonable within particular
realms. And that’s important.
You know the old joke, told about Ford’s Theater in April
1865. “Other than that, Mrs. Lincoln,
how did you like the play?” Well, I for
one actually care a lot about the play.
But the book suggests that often important things have been
missed, and simplifying assumptions treated as if they were entirely true. For example, if you over-focus on lifecycle
saving relative to bequests, or if you model utility as purely a function of
own consumption – leaving declining marginal utility as the only welfare-based
motivation for concern about inequality – then you may miss important things.
And suppose the book is correct in attributing rising high-end
inequality mainly to the excess of r
over g. If it’s correct, high saving and/or high
returns to saving and/or bequests have negative distributional externalities
that are important yet have been ignored.
Word choice can tell you a lot. Consider the terms “saving” as compared to “capital.” The tax policy literature tends to talk about
“saving,” which is a verbal noun, denoting the aftermath of a choice. It uses “capital” mainly as an adjective – as
in capital income, capital asset, or capital gains, though with the all-too-telling
exception of “human capital.” Thomas’
book, of course, is about “capital,” specifically other than human capital,
which he objects to amalgamating with the rest.
And the book treats capital not just as a thing, but also as the marker
for a social group, as in “capital versus labor.” In the tax policy literature, by contrast, we
typically discuss “high-earners versus low-earners.”
The savings literature is fundamentally ex ante and about
individuals’ preferences and decisions.
Such a perspective is important, but it can lead to missing the forest
for the trees, and also to unconscious normative identification with savers’
particular interests. This is not a
surprise, perhaps – prominent academics are often pretty well-heeled, even if
not all the way at the top.
Capital in the 21st
Century, by contrast, is fundamentally ex post, emphasizing the measurement
of realized outcomes. But risk, among
other underlying components, is hiding behind the scenes. Thus, while the years 1815 to 1900 were a lot
better for capital than 1914 to 1970, who knows how it would turn out in the
“What If?” scenario where you could turn back the clock and let history unfold
again.
An ex post approach is also valuable, but can result in
amalgamating things that are distinct, and in ignoring important nuances that
are relevant to choices between policy instruments. Consider the tax policy literature’s decomposition
of r into multiple elements, including
the “normal” risk-free return that surely is below g, even if it’s more than, say, the 3-month rate for U.S.
government bonds. There’s also the risk
element, including both the expected risk premium, if any, and the actual risky
outcome.
Ex ante risk can affect tax incidence, since investors can
adjust it in light of the tax regime. In
particular, the impact of a capital income tax on risk can be addressed by choosing
investment positions in light of the tax treatment of gains and losses. In effect, you can undo at least some of the
automatic insurance that results from taxing winners more than losers.
Now consider the tax policy literature on gifts. Henry Simons famously endorsed double-taxing them,
based on their commonly representing consumption by both the donor and the
donee. The logic is strong, in terms of
measuring individual welfare, whether or not you accept the conclusion. Louis Kaplow helps explain why we might want
to subsidize gifts, relative to Simons’ baseline, given the altruistic
externality when a donor makes double consumption possible. But you may want a high tax on gifts and
bequests if they have big negative distributional externalities, and if you don’t
assign much weight to high-end altruistic externalities.
I realize I’m being very summary and cursory here,
especially for the students in the audience.
But again, the paper offers a fuller discussion.
One last set of points before I pass the baton to Joe. At least in the U.S., as the book agrees, the
main driver of rising high-end inequality in recent years has not been the relationship between r and g. Instead, it has been rising
wage inequality, suggesting a central role for human capital, or what we call “ability”
with deliberate scare quotes.
Now, even in the 19th Century literature that the
book so delightfully deploys, we see evidence of ability’s important role. Is Pere
Goriot about a rentier society?
Well, certainly yes to a degree.
But it’s also one of many classic 19th century novels that focuses
on an adventurer or arriviste who aims at the highest social heights despite
starting out with very little. Yes,
Rastignac accepts Vautrin’s advice against wasting his time with law studies –
you see, law firm hiring was really
bad back then – but that’s just because the real action was in the salons and
opera houses.
I wish I could discuss at length our paper’s twentieth
century updating of the rentiers versus adventurers literature to include P.G.
Wodehouse and Bertie Wooster. Bertie, of
course, is the rentier par excellence, turned object of mockery, from the
period of the Great Easing. Surely his tribulations
are more evocative than any economic study in showing what had and hadn’t happened
to rentiers since the turn of the century.
But I suppose I should move on.
We like the book’s critique of self-satisfied moralizing
about “ability.” High-earners often like
to think that it means IQ or character or honest toil or helping humanity. But the ability to generate high earnings is
purely about the relationship between a given individual and the environment in
which she happens to find herself. If enough
of the people in a society are vicious racists, then having white skin may
increase one’s potential earnings. Math
skills help more in some environments, resistance to dysentery in others.
There’s an analogy to evolution. No set of genes is fit in the abstract – it
depends on the environment. And to moralize
evolution’s winners would be silly. Now,
it’s true that economic competition with perfect markets and the invisible hand
is somewhat more benign than nature red in tooth and claw. But that merely supports an efficiency
argument against too much downward redistribution. And even that argument depends on the relationship
between high-end wages and marginal social productivity.
We agree with Thomas that high-end wages often don’t reflect
marginal social productivity. But while
the book attributes this mainly to corporate governance problems, the really
huge salaries of recent years have often been earned at arm’s length – whether
we’re talking about hedge fund managers, or other entrepreneurial free agents
in the financial sector, or the founders of a wildly successful new business
venture. The gap between high-end wages and
social value created is often less about corporate governance problems than
about the distinction between marginal private
productivity and marginal social productivity, as in the case of rent-seeking and
heads-we-win, tails-you-lose bets in the financial sector.
Okay, over to Joe.
Day-long workshop with Thomas Piketty at NYU
Just an hour ago here at NYU, we completed this year's NYU-UCLA tax policy symposium, featuring
Thomas Piketty and his best-selling book Capital in the Twenty-First Century. It felt like a success, in keeping with our high
expectations.
All five of the
papers, and a response by Piketty, will be featured in the Tax Law Review next
year. The first, by Wojciech Kopczuk,
raised issues that have been prominent in economists’ responses to Piketty, regarding such issues as the uncertainty of whether wealth inequality has
increased as much as income inequality and the difficulty of projecting future
trends.
My paper, with
Joe Bankman, discussed what we see as the gap between the standard tax policy literature
(ranging from optimal income taxation, to welfare economics, to the fundamental
tax literature, to various sectors of public economics) and the analysis in the
book, and what light this gap might shed on each. I will post my portion of our joint talk
shortly, since I wrote it out in advance.
Next came a paper
by Gregory Davis, discussing English data from as far back as the 1200s (!) that seem to conflict with the inheritance story that Piketty tells. Then, a political science paper by Suzanne
Mettler discussing why the U.S. political system has responded so disparately
over time to redistributive policy aims.
Last, a paper by Liam Murphy discussing alternative philosophical
grounds for objecting (or not) to high-end inequality, and grouping Piketty
with Rawls and Dworkin, the latter for his embrace of meritocracy to the
extent of thinking that people who freely choose well “deserve” to do better
than those who freely choose poorly. (Hence a view of rentiers as less deserving than the self-made rich, a distinction that I wouldn't personally embrace absent consequentialist reasons for the distinction.)
Large and
distinguished audience even in the afternoon, broad-based participation, full engagement from a very well-known author who chose to spend the day with us, truly
inter-disciplinary dialogue. So the thing went well.
Tuesday, September 30, 2014
Three interesting but totally different articles in today's Times
An article on the decision not to bail out Lehman Brothers (suggesting that it was in some ways arbitrary, ill-thought-out, deceptively presented, and quite political) builds on recent pieces discussing AIG et al (with no haircut whatsoever for Goldman Sachs) that bring to mind the dual nature of the 2008 rescues. On the one hand, the Fed's interventions were necessary to prevent true global macroeconomic calamity, well beyond the plenty-bad-enough consequences that we nonetheless experienced, and yet they were politically attacked in a way that could make doing the right thing harder in the future. (Then again, perhaps the political costs of rescue do help to ease, if only slightly, the moral hazard problems caused by knowing that one is too big or central to fail.) But on the other hand, they reinforce my sense that in some ways the rescuers' choices really can't withstand much scrutiny, given how they arbitrarily played favorites and reflected the undue political influence of players such as Goldman.
On a totally separate theme, an article on the European Commission's preliminary finding that Ireland gave Apple tax advantages that amounted to illegal state aid, and may be ordered to collect billions of dollars in back taxes that the Irish government, with an eye to future freedom of action in making deals with companies, may not even want.
Finally, for comic relief, Mitt Romney keeps bringing to mind the song, "How Can I Miss You if You Won't Go Away?"
Book review for Fixing U.S. International Taxation
Christiana Panayi of the Queen Mary University in London has written a book review of my recently published book Fixing U.S. International Taxation. It should be appearing shortly in the British Tax Review. The text of the review goes something like this:
"Professor Daniel Shaviro is a well-known and widely
published professor of international taxation at New York University. As the
title suggests, in this book Shaviro advances several proposals aimed at
improving US international tax law. Broadly, his main proposal is to set the
average effective rate on foreign-source income of US multinationals somewhere
below the statutory corporate rate and above zero. He also proposes to
eliminate deferral advantages and to abolish the foreign tax credit, replacing
it with a deduction for foreign taxes.
"Shaviro’s writing is clear and highly
thought-provoking. In spite of the complexities of the issues in place, the
author manages to offer a concise and comprehensible overview of the problems
plaguing the current discourse on reform of US international tax law.
"There are six chapters in this 200 page book.
"Chapter one is an introductory chapter. Here, Shaviro
identifies the problems with the current rules of US international tax law, and
reviews the academic debate on these problems. He sets out “the core dilemmas
in international tax policy” and “the defects in prevailing modes of analysis”,
before laying down the parameters for his proposals and the main policy implications.
"All of these issues are examined in greater detail in
the following chapters.
"Chapters two and three delve into the basics of the
US international tax regime. The author focuses on what he considers to be the
main building blocks of this regime, namely the rules for determining corporate
residence, some source rules such as transfer pricing, the rules on foreign tax
credits and the rules on deferral and Subpart F. Chapter three revisits these
building blocks, but the focus is on the main incentives and tax planning
opportunities that the existing rules create and the possible impact of
marginal changes to these rules.
"Chapter four explores the global welfare perspective
on US international tax policy. The author reaches the conclusion that global
welfare analysis plays a small role, notwithstanding its normative appeal. In
fact, in Shaviro’s view, prevailing international tax practices are not greatly
influenced by global welfare considerations. In any case, the author argues
that the potential gains that are available through global cooperation are much
more limited than in the field of international trade. In this chapter, the
author goes on to reject what he calls the global “alphabet
soup” and the single-bullet approach of achieving
global welfare. The alphabet soup is a reference to the acronyms used for
capital export neutrality (CEN), capital import neutrality (CIN), national neutrality
(NN), and, more recently, capital ownership neutrality (CON), national
ownership neutrality (NON) and global portfolio neutrality (GPN). All of these
concepts are analysed at some length. Shaviro concludes that “[w]hile global welfare considerations may be
important when unilateral cooperation is sufficiently feasible, in the main
countries must and will make international tax policy choices in a largely
unilateral setting”.
"This idea, which he describes as the unilateral
national welfare perspective, is further elaborated in Chapter five, wherein
the basic elements of this perspective are analysed. Shaviro argues that foreign-sourced
income should be subject to a lower rate than is currently the case, but the
base should be broadened. Both deferral and foreign tax credits should be
eliminated.
"On the basis of these conclusions, Shaviro sets out
in Chapter six the practical steps that should be taken to improve US
international tax policy. In addition to the above proposals, Shaviro makes
further interesting suggestions. Inter alia, he argues that the concept of US
corporate residence should include companies that are incorporated abroad but
have US headquarters. He also argues for the application of formulary approach
to allocating interest expenses.
"Interestingly, though rather briefly, at the end of
this chapter, Shaviro touches on the topic of transfer pricing versus formulary
apportionment, and emphasises the importance of 'think[ing] about the proper choice
of factors' under formulary apportionment. He suggests the use of all three
traditional factors (sales, employees and assets), but would give extra weight
to the sales factor.
"This book offers an excellent analysis of the topic
and it is especially helpful to non-US tax lawyers. One of its main strengths
is that while it shows a wealth of knowledge of public finance, the writing is
plain and understandable to those not well versed with public economics. Apart from
the bold—but practical—suggestions made for reform, the book also identifies
issues that need further examination. It provides an excellent benchmark for
further research to be undertaken.
"Rather humbly, Shaviro closes the book 'with the hope
that you, at least—the current reader—have found new ideas here that will
stimulate further reflection'. Most open-minded readers will certainly do so."
Sunday, September 28, 2014
NYU-UCLA conference on Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century
The conference is this Friday, 9 am - 4 pm, alas by invitation only due to space limitations (but we might be able to fit in a few more people), at NYU Law School. Papers by Liam Murphy (philosophy), Suzanne Mettler (political science), Gregory Clark (economic history), Wojciech Kopsczuk (economics), and myself with Joe Bankman (law). Piketty to respond verbally to all papers.
Papers are or will be available to those registered for the conference, but not to be posted just yet. I am reasonably happy with Joe's and my paper, but obviously we will see how others respond.
Papers are or will be available to those registered for the conference, but not to be posted just yet. I am reasonably happy with Joe's and my paper, but obviously we will see how others respond.
Friday, September 26, 2014
A short comment on baseball
A now-mediocre player, on a now-mediocre team, gets a walk-off hit at home (apparently, his first such in 7 years) in a meaningless game. Fans go crazy. But living in the past turns sour at some point (as we Met fans well know)..
Sunday, September 21, 2014
Another long silence ...
While on sabbatical, I've been traveling again, mixed personal and work. Recent locales: Paris, Giverny, Vienna, Budapest, now Vienna again, all fantastic places in very different ways. I'll be back in NYC on Wednesday.
While away, I've noticed a disagreement about U.S. corporate inversions among 2 friends, Ed Kleinbard at USC Law School and Kim Blanchard at Weil Gotschal. Ed's views on inversions are well-known, and I generally agree with them (although his approach and mine to U.S. international tax issues certainly differ in some respects - e.g., I am more hostile to the foreign tax credit and more leery about how far we can push residence-based WW taxation of U.S. companies even in the short run).
Kim had a recent letter to Tax Notes disagreeing with Ed (who no doubt will be responding very soon). I read her piece (from afar) as suggesting that Ed views the new wave of inversions as essentially sham transactions that are purely motivated by tax avoidance, whereas clearly some of them may have significant non-tax effects that may even be sought-after and intended independently of the tax benefits. E.g., if a big U.S. company merges with a big non-U.S. company, then even if they put the latter company on top for tax reasons, and even if the tax benefits of ceasing to have a U.S. company at the very top are appealing, then the deal may be far from a pure paper-shuffling sham.
I don't think that one needs sham transactions to have the concerns about inversions that Ed has been expressing. The need to have a real and not wholly insignificant merger, in order to get the tax benefits of an inversion, does indeed provide a potential friction that can reduce the frequency of inversions relative to the scenario where it's purely a paper play, but that doesn't prevent one from having concerns about the effects on the U.S. tax base of permitting them to go forward in the face of their often having significant tax benefits that will increase their frequency.
I would tend to favor treating even economically significant inversions as triggering an automatic deemed repatriation ending deferral (at least for a significant % of foreign earnings) for the U.S. company's CFCs (even if they remain such), possibly with deferred payment that bears an interest rate for the deferral. I also think we need to find our way towards what I call more residence-neutral rules for determining the source of income earned by companies that are active in the U.S. as well as abroad, i.e., addressing the extra opportunities to strip income out of the U.S. that may arise for foreign-headed multinationals. But in the interim I'd regard inversions as a problem even when they are "real" transactions with significant non-tax effects.
While away, I've noticed a disagreement about U.S. corporate inversions among 2 friends, Ed Kleinbard at USC Law School and Kim Blanchard at Weil Gotschal. Ed's views on inversions are well-known, and I generally agree with them (although his approach and mine to U.S. international tax issues certainly differ in some respects - e.g., I am more hostile to the foreign tax credit and more leery about how far we can push residence-based WW taxation of U.S. companies even in the short run).
Kim had a recent letter to Tax Notes disagreeing with Ed (who no doubt will be responding very soon). I read her piece (from afar) as suggesting that Ed views the new wave of inversions as essentially sham transactions that are purely motivated by tax avoidance, whereas clearly some of them may have significant non-tax effects that may even be sought-after and intended independently of the tax benefits. E.g., if a big U.S. company merges with a big non-U.S. company, then even if they put the latter company on top for tax reasons, and even if the tax benefits of ceasing to have a U.S. company at the very top are appealing, then the deal may be far from a pure paper-shuffling sham.
I don't think that one needs sham transactions to have the concerns about inversions that Ed has been expressing. The need to have a real and not wholly insignificant merger, in order to get the tax benefits of an inversion, does indeed provide a potential friction that can reduce the frequency of inversions relative to the scenario where it's purely a paper play, but that doesn't prevent one from having concerns about the effects on the U.S. tax base of permitting them to go forward in the face of their often having significant tax benefits that will increase their frequency.
I would tend to favor treating even economically significant inversions as triggering an automatic deemed repatriation ending deferral (at least for a significant % of foreign earnings) for the U.S. company's CFCs (even if they remain such), possibly with deferred payment that bears an interest rate for the deferral. I also think we need to find our way towards what I call more residence-neutral rules for determining the source of income earned by companies that are active in the U.S. as well as abroad, i.e., addressing the extra opportunities to strip income out of the U.S. that may arise for foreign-headed multinationals. But in the interim I'd regard inversions as a problem even when they are "real" transactions with significant non-tax effects.
Thursday, August 28, 2014
Allergies
... are the body's version of McCarthyism. The immune system can't find enough real enemies, so it invents fake ones and makes everything worse.
Explaining August's nearly unbroken radio silence
Another month almost gone - the last in my favorite three-month stretch of the year (aka the true, as opposed to purely astronomical or even meteorological, summer) - and I have scarcely posted lately. Thus, for example, I have yet to mention here the Burger King inversion story, although over the last couple of days I have been discussing it with members of the press.
I've been traveling for much of the month, first on vacation and then, as a parent, to help deliver a rising freshman to his college in southern California. Two side benefits that I got from the latter trip were as follows.
First, I was able to fit in a trip to the Nixon Museum in Yorba Linda. As a long-time Nixon aficionado, this was a treat indeed. (I realize that no one under 50 can truly appreciate Nixon's astounding comic, dramatic, and literary greatness as a better-than-fictional character.)
Nixon's memoirs begin with the line "I was born in the house my father built." Speak of great openings, although I never tried to read the rest as I gather it falls short of his most personally revealing work, "Six Crises." But the house his father built is actually there at the library, at its original site, and I got to step inside. Also at the Nixon Library is the famous helicopter from which he did his characteristic V-for-Victory pose before boarding to fly away from the White House after he resigned. Other features include his and Pat's graves, a reconstruction of the White House East Room, and a fairly balanced review of his career. (The National Archives now runs the place, helping to account for the balance.)
Rather a melancholic site, however, especially in light of Nixon's grandiose ambitions, along with the certainty that he must have felt, even as late as March 1973, that he had fully achieved them. His ultimate disgrace not only is recounted there, but affects everything about the site. Not for him the giant Pharaonic monument that I am sure he wanted. For one thing, the money evidently wasn't there post-disgrace. Instead, it is quite modest. Presumably to help make ends meet, they have to rent out the place for weddings, real estate seminars, and the like. You don't see that sort of thing in Napoleon's Invalides.
Biggest surprise: We got there just after it opened, and the parking lot was completely full, requiring us to park in the Quaker church lot (I think it was) across the street. I had been joking all the way there about the giant lines we would face, and then was startled to see this evidently confirmed. But not so fast. It turned out that the reason for the full parking lot was a seminar offering pointers to real estate salesman.
Best comment: Standing just outside the main building during a tour, my wife and I saw a little field mouse race down a corner of the sidewalk and disappear into a small hole on the lawn. She noted that seeing a rat on the grounds would have been more appropriate still.
On to the second side benefit of the trip. It gave me a chance to read Balzac's Pere Goriot, discussed extensively by Thomas Piketty in Capital in the Twenty-First Century and to feature as well in the review that I am co-authoring with Joe Bankman for the NYU-UCLA Tax Policy Symposium on (and with) Piketty that will take place at NYU on October 3. (Side-comment: We realized that this was Yom Kippur Eve when we scheduled the event, but it was the only mutually convenient date available).
I had previously read Pere Goriot and several other works by Balzac, back in the 1970s, when it in particular had made a strong impression although I didn't entirely like it, but hadn't been through it since. Lots of boiling melodrama, long declamatory speeches, etc. "What will Paris say?" I must admit that I continue to strongly prefer two roughly contemporary French novels that I regard as similar in genre (i.e., bildungsroman featuring an upwardly mobile adventurer): Stendhal's The Red and the Black, which was published five years earlier, and Flaubert's Sentimental Education, which came out more than 30 years later. But Balzac certainly has a rude and highly theatrical gusto, and if unfashionably unjaded he is certainly plenty cynical.
In our NYU-UCLA commentary, we will be quibbling a bit with how Piketty interprets Pere Goriot as a social document. But I'll save that for later - with luck we may reach the stage of posting the full piece on SSRN within a couple of weeks or even less.
I've been traveling for much of the month, first on vacation and then, as a parent, to help deliver a rising freshman to his college in southern California. Two side benefits that I got from the latter trip were as follows.
First, I was able to fit in a trip to the Nixon Museum in Yorba Linda. As a long-time Nixon aficionado, this was a treat indeed. (I realize that no one under 50 can truly appreciate Nixon's astounding comic, dramatic, and literary greatness as a better-than-fictional character.)
Nixon's memoirs begin with the line "I was born in the house my father built." Speak of great openings, although I never tried to read the rest as I gather it falls short of his most personally revealing work, "Six Crises." But the house his father built is actually there at the library, at its original site, and I got to step inside. Also at the Nixon Library is the famous helicopter from which he did his characteristic V-for-Victory pose before boarding to fly away from the White House after he resigned. Other features include his and Pat's graves, a reconstruction of the White House East Room, and a fairly balanced review of his career. (The National Archives now runs the place, helping to account for the balance.)
Rather a melancholic site, however, especially in light of Nixon's grandiose ambitions, along with the certainty that he must have felt, even as late as March 1973, that he had fully achieved them. His ultimate disgrace not only is recounted there, but affects everything about the site. Not for him the giant Pharaonic monument that I am sure he wanted. For one thing, the money evidently wasn't there post-disgrace. Instead, it is quite modest. Presumably to help make ends meet, they have to rent out the place for weddings, real estate seminars, and the like. You don't see that sort of thing in Napoleon's Invalides.
Biggest surprise: We got there just after it opened, and the parking lot was completely full, requiring us to park in the Quaker church lot (I think it was) across the street. I had been joking all the way there about the giant lines we would face, and then was startled to see this evidently confirmed. But not so fast. It turned out that the reason for the full parking lot was a seminar offering pointers to real estate salesman.
Best comment: Standing just outside the main building during a tour, my wife and I saw a little field mouse race down a corner of the sidewalk and disappear into a small hole on the lawn. She noted that seeing a rat on the grounds would have been more appropriate still.
On to the second side benefit of the trip. It gave me a chance to read Balzac's Pere Goriot, discussed extensively by Thomas Piketty in Capital in the Twenty-First Century and to feature as well in the review that I am co-authoring with Joe Bankman for the NYU-UCLA Tax Policy Symposium on (and with) Piketty that will take place at NYU on October 3. (Side-comment: We realized that this was Yom Kippur Eve when we scheduled the event, but it was the only mutually convenient date available).
I had previously read Pere Goriot and several other works by Balzac, back in the 1970s, when it in particular had made a strong impression although I didn't entirely like it, but hadn't been through it since. Lots of boiling melodrama, long declamatory speeches, etc. "What will Paris say?" I must admit that I continue to strongly prefer two roughly contemporary French novels that I regard as similar in genre (i.e., bildungsroman featuring an upwardly mobile adventurer): Stendhal's The Red and the Black, which was published five years earlier, and Flaubert's Sentimental Education, which came out more than 30 years later. But Balzac certainly has a rude and highly theatrical gusto, and if unfashionably unjaded he is certainly plenty cynical.
In our NYU-UCLA commentary, we will be quibbling a bit with how Piketty interprets Pere Goriot as a social document. But I'll save that for later - with luck we may reach the stage of posting the full piece on SSRN within a couple of weeks or even less.
Tuesday, August 19, 2014
The Obama Administration's move towards greater unilateral executive action
Today's New York Times notes "Mr. Obama's increasingly expansive appetite for the use of unilateral action on issues including immigration, tax policy, and gay rights," which it says has "emboldened activists and businesses to flock to the administration with their policy wish lists."
Esteemed colleagues at other law schools have been playing a prominent role in urging unilateral executive action to address significant tax policy issues that typically, in the past, would have been handled through legislation. For example, Steve Shay has written about what the Administration can do unilaterally through its regulatory levers about corporate inversions. Victor Fleischer argues that the Treasury's regulatory authority would permit it to address unilaterally, not just inversions (as to which he says "[t]here is no question that Professor Shay gets the law right" concerning the Treasury's regulatory powers), but also the carried interest loophole for hedge fund managers.
As I was quoted as saying in Fleischer's carried interest write-up, it should be no surprise that the Treasury is thinking in these terms, even though traditionally it would not have acted to change policies that customary practice assigns to the legislative process. "[W]hen the legislative process is as broken as it has become today ... it's simply inevitable that administrations will care less about such comity, and be more willing to advance their policy views in controversial areas through the unilateral exercise of regulatory authority."
Would it be better if the Obama Administration were more circumspect, even assuming (in keeping with my own views) that Shay and Fleischer are right in tax policy terms? Definitely yes in a better, but counter-factual, state of the world. But when the legislative process has so completely broken down, the question changes to that of whether one is sufficiently incrementally worsening things at the institutional level to outweigh the policy benefits.
In other words, suppose the Obama Administration changes policies in these two areas but then the next Republican Administration reverses both sets of regulatory changes, and also pushes through lots of stuff that either comity or blind acceptance of then-prevailing practice discouraged the Bush Administration from doing. Then the next Democratic Administration flips things back the other way, and so on. Meanwhile, as the Times article notes, special deals and favors start being meted out through regulatory changes, without even the admittedly limited scrutiny that such things get when done legislatively.
This does not sound like a great state of the world. But I think it is where we are headed in any event, and under administrations from both parties. So again, I see the principled question for the Obama Administration as whether it is significantly aggravating / speeding up this process if it takes an aggressive stand during its last 2-plus years in office.
I tend to think not, on the ground that we are headed there with all due speed anyway, and that the next Republican Administration will not be greatly discouraged from doing such things, where it wants to, by Obama Administration forbearance. Think of filibusters, which minorities always had the power to do, but generally accepted as subject to limitations of convention that have by now almost wholly eroded. In that type of environment, honoring conventional limitations on the exercise of one's legal rights or powers makes a lot less sense than otherwise. It's a prisoner's dilemma scenario in which everyone else is defecting anyway.
UPDATE: Jonathan Chait provides a well-chosen hypothetical for critiquing the view that I take above. In response to discretionary non-enforcement of legal rules - as distinct from issuing new regulations - he argues that, if President Obama can, say, decide not to enforce particular immigration laws, then what is to prevent, say, a President Romney from announcing that he would stop all enforcement actions against the non-payment of estate taxes?
The example is not legally on point for my discussion above, since discretionary non-enforcement of a law on the books is distinct from revising administrative regulations that permissibly define applicable law. But the same concern about escalating breakdown of accepted norms that we rely on in practice is surely germane. And the conclusion might either be that one should tread a bit lightly after all, or that we are in big trouble whether one side unilaterally does so or not, given the accelerating breakdown of norms that, as Chait notes, are no less crucial than our express constitutional and legal structure to "secur[ing] our republic."
Esteemed colleagues at other law schools have been playing a prominent role in urging unilateral executive action to address significant tax policy issues that typically, in the past, would have been handled through legislation. For example, Steve Shay has written about what the Administration can do unilaterally through its regulatory levers about corporate inversions. Victor Fleischer argues that the Treasury's regulatory authority would permit it to address unilaterally, not just inversions (as to which he says "[t]here is no question that Professor Shay gets the law right" concerning the Treasury's regulatory powers), but also the carried interest loophole for hedge fund managers.
As I was quoted as saying in Fleischer's carried interest write-up, it should be no surprise that the Treasury is thinking in these terms, even though traditionally it would not have acted to change policies that customary practice assigns to the legislative process. "[W]hen the legislative process is as broken as it has become today ... it's simply inevitable that administrations will care less about such comity, and be more willing to advance their policy views in controversial areas through the unilateral exercise of regulatory authority."
Would it be better if the Obama Administration were more circumspect, even assuming (in keeping with my own views) that Shay and Fleischer are right in tax policy terms? Definitely yes in a better, but counter-factual, state of the world. But when the legislative process has so completely broken down, the question changes to that of whether one is sufficiently incrementally worsening things at the institutional level to outweigh the policy benefits.
In other words, suppose the Obama Administration changes policies in these two areas but then the next Republican Administration reverses both sets of regulatory changes, and also pushes through lots of stuff that either comity or blind acceptance of then-prevailing practice discouraged the Bush Administration from doing. Then the next Democratic Administration flips things back the other way, and so on. Meanwhile, as the Times article notes, special deals and favors start being meted out through regulatory changes, without even the admittedly limited scrutiny that such things get when done legislatively.
This does not sound like a great state of the world. But I think it is where we are headed in any event, and under administrations from both parties. So again, I see the principled question for the Obama Administration as whether it is significantly aggravating / speeding up this process if it takes an aggressive stand during its last 2-plus years in office.
I tend to think not, on the ground that we are headed there with all due speed anyway, and that the next Republican Administration will not be greatly discouraged from doing such things, where it wants to, by Obama Administration forbearance. Think of filibusters, which minorities always had the power to do, but generally accepted as subject to limitations of convention that have by now almost wholly eroded. In that type of environment, honoring conventional limitations on the exercise of one's legal rights or powers makes a lot less sense than otherwise. It's a prisoner's dilemma scenario in which everyone else is defecting anyway.
UPDATE: Jonathan Chait provides a well-chosen hypothetical for critiquing the view that I take above. In response to discretionary non-enforcement of legal rules - as distinct from issuing new regulations - he argues that, if President Obama can, say, decide not to enforce particular immigration laws, then what is to prevent, say, a President Romney from announcing that he would stop all enforcement actions against the non-payment of estate taxes?
The example is not legally on point for my discussion above, since discretionary non-enforcement of a law on the books is distinct from revising administrative regulations that permissibly define applicable law. But the same concern about escalating breakdown of accepted norms that we rely on in practice is surely germane. And the conclusion might either be that one should tread a bit lightly after all, or that we are in big trouble whether one side unilaterally does so or not, given the accelerating breakdown of norms that, as Chait notes, are no less crucial than our express constitutional and legal structure to "secur[ing] our republic."
Monday, August 18, 2014
Forthcoming conference at NYU Law School on Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century
Here is the text of an announcement that has just been sent out. The event has been in the works for some months now, but I didn't think I should mention it here until it officially went public.
I will mention further details in due course.
Fourth
Annual NYU/UCLA Tax Policy Symposium:
Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the
Twenty-First Century
NYU
School of Law
Greenberg
Lounge (40 Washington Square South)
Friday,
October 3, 2014, 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM
On
Friday, October 3rd, at NYU School of Law, the Fourth Annual
NYU/UCLA Tax Policy Symposium will address Thomas Piketty’s groundbreaking and
best-selling book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century. The
day-long event will consist of five panels featuring leading scholars who will
analyze the book from economic, legal, historical, political science and
philosophical perspectives. Thomas Piketty will participate in the
discussion and deliver responses to each of the papers presented.
Confirmed
panels and paper presentations are:
·
Wojciech
Kopczuk, Columbia University; moderated by David Kamin, NYU School of Law
·
Joseph
Bankman, Stanford Law School, and Daniel Shaviro, NYU School of Law; moderated
by Eric Zolt, UCLA School of Law
·
Gregory
Clark, UC-Davis; moderated by Joshua Blank, NYU School of Law
·
Suzanne
Mettler, Cornell; moderated by Jason Oh, UCLA School of Law
·
Liam
Murphy, NYU School of Law; moderated by Kirk Stark, UCLA School of Law
All
papers will be published in the Tax Law Review in 2015.
Due to
the anticipated high interest in this event, participation will be limited to
NYU Law and UCLA School of Law faculty, students and invited guests. An
invitation and registration information will be e-mailed shortly.
The
NYU/UCLA Tax Policy Symposium hosted by NYU School of Law and UCLA School of
Law is a joint annual conference focusing on tax policy issues from both a
legal and economic perspective. It provides a forum in which leading
scholars, policymakers, and practitioners can analyze complex tax policy
questions and options for reform, and brings together members of both NYU Law’s
tax law faculty and UCLA Law’s business law and policy program. It builds
on tax policy symposia that have historically been hosted by the Tax Law
Review, the premier law school journal for tax policy scholarship, and the
UCLA Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance, started in 2004.
Financial support for this conference is provided by NYU School of Law and the
Lowell Milken Institute of Business Law and Policy, UCLA School of Law.
Saturday, August 02, 2014
Kotlikoff versus Baker and Krugman
This past Thursday, Laurence Kotlikoff had a NY Times op-ed with two main points. First, the infinite horizon U.S. fiscal gap is huge, and ought to be reported. It stands at $210 trillion, and eliminating it would require an immediate, permanent 59% increase in federal revenues, or else an immediate, permanent 38% reduction in federal spending. Second, we must immediately start raising taxes and/or cutting benefits in order to address it. Indeed, "this is not just an economics problem. It's a moral issue" - which he frames in terms of policy transparency, but surely with an underlying premise that it would be immoral to leave the full burden of policy adjustment to be borne by the members of future generations.
As unsurprising as Kotlikoff's column (if you know his views) are Dean Baker's and Paul Krugman's responses (if you know theirs).
First, Baker: all we learn from this is "why we should not use infinite horizon budget accounting. Kotlikoff showed how this accounting could be used to scare people to promote a political agenda, while providing no information whatsoever." E.g., if we just go out 75 years the fiscal gap is far more manageable. And we could tame it by bringing healthcare costs per capita into line with those in other economically advanced countries, so why cut benefits? And Kotlikoff could / should have pointed out that the unfunded infinite horizon Social Security liability of $25 trillion, which he gives significant emphasis in the Times op-ed, equals just 1.4% of future income (i.e., the present value of GDP in the infinite horizon forecast).
It seems to me that Baker is showing a different point than he thinks - that we can actually have reasoned debate about the numbers Kotlikoff wants to emphasize, rather than that we shouldn't use them because they will be misunderstood. But moving on to Krugman, he agrees that the fiscal gap suggests that current policy is unsustainable and will have to change at some point. "But why, exactly, is that something that must be done immediately? If you state the supposed logic, it seems to be that to avoid future benefit cuts, we must cut future benefits. I've asked for further clarification many times, and never gotten it."
But Krugman then answers his own question: "You can argue that it's better to avoid abrupt changes - to put things on a glide path to sustainability. But that's a much weaker point than you might expect given all the cries of bankruptcy and crisis."
Fair enough. But there's more to this point than Krugman says here. In a 2006 book that has the admittedly Kotlikoffian-sounding title "Taxes, Spending, and the U.S. Government's March Towards Bankruptcy," I make a "smoothing" argument that goes beyond just avoiding abrupt changes. Subject to other considerations such as macroeconomic policy and the aim of benefiting poorer relative to richer age cohorts, and leaving aside political economy issues, I argue that one should generally want to both announce and start implementing indefinitely sustainable policies ASAP. Credible early announcement can provide greater certainty, and sharing the pain of course correction between all years can have "smoothing" benefits. For example, suppose that your future healthcare benefits were going to be cut. If all years are expected to be similar, and if "fat" tends to get eliminated before "bone," you'd probably prefer a 5% cut for all future years to no cut in some years and a 10% cut in others.
Let me add a word about that title, by the way, given that, even by 2006, I had moved further from the Kotlikoff camp and closer to the Baker-Krugman camp than I had been, say, in the late 1990s (although I remain fully in neither camp). My preferred title was "The Use and Abuse of Fiscal Language." My publisher, no doubt correctly, felt that this would not serve the book's prospects very well. And while I discerned a "march towards bankruptcy," this was not nearly so much based on the types of numbers that Kotlikoff likes to cite (and which I agree should be included in public debate) as on pessimism about the capacity of the U.S. political system to handle tough policy choices of almost any serious or difficult kind. Surely that pessimism remains as plausible as ever, whether or not government bankruptcy is the particular disaster that it's most likely to cause.
As unsurprising as Kotlikoff's column (if you know his views) are Dean Baker's and Paul Krugman's responses (if you know theirs).
First, Baker: all we learn from this is "why we should not use infinite horizon budget accounting. Kotlikoff showed how this accounting could be used to scare people to promote a political agenda, while providing no information whatsoever." E.g., if we just go out 75 years the fiscal gap is far more manageable. And we could tame it by bringing healthcare costs per capita into line with those in other economically advanced countries, so why cut benefits? And Kotlikoff could / should have pointed out that the unfunded infinite horizon Social Security liability of $25 trillion, which he gives significant emphasis in the Times op-ed, equals just 1.4% of future income (i.e., the present value of GDP in the infinite horizon forecast).
It seems to me that Baker is showing a different point than he thinks - that we can actually have reasoned debate about the numbers Kotlikoff wants to emphasize, rather than that we shouldn't use them because they will be misunderstood. But moving on to Krugman, he agrees that the fiscal gap suggests that current policy is unsustainable and will have to change at some point. "But why, exactly, is that something that must be done immediately? If you state the supposed logic, it seems to be that to avoid future benefit cuts, we must cut future benefits. I've asked for further clarification many times, and never gotten it."
But Krugman then answers his own question: "You can argue that it's better to avoid abrupt changes - to put things on a glide path to sustainability. But that's a much weaker point than you might expect given all the cries of bankruptcy and crisis."
Fair enough. But there's more to this point than Krugman says here. In a 2006 book that has the admittedly Kotlikoffian-sounding title "Taxes, Spending, and the U.S. Government's March Towards Bankruptcy," I make a "smoothing" argument that goes beyond just avoiding abrupt changes. Subject to other considerations such as macroeconomic policy and the aim of benefiting poorer relative to richer age cohorts, and leaving aside political economy issues, I argue that one should generally want to both announce and start implementing indefinitely sustainable policies ASAP. Credible early announcement can provide greater certainty, and sharing the pain of course correction between all years can have "smoothing" benefits. For example, suppose that your future healthcare benefits were going to be cut. If all years are expected to be similar, and if "fat" tends to get eliminated before "bone," you'd probably prefer a 5% cut for all future years to no cut in some years and a 10% cut in others.
Let me add a word about that title, by the way, given that, even by 2006, I had moved further from the Kotlikoff camp and closer to the Baker-Krugman camp than I had been, say, in the late 1990s (although I remain fully in neither camp). My preferred title was "The Use and Abuse of Fiscal Language." My publisher, no doubt correctly, felt that this would not serve the book's prospects very well. And while I discerned a "march towards bankruptcy," this was not nearly so much based on the types of numbers that Kotlikoff likes to cite (and which I agree should be included in public debate) as on pessimism about the capacity of the U.S. political system to handle tough policy choices of almost any serious or difficult kind. Surely that pessimism remains as plausible as ever, whether or not government bankruptcy is the particular disaster that it's most likely to cause.
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