NPIP stands for "New Plutocratic Industrial Policy." It's the label that occurs to me with regard to the 25% maximum tax rate for business income that the House Republican drafters have decided they like.
While they have been claiming it's for "small business," there is absolutely nothing that so limits it. Indeed, it's been very carefully drafted to make sure that people in the 39.6 percent get the full rate reduction. Under the bill, these are people with taxable income of at least $1 million. So we can be reasonably confident that its $4448 billion 10-year revenue estimate is mainly about big non-corporate businesses and their very rich owners. (Since I first posted this, it's been pointed out to me that reportedly 86% of small business pays at a rate of 25% or less anyway, meaning they'd get nothing from giving them a 25% maximum rate.)
So what must you do, or whom must you be, to get the 25% rate? First, you get it for 100% of your net business income from passive activities, which generally are business activities in which you personally do not materially participate. (They take this definition directly from the passive loss rules, which I helped to draft back in 1986.) This typically applies to people who invest money in all kinds of partnerships, S corporation activities, etcetera that engage in pretty much any type of business - subject to the carve-out that I'll mention below. But they are passive investors, giving $$ but not sufficiently working in the business to meet the passive loss rules' material participation standards.
Second, you get the low business rate for 30% (in the simplest case) of net business income from all such activities in which you DO materially participate. This percentage can change under complicated, and at least partly elective (by the taxpayer) tests that seem aimed at raising it for more capital-intensive activities.
Suppose, then, that I have a business activity on which I work full time, earning $1 million and having no expenses. So far as I can tell at an initial read - subject to the limitation that I discuss next - 30% of the $1 million gets the 25% rate. But this income does count to pushing me into higher tax brackets for the rest of my taxable income.
Okay, so what exactly limits this? Under the passive activity rules cross-reference, a business activity is any activity which involves the conduct of a trade or business. I note that being an employee is a trade or business activity. So the one big thing limiting it is an exclusion from the special rate for "specified service activities," defined in a preexisting Internal Revenue Code section that the provision cross-reference as follows:
"ANY TRADE OR BUSINESS INVOLVING THE PERFORMANCE OF SERVICES IN THE FIELDS OF HEALTH, LAW, ENGINEERING, ARCHITECTURE, ACCOUNTING, ACTUARIAL SCIENCE, PERFORMING ARTS, CONSULTING, ATHLETICS, FINANCIAL SERVICES, BROKERAGE SERVICES, OR ANY TRADE OR BUSINESS WHERE THE PRINCIPAL ASSET OF SUCH TRADE OR BUSINESS IS THE REPUTATION OR SKILL OF 1 OR MORE OF ITS EMPLOYEES."
There are also a couple of items added for particular functions in the financial services industry.
What does this mean? If you're in the professional service industries, the arts, sports, financial services, consulting, etc., you lose. If you're in the trade or business of being an employee, you lose. But if you're a business owner (including via passive investment) in, say, the real estate, oil and gas, manufacturing, or retail sectors, it sure looks like you win. Although you win more (from 100% vs. 30%) if you aren't actually doing the work.
This is industrial policy - picking favored industries that should win while the rest lose. Businesses using capital and not just selling services are good, services businesses are bad. Perhaps the regulations will pick winners and losers in an even more fine-grained manner, especially if you can lobby the White House, not just the Treasury and IRS.
And it's a weapon to enhance plutocracy - offering the biggest rate cut to millionaires, allowing plutocrats who work to get the low rate for 30% of their income, and those who are in effect rentiers to get the low rate for 100%.
And here's a tax planning trick that occurs to me right off. I'm a plutocrat and so are you. If we just got the $$ from our own businesses, in which we're working actively, we'd only get the low rate for 30% of our net business income. But if we invest in each other's business, 100% since we're passive as to the other person's business.
So why don't I invest in your business and you invest in mine? And I get some of the returns from your business, while you get some of the returns from mine? But since we don't really want to invest in each other's businesses, rather than our own, what can we do to ensure indirectly that, at the end, of the day, our takes from each other will be somehow adjusted so that we are really getting ultimate net payouts based on our own stuff, not each other's?
Let the drafting, of contracts followed by tax opinions, begin.
But that's not the worst of it, purely as a matter of tax administration. Consider also this. Under the passive activity rules, people most commonly want to AVOID being classified as passive, and to show that they are materially participating. This often depends on things such as how many hours they spent working on the activity. They are as a practical matter encouraged, although not required, to keep records establishing their hours spent. There has actually been Tax Court litigation about what sorts of hours count.
But now it's reversed. To get the 25% rate for ALL of your business income, not just 30% of it, you have to AVOID materially participating. So it's up to the IRS to prove how you actually spent your time (!!). How exactly are they supposed to do that, for business people with ownership interests who go around doing this & that?
So you have a horrendously bad statute administratively, devoted solely, it seems, to enforcing an incoherent industrial policy and enhancing plutocracy. If there's ever been a worse federal income tax enactment, I'd like to know what it could possibly be.
Thursday, November 02, 2017
Wednesday, November 01, 2017
Renaissance Technologies and "basket options"
Earlier this week, I was on MSNBC discussing (with Stephanie Ruhle) Robert Mercer / Renaissance Technologies in re. the "basket options" tax avoidance scheme that they are reported to have used to the tune of $6.8 billion or so. I'm told that the feature may air again later this week, but you needn't wait if you click here. It's about a 4-minute clip, and I first appear at about 2:30. It also features Steve Rosenthal.
The interview was taped a couple of weeks back. So I hadn't known exactly when it would air. But then I heard about it from excited fans (so to speak).
I think there's a possible journalistic backstory to this that doesn't appear in the piece, but that may have helped to motivate general press interest. Mercer's political activism has increased since the IRS started questioning his reported $6.8 billion of claimed tax benefits from the basket options, and I gather that his involvement has extended to the conservative campaign against the IRS Commissioner. One might deem this a bit tactless and tasteless, although Mercer certainly appears to have far bigger (and, I would say, more rancid) fish to fry than "just" a possible $6.8B tax liability.
Another question that I suspect has prompted journalistic interest in the story pertains to whether the Trump Administration would interfere with the IRS to Mercer's benefit. When I've been asked about this, I've said that for decades we have had clear norms that generally prevent any such thing from happening. These norms and institutional barriers date back to Nixon, who tried to weaponize the IRS against his political foes, and thereby provoked a whole lot of pushback.
But we do of course live in an era when norms of fair and honest governance seem to be increasingly under threat. So, while this would not have been a major concern at any time in the last 40+ years, who knows what one should expect today.
The interview was taped a couple of weeks back. So I hadn't known exactly when it would air. But then I heard about it from excited fans (so to speak).
I think there's a possible journalistic backstory to this that doesn't appear in the piece, but that may have helped to motivate general press interest. Mercer's political activism has increased since the IRS started questioning his reported $6.8 billion of claimed tax benefits from the basket options, and I gather that his involvement has extended to the conservative campaign against the IRS Commissioner. One might deem this a bit tactless and tasteless, although Mercer certainly appears to have far bigger (and, I would say, more rancid) fish to fry than "just" a possible $6.8B tax liability.
Another question that I suspect has prompted journalistic interest in the story pertains to whether the Trump Administration would interfere with the IRS to Mercer's benefit. When I've been asked about this, I've said that for decades we have had clear norms that generally prevent any such thing from happening. These norms and institutional barriers date back to Nixon, who tried to weaponize the IRS against his political foes, and thereby provoked a whole lot of pushback.
But we do of course live in an era when norms of fair and honest governance seem to be increasingly under threat. So, while this would not have been a major concern at any time in the last 40+ years, who knows what one should expect today.
Taking a (more) charitable ad hominem view of CEA wage claims about corporate tax reform
Kevin Hassett, in his new perch at CEA, has dismayed me by claiming - I would say (and I'm not alone in this) absurdly - that cutting the corporate rate from 35% to 20% would in short order raise wages by at least $4,000 per household. Indeed, I have considered this claim dubious enough to cause me to speculate that he has consciously decided that academic and think tank economists, among whom he has certainly hurt his credibility by making this claim, are not the audience that he believes will matter to him personally or professionally when his CEA stint is done.
But to put it more charitably, perhaps he is subject to sincere (if ill-founded) over-exuberance - akin to Dr. Malcolm's "deplorable excess of personality" in the Jurassic Park I movie - that can lead him astray without evidencing bad faith. As evidence for continued sincerity and good faith, he today reiterated, in a Politico interview, a previously expressed view that is anathema to right-wing Trumpite opinion leaders, and hence that presumably reflects sincere conviction while not otherwise serving his or the Administration's interests.
He says, in particular: "We've not done a good job as a society at thinking about how do we take people who have become discouraged [from participating in the workforce] and reconnect them. And it's such an urgent problem that government programs that directly hire people might be part of the solution."
As the Politico column describing the interview notes, "[t]hat's a New Deal-style idea more closely associated with highly progressive Democrats." It has already begun to attract the inevitable brickbats, and I see no reason to think that there's anything more behind it than his believing that it's actually true. It doesn't look, from here at least, like a deliberate sop or pitch to the Bannon wing.
The interview does, however, rewrite history a bit concerning a prior instance of ill-founded over-exuberance:
"Hassett, an affable economist with friends on both sides of the partisan aisle, also spoke about his often-lampooned 1999 book with James Glassman, Dow 36,000, that predicted stocks would hit that mark by 2004. Instead, the dot-com bubble burst and stocks tanked.
"Hassett described the title of the book as a bit of a 'youthful indiscretion' that was also somewhat unfairly maligned. 'The point was that people who buy and hold stocks tend to do well, but that stocks go up and down a lot and it's scary.'"
With all due respect, while that may reflect how he thinks about the stock market now, it's not quite the same as what the book said. Again, Dow 36,000 offered a specific prediction with an equally specific analysis behind it. This framework went well beyond "buy and hold," to assert that historical evidence supported viewing stocks as grossly undervalued based on their expected future payouts, even allowing for a reasonable degree of risk aversion.
I actually recall speaking to Kevin, at an AEI event, before Dow 36,000 came out or had been widely publicized. He explained the book's basic undervaluation claim to me, and added that, because he was so convinced it was true, he had placed all his savings in the stock market, none in bonds.
I asked him (obviously paraphrasing here): "If you're so bullish about stocks, why stop at 100% of your net equity, instead of also borrowing a lot of money and putting that in the stock market, too?" But someone else came up to chat just then, so I never got an answer to this question. From today's perspective, I'd note that even going 100% of net equity, without also borrowing so that one can push past that line, seems a bit aggressive (even allowing for the fact that Kevin, like me, was younger at the time) if "stocks go up and down a lot and it's scary."
In fairness, he was not alone in 1999 in thinking that the stock market was undervalued, even duly adjusting for risk (e.g., based on evidence of comparative asset riskiness and how people adjusted for it elsewhere). Finance folk were writing a lot more in those days than they seem to be doing today about the "equity premium puzzle," i.e., the view that, all things considered, stock prices seemed to be over-discounting for risk.
At a general conceptual level, the main things that Dow 36,000 added to merely relying on the equity premium puzzle were (1) a particular set of claims about what stock values "should" be if the premium, assumed to be mysterious and irrational, were to disappear, and (2) as assertion of confidence that it would indeed disappear in fairly short order. (This too I recall, perhaps from the same conversation, as resting on the idea, not exactly uncommon among economists, that surely rationality will soon prevail.)
Even back then, however, a mutual friend with unimpeachable academic credentials, who was highly skeptical of the book's thesis even at the time, told me that he had advised Kevin to have stickers ready for all the book's copies to cover the last zero if necessary. This would have allowed rapidly changing the title to Dow 3600.
In sum, one could think of Dow 36,000 as supporting a relatively charitable explanation for what we are hearing from Kevin these days about how a corporate rate cut would rapidly boost wages. Both in a personal sense and given his possible influence while at CEA, that's good to know. But I believe that at least the general basics of his Dow 36,000 claim were closer to the mainstream, and to apparent contemporary plausibility, than what he is saying about corporate tax rates and wages now.
But to put it more charitably, perhaps he is subject to sincere (if ill-founded) over-exuberance - akin to Dr. Malcolm's "deplorable excess of personality" in the Jurassic Park I movie - that can lead him astray without evidencing bad faith. As evidence for continued sincerity and good faith, he today reiterated, in a Politico interview, a previously expressed view that is anathema to right-wing Trumpite opinion leaders, and hence that presumably reflects sincere conviction while not otherwise serving his or the Administration's interests.
He says, in particular: "We've not done a good job as a society at thinking about how do we take people who have become discouraged [from participating in the workforce] and reconnect them. And it's such an urgent problem that government programs that directly hire people might be part of the solution."
As the Politico column describing the interview notes, "[t]hat's a New Deal-style idea more closely associated with highly progressive Democrats." It has already begun to attract the inevitable brickbats, and I see no reason to think that there's anything more behind it than his believing that it's actually true. It doesn't look, from here at least, like a deliberate sop or pitch to the Bannon wing.
The interview does, however, rewrite history a bit concerning a prior instance of ill-founded over-exuberance:
"Hassett, an affable economist with friends on both sides of the partisan aisle, also spoke about his often-lampooned 1999 book with James Glassman, Dow 36,000, that predicted stocks would hit that mark by 2004. Instead, the dot-com bubble burst and stocks tanked.
"Hassett described the title of the book as a bit of a 'youthful indiscretion' that was also somewhat unfairly maligned. 'The point was that people who buy and hold stocks tend to do well, but that stocks go up and down a lot and it's scary.'"
With all due respect, while that may reflect how he thinks about the stock market now, it's not quite the same as what the book said. Again, Dow 36,000 offered a specific prediction with an equally specific analysis behind it. This framework went well beyond "buy and hold," to assert that historical evidence supported viewing stocks as grossly undervalued based on their expected future payouts, even allowing for a reasonable degree of risk aversion.
I actually recall speaking to Kevin, at an AEI event, before Dow 36,000 came out or had been widely publicized. He explained the book's basic undervaluation claim to me, and added that, because he was so convinced it was true, he had placed all his savings in the stock market, none in bonds.
I asked him (obviously paraphrasing here): "If you're so bullish about stocks, why stop at 100% of your net equity, instead of also borrowing a lot of money and putting that in the stock market, too?" But someone else came up to chat just then, so I never got an answer to this question. From today's perspective, I'd note that even going 100% of net equity, without also borrowing so that one can push past that line, seems a bit aggressive (even allowing for the fact that Kevin, like me, was younger at the time) if "stocks go up and down a lot and it's scary."
In fairness, he was not alone in 1999 in thinking that the stock market was undervalued, even duly adjusting for risk (e.g., based on evidence of comparative asset riskiness and how people adjusted for it elsewhere). Finance folk were writing a lot more in those days than they seem to be doing today about the "equity premium puzzle," i.e., the view that, all things considered, stock prices seemed to be over-discounting for risk.
At a general conceptual level, the main things that Dow 36,000 added to merely relying on the equity premium puzzle were (1) a particular set of claims about what stock values "should" be if the premium, assumed to be mysterious and irrational, were to disappear, and (2) as assertion of confidence that it would indeed disappear in fairly short order. (This too I recall, perhaps from the same conversation, as resting on the idea, not exactly uncommon among economists, that surely rationality will soon prevail.)
Even back then, however, a mutual friend with unimpeachable academic credentials, who was highly skeptical of the book's thesis even at the time, told me that he had advised Kevin to have stickers ready for all the book's copies to cover the last zero if necessary. This would have allowed rapidly changing the title to Dow 3600.
In sum, one could think of Dow 36,000 as supporting a relatively charitable explanation for what we are hearing from Kevin these days about how a corporate rate cut would rapidly boost wages. Both in a personal sense and given his possible influence while at CEA, that's good to know. But I believe that at least the general basics of his Dow 36,000 claim were closer to the mainstream, and to apparent contemporary plausibility, than what he is saying about corporate tax rates and wages now.
The best summary of "tax reform" that I have yet seen
From Jonathan Chait:
"Republicans have promised their donors $5 trillion worth of tax cuts. But their budget only allows for revenue loss of $1.5 trillion. What they call “tax reform” is a process of trying to stuff the $5 trillion tax cuts into a $1.5 trillion bag."
"Republicans have promised their donors $5 trillion worth of tax cuts. But their budget only allows for revenue loss of $1.5 trillion. What they call “tax reform” is a process of trying to stuff the $5 trillion tax cuts into a $1.5 trillion bag."
Saturday, October 28, 2017
Worst proposal in the history of the U.S. federal income tax?
With apologies for the hyperbole, I do think it's possible that the special 25% passthrough rate that the Republicans are eager to enact might be the single worst proposal ever prominently made, in the history of the U.S. federal income tax. Certainly I can think of none close to being as bad in the last 30+ years when I have been an observer.
It combines inequity with inefficiency in a manner that is really hard to top. Let's start with the inequity. It ensures (and this is evidently its central purpose) that people like Trump and the Koch brothers will pay taxes at a lower marginal rate than you and me. This is both horizontally and vertically unfair. Lower rates for the super-rich than the upper middle class. Express regressivity. This is why I've in the past compared it to the gabelle - the hated salt tax in pre-Revolutionary France from which the nobles were exempt. Here, the equivalent to the gabelle is the excess over 25% that only employees and those in service businesses, as distinct from super-rich business owners who are able to blend their labor income with capital income, are required to pay.
Making this inequity worse, it's precisely targeted, almost like a laser, in order to make rising high-end inequality as much worse as possible. Consider this article, Capitalists in the 21st Century (by Smith, Yagan, Zidar, and Zwick), which as it happens I will get to see being presented at Columbia Law School next week. Here is the paper's abstract:
"Have passive rentiers replaced the working rich at the top of the U.S. income distribution? Using administrative data linking 10 million firms to their owners, this paper shows that private business owners who actively manage their firms are key for top income inequality. Private business income accounts for most of the rise of top incomes since 2000 and the majority of top earners receive private business income—most of which accrues to active owner-managers of mid-market firms in relatively skill-intensive and unconcentrated industries. Profit falls substantially after premature owner deaths. Top-owned firms are twice as profitable per worker as other firms despite similar risk, and rising profitability without rising scale explains most of their profit growth. Together, these facts indicate that the working rich remain central to rising top incomes in the twenty-first century."
These are exactly the people who would get the 25% passthrough rate. Hence my view that this proposal is laser-targeted to increase high-end inequality as much as possible, by offering a special low tax rate to the exact people whose rise is causing it.
What about efficiency? I would call the proposal social engineering or targeted micromanaging of the economy, attempting to override the signals of the free market regarding pretax returns, except that would be giving it too much credit. Aiding the coal industry would be an example of that, but here I see no ghost of a rationale apart from cliches about "entrepreneurship" (which can be countered by noting that, when people are earning rents, that should make them less tax-sensitive).
Here are a couple of simplified examples showing how this provision inefficiently tampers with market outcomes, and leads to the diversion of effort and investment out of the most productive channels.
Example 1: Suppose I could earn $1 million as an employee, and pay tax at 35%, or $900,000 as a self-employed passthrough owner, and pay tax at 25%. If markets set prices properly, the former is more socially valuable than the latter. But as an employee I'll end up with $650,000 after tax, whereas as a self-employed passthrough owner I'll end up with $675,000. So the special tax break steers me into the less productive activity.
Example 2: Suppose that the passthrough rules prevent people like me from just using S corporations and the like to convert our labor income into passthrough income that qualifies for the low rate. These rules might require that capital is being sufficiently used in the business.
Now suppose that I have the following choice. I can: (a) earn $1 million in a service business, and separately invest $1 million in capital that I possess so that it earns 5% ($50,000) before tax - say, as interest income. So I end up with $1,050,000 before tax.
Or I can (b) mix up the capital with my services, even though this puts me in a worse business that earns less money - say, $925,000. In effect, the capital has a negative rate of return. Given its effect on the bottom line, one could think of it as having been invested at a negative 7.5% rate of return, rather than positive 5%. But it served to allow me to bring my labor income into the low-rate passthrough regime.
Under option (a), at a 35% tax rate I end up with $682,500.
Under option (b), at the 25% passthrough rate, I end up with $693,750.
But at least I will be making America (and high-end inequality) great again.
The proposal amounts to fining people for being employees and working in service businesses. This is mindless and senseless at best, combining inequity and inefficiency in a perfect storm of disingenuousness by the self-interested proponents.
UPDATE: It's true that lowering the corporate rate to 20% would incline one to think about the relative taxation of alternative business organizational forms. But:
(1) There is a second level of corporate tax. And if we are talking here about people who will organize businesses, to which they supply their own labor, either as passthroughs or via a C corporation, then we are not talking about all the corporate shareholders who, as discussed in recent work by Austin and Rosenthal, are tax-free with respect to dividends.
(2) The proper solution to that problem is to address misuse of the lower corporate rate to benefit owner-employees who cause the entities to underpay their own salaries because they benefit from stock appreciation anyway. There are ways of doing this (e.g., Kleinbard on the dual income tax aspect of his dual BEIT proposal).
It combines inequity with inefficiency in a manner that is really hard to top. Let's start with the inequity. It ensures (and this is evidently its central purpose) that people like Trump and the Koch brothers will pay taxes at a lower marginal rate than you and me. This is both horizontally and vertically unfair. Lower rates for the super-rich than the upper middle class. Express regressivity. This is why I've in the past compared it to the gabelle - the hated salt tax in pre-Revolutionary France from which the nobles were exempt. Here, the equivalent to the gabelle is the excess over 25% that only employees and those in service businesses, as distinct from super-rich business owners who are able to blend their labor income with capital income, are required to pay.
Making this inequity worse, it's precisely targeted, almost like a laser, in order to make rising high-end inequality as much worse as possible. Consider this article, Capitalists in the 21st Century (by Smith, Yagan, Zidar, and Zwick), which as it happens I will get to see being presented at Columbia Law School next week. Here is the paper's abstract:
"Have passive rentiers replaced the working rich at the top of the U.S. income distribution? Using administrative data linking 10 million firms to their owners, this paper shows that private business owners who actively manage their firms are key for top income inequality. Private business income accounts for most of the rise of top incomes since 2000 and the majority of top earners receive private business income—most of which accrues to active owner-managers of mid-market firms in relatively skill-intensive and unconcentrated industries. Profit falls substantially after premature owner deaths. Top-owned firms are twice as profitable per worker as other firms despite similar risk, and rising profitability without rising scale explains most of their profit growth. Together, these facts indicate that the working rich remain central to rising top incomes in the twenty-first century."
These are exactly the people who would get the 25% passthrough rate. Hence my view that this proposal is laser-targeted to increase high-end inequality as much as possible, by offering a special low tax rate to the exact people whose rise is causing it.
What about efficiency? I would call the proposal social engineering or targeted micromanaging of the economy, attempting to override the signals of the free market regarding pretax returns, except that would be giving it too much credit. Aiding the coal industry would be an example of that, but here I see no ghost of a rationale apart from cliches about "entrepreneurship" (which can be countered by noting that, when people are earning rents, that should make them less tax-sensitive).
Here are a couple of simplified examples showing how this provision inefficiently tampers with market outcomes, and leads to the diversion of effort and investment out of the most productive channels.
Example 1: Suppose I could earn $1 million as an employee, and pay tax at 35%, or $900,000 as a self-employed passthrough owner, and pay tax at 25%. If markets set prices properly, the former is more socially valuable than the latter. But as an employee I'll end up with $650,000 after tax, whereas as a self-employed passthrough owner I'll end up with $675,000. So the special tax break steers me into the less productive activity.
Example 2: Suppose that the passthrough rules prevent people like me from just using S corporations and the like to convert our labor income into passthrough income that qualifies for the low rate. These rules might require that capital is being sufficiently used in the business.
Now suppose that I have the following choice. I can: (a) earn $1 million in a service business, and separately invest $1 million in capital that I possess so that it earns 5% ($50,000) before tax - say, as interest income. So I end up with $1,050,000 before tax.
Or I can (b) mix up the capital with my services, even though this puts me in a worse business that earns less money - say, $925,000. In effect, the capital has a negative rate of return. Given its effect on the bottom line, one could think of it as having been invested at a negative 7.5% rate of return, rather than positive 5%. But it served to allow me to bring my labor income into the low-rate passthrough regime.
Under option (a), at a 35% tax rate I end up with $682,500.
Under option (b), at the 25% passthrough rate, I end up with $693,750.
But at least I will be making America (and high-end inequality) great again.
The proposal amounts to fining people for being employees and working in service businesses. This is mindless and senseless at best, combining inequity and inefficiency in a perfect storm of disingenuousness by the self-interested proponents.
UPDATE: It's true that lowering the corporate rate to 20% would incline one to think about the relative taxation of alternative business organizational forms. But:
(1) There is a second level of corporate tax. And if we are talking here about people who will organize businesses, to which they supply their own labor, either as passthroughs or via a C corporation, then we are not talking about all the corporate shareholders who, as discussed in recent work by Austin and Rosenthal, are tax-free with respect to dividends.
(2) The proper solution to that problem is to address misuse of the lower corporate rate to benefit owner-employees who cause the entities to underpay their own salaries because they benefit from stock appreciation anyway. There are ways of doing this (e.g., Kleinbard on the dual income tax aspect of his dual BEIT proposal).
Friday, October 27, 2017
Warning: conceptual hipsters are on the loose in my neighborhood
Here is the evidence:
in case the photo doesn't make it clear, this actually is a mattress, which someone left propped upright on a street corner.
in case the photo doesn't make it clear, this actually is a mattress, which someone left propped upright on a street corner.
Monday, October 16, 2017
Back in the U.S.A.
Last Friday, I returned to NYC after almost a month abroad.
Most of my time away was spent in Berlin, where I was a Research Fellow for 3 weeks at NYU Berlin. My professional activity there consisted mainly of working on a new article draft on international tax policy. Then I spent a week in Vienna, where I taught a mini-course on International Tax Policy for graduate students in Vienna University's doctoral program in international business taxation (DIBT). Side trips to Amsterdam (for a public speaking event) and Ljubljana (for enjoyment).
Although I enjoyed the trip, it's nice to be back in NYC, which remains my favorite city apart from its winters.
Most of my time away was spent in Berlin, where I was a Research Fellow for 3 weeks at NYU Berlin. My professional activity there consisted mainly of working on a new article draft on international tax policy. Then I spent a week in Vienna, where I taught a mini-course on International Tax Policy for graduate students in Vienna University's doctoral program in international business taxation (DIBT). Side trips to Amsterdam (for a public speaking event) and Ljubljana (for enjoyment).
Although I enjoyed the trip, it's nice to be back in NYC, which remains my favorite city apart from its winters.
Tuesday, October 10, 2017
Ninth Circuit oral argument on Altera
I have been reliably informed (and then was able to confirm for myself online) that the Ninth Circuit oral argument in the appeal of the Tax Court's misguided Altera decision is taking place this Wednesday. I gather that Susan Morse and Steve Shay will be blogging about this, and I'll duly post links thereto.
I previously discussed the Altera decision here and here. Stripped to its substantive (as opposed to administrative law) essentials, it's a case in which the Tax Court ruled that an indisputably correct Treasury regulation, to the effect that the bulk of compensation costs in a cost-sharing deal between related parties should be included in the formula even if they're structured as incentive compensation, was arbitrary and capricious, hence an abuse of discretion. In effect, it's an abuse of discretion to say that 1 + 1 = 2, unless one spends pages of regulatory preamble explaining why taxpayers were incorrect when they filed briefs at the notice and comment stage arguing that 1 + 1 = 1.
The Tax Court relied upon aspects of true arm's length deals that had zero pertinence or relevance to related party paper-shuffling agreements, and accepted expert testimony to the effect that incentive compensation that in fact is worth millions of dollars should be viewed as having a cost of zero. Here's hoping that the Ninth Circuit straightens things out.
UPDATE: Here is the link for the Morse-Shay posting, further explaining why the Tax Court so clearly erred in striking down the regulation at issue in Altera.
Leandra Lederman adds her comments here.
I previously discussed the Altera decision here and here. Stripped to its substantive (as opposed to administrative law) essentials, it's a case in which the Tax Court ruled that an indisputably correct Treasury regulation, to the effect that the bulk of compensation costs in a cost-sharing deal between related parties should be included in the formula even if they're structured as incentive compensation, was arbitrary and capricious, hence an abuse of discretion. In effect, it's an abuse of discretion to say that 1 + 1 = 2, unless one spends pages of regulatory preamble explaining why taxpayers were incorrect when they filed briefs at the notice and comment stage arguing that 1 + 1 = 1.
The Tax Court relied upon aspects of true arm's length deals that had zero pertinence or relevance to related party paper-shuffling agreements, and accepted expert testimony to the effect that incentive compensation that in fact is worth millions of dollars should be viewed as having a cost of zero. Here's hoping that the Ninth Circuit straightens things out.
UPDATE: Here is the link for the Morse-Shay posting, further explaining why the Tax Court so clearly erred in striking down the regulation at issue in Altera.
Leandra Lederman adds her comments here.
Tuesday, October 03, 2017
Busy weekend in Ljubljana
Taking time off from my Berlin stay to enjoy a vacation weekend in Ljubljana (pronounced Loobleeyana), I kept busy by testing my new superpowers.
I also got to practice my famous John the Baptist impression.
Unfortunately, neither special talent seems to have survived my return to places further west.
I also got to practice my famous John the Baptist impression.
Unfortunately, neither special talent seems to have survived my return to places further west.
Thursday, September 28, 2017
The international part of the "Framework"
The bit on international in the "framework" is
worth quoting in full:
"TERRITORIAL TAXATION OF GLOBAL AMERICAN COMPANIES
"The framework transforms our existing 'offshoring'
model to an American model. It ends the perverse incentive to keep foreign
profits offshore by exempting them when they are repatriated to the United
States. It will replace the existing, outdated worldwide tax system with a 100%
exemption for dividends from foreign subsidiaries (in which the U.S. parent
owns at least a 10% stake).
To transition to this new system, the framework treats
foreign earnings that have accumulated overseas under the old system as
repatriated. Accumulated foreign earnings held in illiquid assets will be
subject to a lower tax rate than foreign earnings held in cash or cash
equivalents. Payment of the tax liability will be spread out over several
years.
"STOPPING CORPORATIONS FROM SHIPPING JOBS AND CAPITAL
OVERSEAS
"To prevent companies from shifting profits to tax
havens, the framework includes rules to protect the U.S. tax base by taxing at
a reduced rate and on a global basis the foreign profits of U.S. multinational
corporations. The committees will incorporate rules to level the playing
field between U.S.-headquartered parent companies and
foreign-headquartered parent companies."
Let me see if I can make any sense of this. They say it's a
territorial system. But they also say that they will be "taxing at a
reduced rate and on a global basis the foreign profits of U.S. multinational
corporations." This can formally be reconciled, in the sense that what
they literally say up top is that they will offer dividend exemption. Of
course, a full worldwide system in which deferral (for the foreign profits of
foreign subsidiaries) was repealed would also have dividend exemption. Bringing
the foreign profits home would have no tax consequences, since those profits
would already have been taxed.
Is that what they are saying, albeit with a reduced rate for foreign source income? Seemingly yes, but then how is it a "territorial" system? And if they are taxing U.S. companies' foreign source income, how do they propose to "level the playing field between U.S.-headquartered parent companies and foreign-headquartered parent companies"?
The repatriation tax is of course a welcome feature of switching to territorial, but the rate imposed is all important here. I'm guessing it will end up being very low. The dual feature, as between cash equivalents and illiquid assets, has a rationale but is likely to be messy at best in practice.
Neither tax reform nor a plan
I often feel impelled to quote that famous line about how the Holy Roman Empire was neither holy, Roman, nor an empire. The supposed tax reform plan that the "Big Six" have just released gets two-thirds of the way there. It is about taxes, but it's not reform - just massive, unfunded tax cuts - and it's not a plan - just rough ideas, sketched in crayon, that a Tax I law student could have done (better) in 24 hours or less.
It's really an insult to have to focus on so sketchy and poorly conceived an issuance. I have better things to do with my time, and there are more thoughtful people around, on the right as well as the left, with whom it would be more fruitful to interact intellectually.
Just two quick things, as I'm saving international for a follow-up post:
--Why raise the bottom rate from 10% to 12%? I can see no good reason for this apart from malicious class warfare. It can't be about revenue, given everything else in the plan.
--The 25% rate for business income of pass-throughs may take the prize as the worst new tax policy idea of the past thirty years. They say they'll have rules to prevent conversion of "personal income" into business income - but that just states (a part of) the problem, rather than offering any suggestion that it could be handled with any success or without massive and idiotic complexity. And why should "business income" get a lower tax rate than "personal income" - such as wages - anyway? Do they hate employment, as opposed to being self-employed? If so, why not simply fine people who take jobs working for someone else? That is essentially what they are proposing to do.
It's really an insult to have to focus on so sketchy and poorly conceived an issuance. I have better things to do with my time, and there are more thoughtful people around, on the right as well as the left, with whom it would be more fruitful to interact intellectually.
Just two quick things, as I'm saving international for a follow-up post:
--Why raise the bottom rate from 10% to 12%? I can see no good reason for this apart from malicious class warfare. It can't be about revenue, given everything else in the plan.
--The 25% rate for business income of pass-throughs may take the prize as the worst new tax policy idea of the past thirty years. They say they'll have rules to prevent conversion of "personal income" into business income - but that just states (a part of) the problem, rather than offering any suggestion that it could be handled with any success or without massive and idiotic complexity. And why should "business income" get a lower tax rate than "personal income" - such as wages - anyway? Do they hate employment, as opposed to being self-employed? If so, why not simply fine people who take jobs working for someone else? That is essentially what they are proposing to do.
Wednesday, September 27, 2017
Back from Amsterdam
Back in Berlin after 3 days in Amsterdam, where I participated in a KPMG conference meant to enlighten corporate tax directors and such on what to expect and prepare for. I played the role of American expert (as did Danielle Rolfes) and of house pessimist. The two are strangely linked these days.
Back in Berlin, where I've been writing a new international tax article on the treatment of foreign taxes by the U.S. and other tax systems and how this might related to what I call unilateral and strategic tax policy approaches. This piece pushes forward on some ideas that I've covered more cursorily in the past, and is a nice change of pace for me before returning to my literature & high-end inequality book. Among other things, it's easier to write.
Back in Berlin, where I've been writing a new international tax article on the treatment of foreign taxes by the U.S. and other tax systems and how this might related to what I call unilateral and strategic tax policy approaches. This piece pushes forward on some ideas that I've covered more cursorily in the past, and is a nice change of pace for me before returning to my literature & high-end inequality book. Among other things, it's easier to write.
Tuesday, September 19, 2017
The view from my window at NYU Berlin
Nice to see this corvid right outside my window at NYU Berlin, where at the moment I am working on a new international tax article (as a brief change of pace from my literature book). I am a fan, or more like a distant admirer, of corvids as a group.
Corvids, due to their strikingly high intelligence, have been called "flying monkeys" by knowledgeable bird experts. I gather that they need the brains (which are definitely not "bird brains" in the colloquial sense) both for social reasons and to navigate a complex environment. E.g., given that they are willing and able to eat just about anything, they both need to make good choices, and may try to access things that require some work and cleverness.
But, alas, it doesn't seem practical (and might not be prudent) to try to make a new friend here.
I am confident that my cats, if they were on the scene, also wouldn't deem it prudent to seek a closer association, even if they could get through the closed window. This bird is too big for them.
Corvids, due to their strikingly high intelligence, have been called "flying monkeys" by knowledgeable bird experts. I gather that they need the brains (which are definitely not "bird brains" in the colloquial sense) both for social reasons and to navigate a complex environment. E.g., given that they are willing and able to eat just about anything, they both need to make good choices, and may try to access things that require some work and cleverness.
But, alas, it doesn't seem practical (and might not be prudent) to try to make a new friend here.
I am confident that my cats, if they were on the scene, also wouldn't deem it prudent to seek a closer association, even if they could get through the closed window. This bird is too big for them.
Friday, September 15, 2017
Precise targeting to increase high-end inequality?
I haven't yet read this recently posted article, but I plan to, as it seems to be important (and is by good researchers). But here is the key finding from its abstract:
"Using administrative data linking 10 million firms to their owners, this paper shows that private business owners who actively manage their firms are key for top-income inequality. Private business income accounts for most of the rise of top incomes since 2000 and the majority of top-earners receive private business income - most of which accrues to active owner-managers of mid-market firms in relatively skill-intensive and unconcentrated industries."
This would appear to suggest that the proposed lower tax rates for business owners of pass-throughs are almost precisely targeted to increase high-end inequality as much as possible, in exchange for as little efficiency payoff as possible. These probably tend to be people with low labor supply elasticity and/or who are in effect reaping rents.
"Using administrative data linking 10 million firms to their owners, this paper shows that private business owners who actively manage their firms are key for top-income inequality. Private business income accounts for most of the rise of top incomes since 2000 and the majority of top-earners receive private business income - most of which accrues to active owner-managers of mid-market firms in relatively skill-intensive and unconcentrated industries."
This would appear to suggest that the proposed lower tax rates for business owners of pass-throughs are almost precisely targeted to increase high-end inequality as much as possible, in exchange for as little efficiency payoff as possible. These probably tend to be people with low labor supply elasticity and/or who are in effect reaping rents.
What could Trump / Mnuchin mean when they claim taxes won't decline for the wealthy?
Not just Trump but also Mnuchin have been claiming that taxes won't decline for the high-income in the supposedly soon-emerging tax "reform" plan. The fact that Mnuchin is saying it, too, makes one think that maybe it isn't just impulsive lying or oblivious salesmanship, but reflects a view about what they will be able to claim about the ultimate package. Yet this is a deal that they are working on with Paul Ryan, not with Ron Wyden or Chuck Schumer.
So what might they be thinking, if we make the assumption (not 100% certain to be correct) that they actually are thinking strategically about the next stage? The following four things occur to me:
1) The fact that a corporate rate cut is likely to be at centerstage in the package may help them. Their argument that this doesn't help rich people can be both formalistic (corporations are separate taxpayers) and substantive (claims about the incidence of the corporate tax). Two points they will have to ignore, however, are (1) the transition incidence of cutting the corporate rate, which benefits existing shareholders if it wasn't fully anticipated, e.g., due to political uncertainty, and (2) the tax planning opportunities that a low corporate rate may give to high-income owner-employees.
2) They will be trying desperately to ignore the effects on high-income taxpayers of lowering the tax rate on amounts that business owners earn through pass-through entities. This is where the really big distributional action will be, if they go ahead with their reported plans to require people whom the tax system classifies as employees to pay significantly higher tax rates than those whom the tax system classifies as business owners. They'll call this a "small business" tax cut, but the point will be made in response that this a misportrayal of where the bulk of the benefit actually goes.
3) They anticipate announcing a package that takes away state and local tax deductions, and perhaps that also does something to home mortgage interest deductions. But these provisions seem highly unlikely to get through the Senate even if they are in the package and pass the House. Indeed, it's possible that they're being over-optimistic about the prospects even for unified "Big Six" endorsement of this.
4) Might they be planning not to propose repealing what is left of estate and gift taxes? Leaving that out of the package would certainly make it easier to claim that taxes aren't declining for the wealthy. But if I had to guess, they'll just try to brazen through the awkward tension between proposing estate and gift tax repeal and dressing up the package as no tax cut for the rich.
So what might they be thinking, if we make the assumption (not 100% certain to be correct) that they actually are thinking strategically about the next stage? The following four things occur to me:
1) The fact that a corporate rate cut is likely to be at centerstage in the package may help them. Their argument that this doesn't help rich people can be both formalistic (corporations are separate taxpayers) and substantive (claims about the incidence of the corporate tax). Two points they will have to ignore, however, are (1) the transition incidence of cutting the corporate rate, which benefits existing shareholders if it wasn't fully anticipated, e.g., due to political uncertainty, and (2) the tax planning opportunities that a low corporate rate may give to high-income owner-employees.
2) They will be trying desperately to ignore the effects on high-income taxpayers of lowering the tax rate on amounts that business owners earn through pass-through entities. This is where the really big distributional action will be, if they go ahead with their reported plans to require people whom the tax system classifies as employees to pay significantly higher tax rates than those whom the tax system classifies as business owners. They'll call this a "small business" tax cut, but the point will be made in response that this a misportrayal of where the bulk of the benefit actually goes.
3) They anticipate announcing a package that takes away state and local tax deductions, and perhaps that also does something to home mortgage interest deductions. But these provisions seem highly unlikely to get through the Senate even if they are in the package and pass the House. Indeed, it's possible that they're being over-optimistic about the prospects even for unified "Big Six" endorsement of this.
4) Might they be planning not to propose repealing what is left of estate and gift taxes? Leaving that out of the package would certainly make it easier to claim that taxes aren't declining for the wealthy. But if I had to guess, they'll just try to brazen through the awkward tension between proposing estate and gift tax repeal and dressing up the package as no tax cut for the rich.
Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose
After last night's game, the New York Mets' team ERA climbed to 5.02.
In 1962, the Mets' team ERA was 5.04.
Very different eras, but just sayin'.
In 1962, the Mets' team ERA was 5.04.
Very different eras, but just sayin'.
Thursday, September 14, 2017
Tax "reform" update
According to this account in Politico, the so-called Big Six disagree fundamentally about what their tax "reform" legislation should look like.
Speaker Ryan wants to enact expensing, but "Senate Republicans believe it won't fly in their chamber."
Ryan also wants to eliminate (net?) corporate interest deductions, but "the break is important to many companies, and other negotiators [Senate? Administration?] want only to reduce it."
Ryan wants to repeal state and local tax deductions for individuals, "but some are concerned over what that means for upper-middle class people."
Meanwhile, Senator Hatch favors a corporate integration proposal that presumably is dividend deductibility, but "the idea has not gotten much traction with House Republicans."
These are some pretty fundamental disagreements. Indeed, other than cutting rates and exempting things, which as a standalone cannot plausibly be called "reform" and would of course raise budget issues, there's nothing of comparable importance left. (Home mortgage interest deductions are presumably even a bigger political lift than state and local tax deductions.)
Speaker Ryan wants to enact expensing, but "Senate Republicans believe it won't fly in their chamber."
Ryan also wants to eliminate (net?) corporate interest deductions, but "the break is important to many companies, and other negotiators [Senate? Administration?] want only to reduce it."
Ryan wants to repeal state and local tax deductions for individuals, "but some are concerned over what that means for upper-middle class people."
Meanwhile, Senator Hatch favors a corporate integration proposal that presumably is dividend deductibility, but "the idea has not gotten much traction with House Republicans."
These are some pretty fundamental disagreements. Indeed, other than cutting rates and exempting things, which as a standalone cannot plausibly be called "reform" and would of course raise budget issues, there's nothing of comparable importance left. (Home mortgage interest deductions are presumably even a bigger political lift than state and local tax deductions.)
Tuesday, September 12, 2017
Tough question?
Two weeks from today, I'll be speaking at a KPMG-run conference in Amsterdam entitled "EMA Tax Summit 2017: A Year of Disruption and Rapid Change." It would be rather a long trip to undertake from the U.S., but as it happens I'll be by then in Berlin, amid a three-week stay at NYU Berlin, where I'll be doing some work on my literature book. (The work isn't site-specific, except insofar as I suppose that getting away can help one's focus.) So I thought it was reasonable to engage in the side-trip.
Since the conference deals with what tax planners should expect in both the US and the EU, I wouldn't be surprised if they asked me whether it's realistic to expect Congress to enact comprehensive tax reform - say, by the end of this year or so.
Hmmm, that's a tough one. I will have to think about it.
Since the conference deals with what tax planners should expect in both the US and the EU, I wouldn't be surprised if they asked me whether it's realistic to expect Congress to enact comprehensive tax reform - say, by the end of this year or so.
Hmmm, that's a tough one. I will have to think about it.
Sunday, September 10, 2017
Why is Exile on Main Street so much better than Let It Bleed and Sticky Fingers?
More ruminations here from my resurrecting stuff via Spotify that I hadn't listened to for a while, to help get me through my elliptical machine sessions at the health club:
The canonical view of the Rolling Stones' career, for those in my approximate taste sector, goes something like this. In the 1960s, they were the best and most important white rock or pop musicians, with the exception of the Beatles and Dylan, plus in retrospect perhaps the Velvet Underground. But they were mainly just a great singles band (plus other outstanding tracks - e.g., Sitting on a Fence, What to Do, She Smiled Sweetly, and Ride On Baby, to name four that come right to mind), whose albums generally fell short of showing them consistently at their best. Then came the mistake of Satanic Majesties, after which they pulled themselves together by starting their mature period with Beggars Banquet, followed by the 3 classics - Let It Bleed, Sticky Fingers, and Exile on Main Street - after which they got bored and mostly dull for a few albums (albeit, still with a few great tracks). Then they woke up one last time for Some Girls, the fading echoes of which somewhat enlivened the next two albums (Emotional Rescue and Tattoo You). But after that, while perhaps there's a good track here or there, their recordings are generally best forgotten.
Canonical or not, this basically matches my view of their career, except that I would make one big revision that I know is not canonical. Of the "3 classics," I find Let It Bleed and Sticky Fingers overrated and at times boring, although of course they have a number of essential tracks. But Exile on Main Street truly is their pinnacle.
I would put Some Girls second and Between the Buttons, released in January 1967 as their version of Revolver, third. Each of my favorite 3 Stones albums has a distinctive internal creative dynamic. Exile on Main Street is basically a Richards album with Jagger just along for the ride. Some Girls is basically a Jagger album with Richards just along for the ride. And Between the Buttons gets a lot of its punch from Brian Jones' playing a different odd instrument to flavor the sound on almost every track. (It thus makes their much later work sound incredibly monochromatic and boring.)
Anyway, so what makes Exile on Main Street so much better (in my view at least) than Let It Bleed and Sticky Fingers? Again, the latter two have a number of incredible tracks. But there's a whole lot of not that interesting macho posturing going on, along with rock-blues stuff that sounds a bit generic although I realize of course that this is partly from its being imitated so much afterwards (but then again, they were imitating earlier black artists when they did it). Take Honky Tonk Women and Brown Sugar, even leaving to one side their racial and sexual political incorrectness, which were deliberate, pursuant to their outlaw image in a more retrograde era than ours today. Although these tracks are extremely catchy, dynamic, and fun, they can't be at or near the artistic and expressive pinnacle of popular music from the rock era, unless that pinnacle was considerably lower than some of us would like to believe.
But Exile on Main Street is not just rich, full, and beautiful in its sound (despite its famously murky mix) - it makes fantastic use of all the great extra musicians and singers they had on hand - but soulful, wistful, elegiac, and hurt. (Just one great example among many is Torn and Frayed.) Macho preening isn't its thing; instead it's about staring into an abyss of one's own creation. A suitable mood, perhaps, for the United States these days.
The canonical view of the Rolling Stones' career, for those in my approximate taste sector, goes something like this. In the 1960s, they were the best and most important white rock or pop musicians, with the exception of the Beatles and Dylan, plus in retrospect perhaps the Velvet Underground. But they were mainly just a great singles band (plus other outstanding tracks - e.g., Sitting on a Fence, What to Do, She Smiled Sweetly, and Ride On Baby, to name four that come right to mind), whose albums generally fell short of showing them consistently at their best. Then came the mistake of Satanic Majesties, after which they pulled themselves together by starting their mature period with Beggars Banquet, followed by the 3 classics - Let It Bleed, Sticky Fingers, and Exile on Main Street - after which they got bored and mostly dull for a few albums (albeit, still with a few great tracks). Then they woke up one last time for Some Girls, the fading echoes of which somewhat enlivened the next two albums (Emotional Rescue and Tattoo You). But after that, while perhaps there's a good track here or there, their recordings are generally best forgotten.
Canonical or not, this basically matches my view of their career, except that I would make one big revision that I know is not canonical. Of the "3 classics," I find Let It Bleed and Sticky Fingers overrated and at times boring, although of course they have a number of essential tracks. But Exile on Main Street truly is their pinnacle.
I would put Some Girls second and Between the Buttons, released in January 1967 as their version of Revolver, third. Each of my favorite 3 Stones albums has a distinctive internal creative dynamic. Exile on Main Street is basically a Richards album with Jagger just along for the ride. Some Girls is basically a Jagger album with Richards just along for the ride. And Between the Buttons gets a lot of its punch from Brian Jones' playing a different odd instrument to flavor the sound on almost every track. (It thus makes their much later work sound incredibly monochromatic and boring.)
Anyway, so what makes Exile on Main Street so much better (in my view at least) than Let It Bleed and Sticky Fingers? Again, the latter two have a number of incredible tracks. But there's a whole lot of not that interesting macho posturing going on, along with rock-blues stuff that sounds a bit generic although I realize of course that this is partly from its being imitated so much afterwards (but then again, they were imitating earlier black artists when they did it). Take Honky Tonk Women and Brown Sugar, even leaving to one side their racial and sexual political incorrectness, which were deliberate, pursuant to their outlaw image in a more retrograde era than ours today. Although these tracks are extremely catchy, dynamic, and fun, they can't be at or near the artistic and expressive pinnacle of popular music from the rock era, unless that pinnacle was considerably lower than some of us would like to believe.
But Exile on Main Street is not just rich, full, and beautiful in its sound (despite its famously murky mix) - it makes fantastic use of all the great extra musicians and singers they had on hand - but soulful, wistful, elegiac, and hurt. (Just one great example among many is Torn and Frayed.) Macho preening isn't its thing; instead it's about staring into an abyss of one's own creation. A suitable mood, perhaps, for the United States these days.
Tuesday, September 05, 2017
Not wonky enough?
Matt Yglesias, in a
generally excellent column about the sorts of federal income tax changes that the
Administration and Republican Congressional leadership may seek in the next
couple of months, rightly notes that tax reform, in common usage, means “reducing tax rates without massively reducing federal tax revenue
because the losses from the rate cuts are offset by closing loopholes and
eliminating or curbing deductions.” He
also rightly notes that the Republicans are unlikely actually to attempt this,
since base-broadening sufficient to offset the revenue loss is no fun
politically. He then asks why, on policy
grounds, one might favor bona fide tax reform:
“What’s good about
tax reform?
“The official wonky case for tax reform stems
from a divergence in the way that a normal person thinks about taxes from the
way that an economist [does] ....
“To a normal person, taxes are a necessary
evil. The evil thing about them is that after you pay taxes you have less money
than you had before. Most people like money, so they like the idea of getting a
tax cut, and they don’t like the idea of getting a tax hike, primarily because
they are focused on the impact of tax changes on their after-tax income. If
Congress changed the law to cut my taxes by $500, I’d be pretty happy about
that. And I wouldn’t care whether they did that by tweaking the individual
exemption, tweaking the dependent exemption for my 2-year-old, making his
preschool tuition tax-deductible, or cutting my marginal income tax rate. At
the end of the day, the point would be to get the $500.
“But from a supply-side viewpoint, these are
very different policies. Making the individual exemption a little bit bigger
puts $500 in my pocket but it doesn’t give me any new incentives to work harder
and earn more money. If anything, by making me a little more economically
comfortable it reduces my
incentive to work harder and earn more money. By contrast, cutting my marginal
income tax rate doesn’t just put $500 in my pocket. It makes it more worth my while to try to go
out and hustle up some paid speaking appearances or otherwise find ways to earn
a bit more.
“Tax reform is good, on this view, because it’s
a way to greatly improve incentives without costing the government much in the
way of revenue. The 1986 tax reform bill, for example, eliminated enough
loopholes to pay for a cut in the top marginal income tax rate from 50 percent
all the way down to 33 percent — drastically increasing the incentive of rich
people to go out and try to become even richer.”
In the above text, Yglesias offers a generally useful
explanation. However, he may overstate (or, at least, slightly misstate) the main
character of the economist’s case for tax reform. To show this, let’s make two tweaks to his
illustration. First, let’s suppose that
I’d get $500 via Congress’s newly making preschool tuition tax-deductible,
rather than by its either (a) raising personal or dependent exemptions or (b)
lowering marginal tax rates. Second, let’s
suppose that I would decide to work and earn more if I were sending my child to
a costly preschool than if I were keeping the child at home.
Now, with the tax treatment of preschool
tuition tax being an input to my labor supply choice, it lines up more the marginal
tax rate change, and less with changing the individual and/or dependent
exemption. So, if we already had preschool tuition tax-deductibility as a
feature of current tax law, and we were thinking of repealing it to fund a
lower marginal tax rate, the “tax reform” might end up, at a first
approximation, not increasing my incentive to earn. E.g., suppose that, when I was
thinking of working more so I could send my child to preschool, the combination
of (a) an increased after-tax return from my work and (b) an increased
after-tax cost to the preschool, left me in the same place as I was before.
To make this a more plausible revision of the hypothetical,
suppose that both decisions are scalable. E.g., I can work just a little bit
more or a lot more; I can send my child to a cheaper preschool or a more expensive
one. The bottom line may still be a lot less change than might otherwise have
been expected to my labor supply incentives. I work to earn money to spend on
things I want, and the base-broadening makes it costlier than it was before to
buy the things I happen to most want.
Why point this out? In the 1986 tax reform, at
least some studies found afterwards that work incentives hadn’t really changed
much, by reason of the base-broadening. E.g., suppose I previously hadn’t
minded the 50% top rate because tax shelters would prevent me from actually
having to pay it. Now the rate was lower but the tax shelters were gone, so I would
actually have to pay the headline rate. This may have been a good policy change
for other reasons that I’ll get to in a moment. But it could mean that my
incentive to earn more $$ wouldn’t actually have increased.
Now let’s turn to contemporary thought
experiments in which, say, state and local tax deductions, home mortgage
interest deductions, and/or 401(k) deductions are repealed to fund lower
rates. (In the 401(k) example, even if
the current deduction is replaced by a future exclusion that’s slated to apply when
I withdraw the money, suppose that I’m either myopic or else don’t trust future
Congresses to retain the exclusion.) If I’m paying about as much tax on balance
as I was before, it’s plausible, depending on the details and on my level of understanding,
that my view of my after-tax incentive to work will also remain about where it
was before, given the changes to the tax treatment of some of my earnings’
possible uses.
With that in mind, let’s re-ask Yglesias’s
question: “What’s good about tax reform?” The answer, if any, is that, even if
we haven’t substantially changed my incentive to work and earn, we have done so
with respect to how I spend my earnings.
In terms of the 1986 example, it’s presumably
good that I’m no longer investing in tax shelters (assuming that their tax
benefits were socially undesirable), since I will now seek opportunities that
offer greater expected pretax profitability. But it’s my inter-asset choices
that are now less tax-distorted than previously, rather than my incentive to
work and earn.
Likewise, for the 2017 scenario, suppose we see
no relevant social difference between my spending my $$ on (a) preschool
tuition or (b) fancy vacations. Then eliminating the distortion to my choice
that resulted from the hypothetical tuition deduction is a good thing here,
albeit by express stipulation. But if we don’t
think the deduction was bad, e.g., because we see positive externalities to
people’s sending their kids to preschool instead of spending the $$ on own
consumption, then so much the worse for the case for “tax reform” here.
I myself tend to like the inter-asset
efficiency consequences of a revenue-neutral tax rate cut plus reduction to the
home mortgage interest deduction. But that’s because I don’t like the deduction,
or more precisely what I take to be its main effects. The state and local tax
deduction example is potentially quite different. So is the 401(k) deduction
repeal, although there we would need to specify a lot more about what people
expect, how they make savings choices, how we should think about socially
optimal savings choices, etcetera.
Returning to Yglesias’s main point about tax
reform, we’ve now both (a) made the economist’s argument wonkier still – by relating
it to distortions in asset or activity or consumption choice, rather than to
labor supply as such, and (b) shown that it needs to be evaluated case-by-case,
in terms of the arguments for a particular tax benefit that would be eliminated
to pay for tax reform.
Of course, as I agreed with Yglesias at the
start, the Republicans appear unlikely to attempt bona fide “tax reform” (with
significant base-broadening) anyway. But just in case anyone should ever
attempt it in the future, I hope it’s useful to clarify the nature of the main
argument for it.
Thursday, August 31, 2017
Talk on my literature book and its E.M. Forster chapter
This Tuesday, hard on the heels of my international tax talk at USF Law School the previous day, I gave a talk at U.C. Hastings College of Law on my literature book in general, and its chapter on E.M. Forster's Howards End in particular.
Slides for the talk are available here.
Slides for the talk are available here.
Talk on inversions and corporate residence
Is it "populist" to cut taxes for Wall Street?
To call corporate tax cuts "populist" really achieves a new level in rhetorical depravity.
It's true that lowering the tax rate on inbound investment (including that which might otherwise be outbound without facing the domestic rate) should increase U.S. investment, all else equal, presumably with positive implications for wages and/or jobs. Although, that said, two important points to keep in mind are:
(1) the labor market is complicated, and it's not a simple question how employment levels end up being set.
(2) the link between productivity and wages also is complicated. It used to be more or less assumed that, if labor productivity increased, including due to added capital investment, wages were bound to go up, too. But data from the last twenty years have cast doubt on this, as "capital" rather than "labor" - although the standard use of these terms may be questioned - has seemed to capture nearly all of the productivity growth. One really has to look closely at how markets operate, how wages are set, who has market power and in what dimensions, and so forth, in order to answer that.
So, even in the best case, calling tax cuts for Wall Street a shot in the arm for American workers is simplistic and questionable, even though it's surely true, all else equal, that we would like U.S. investment to increase and that lower effective tax rates on business investment should tend to accomplish this.
But then we have further aspects to think about. For example, the transition gain from cutting corporate taxes (or, more precisely, from a change in information regarding the likely future tax rate on corporate investment) goes to existing shareholders. Note also that the lower tax rate applies to the fruits of old investment, which are no longer subject to choice based on new incentives. (On the other hand, it is true that Auerbach-Kotlikoff models find a loss to old investment when new investment increases due to a cut in its effective tax rate.)
Also, unfunded tax cuts that the government has to finance through borrowing may lead to crowd-out of new investment. So even the basic simple model in which investment increases so workers gain will not clearly hold. And if you fund the rate cuts - however unlikely that might be in terms of the tax changes that the Republicans are seeking - then someone or something has to pay for it. So middle class taxpayers (and poor people who get reduced services) will have to pay - since it's not going to be the high-income ones, with this crew - and/or there have to be offsetting tax increases on investment (although there is the same issue here of new vs. old investment) that might blunt the incentive effects right from the start.
Final answer: These are complicated issues, so if you want to respect all nuance there is no clear answer to exactly who wins and loses from cutting taxes from Wall Street. And it also of course depends on the package's full details. But if I were forced to give an unnuanced short answer, I would say that the initial optics are probably the best short summary: cutting taxes for Wall Street benefits Wall Street. If that's populist, then it's clear the term has been substantially redefined.
It's true that lowering the tax rate on inbound investment (including that which might otherwise be outbound without facing the domestic rate) should increase U.S. investment, all else equal, presumably with positive implications for wages and/or jobs. Although, that said, two important points to keep in mind are:
(1) the labor market is complicated, and it's not a simple question how employment levels end up being set.
(2) the link between productivity and wages also is complicated. It used to be more or less assumed that, if labor productivity increased, including due to added capital investment, wages were bound to go up, too. But data from the last twenty years have cast doubt on this, as "capital" rather than "labor" - although the standard use of these terms may be questioned - has seemed to capture nearly all of the productivity growth. One really has to look closely at how markets operate, how wages are set, who has market power and in what dimensions, and so forth, in order to answer that.
So, even in the best case, calling tax cuts for Wall Street a shot in the arm for American workers is simplistic and questionable, even though it's surely true, all else equal, that we would like U.S. investment to increase and that lower effective tax rates on business investment should tend to accomplish this.
But then we have further aspects to think about. For example, the transition gain from cutting corporate taxes (or, more precisely, from a change in information regarding the likely future tax rate on corporate investment) goes to existing shareholders. Note also that the lower tax rate applies to the fruits of old investment, which are no longer subject to choice based on new incentives. (On the other hand, it is true that Auerbach-Kotlikoff models find a loss to old investment when new investment increases due to a cut in its effective tax rate.)
Also, unfunded tax cuts that the government has to finance through borrowing may lead to crowd-out of new investment. So even the basic simple model in which investment increases so workers gain will not clearly hold. And if you fund the rate cuts - however unlikely that might be in terms of the tax changes that the Republicans are seeking - then someone or something has to pay for it. So middle class taxpayers (and poor people who get reduced services) will have to pay - since it's not going to be the high-income ones, with this crew - and/or there have to be offsetting tax increases on investment (although there is the same issue here of new vs. old investment) that might blunt the incentive effects right from the start.
Final answer: These are complicated issues, so if you want to respect all nuance there is no clear answer to exactly who wins and loses from cutting taxes from Wall Street. And it also of course depends on the package's full details. But if I were forced to give an unnuanced short answer, I would say that the initial optics are probably the best short summary: cutting taxes for Wall Street benefits Wall Street. If that's populist, then it's clear the term has been substantially redefined.
Friday, August 25, 2017
Off to the West Coast, then back again, then Berlin/Vienna, then back again
I'll be giving a talk at USF Law School on Monday (8/28) regarding inversions and corporate residence, and will probably post slides here afterwards.
Then on Tuesday 8/29 I'll give a talk to the Hastings Law School faculty regarding my literature book and its chapter on E.M. Forster's Howards End. While that's not a public event and I won't be posting slides during the talk, I wrote slides to use as my own lecture notes and may post them afterwards.
Then back to NYC on Wednesday 8/30. I'll be blissfully detached from the start of the new semester, as I'm on sabbatical this fall. On September 18 I'll start 3 weeks at NYU Berlin, mainly just doing my own work while there. I'll fly to Amsterdam for a day to do a tax panel there for CEOs and such, and also to Ljubljana for the weekend at one point for purely touristic reasons, and then I'll spend a week teaching or really more discussing international tax policy with Vienna University's excellent DIBT graduate students. Then back home for a while.
I may actually complete my literature book this fall - the trick that makes this possible is my dividing it into two separate books so it wouldn't be unduly long. The first book ends with the late Gilded Age, and with all the horrors of the twentieth century that eased high-end inequality (World War I, the Great Depression, World War II, and then more benignly the continuation) still looming around the corner but as yet out of sight. Before starting Book 2, which carries us through to the present, I will probably write an international tax policy article. Rather than just rehashing past things I've said in the past, I do have a couple of relatively novel ideas that I might tackle in this. One concerns thinking about the welter of inconsistent policies that arguably underlie the current U.S. system - when they must be used, e.g., to define (whether legislatively, administratively, or judicially) "abuses" that are counter to its "policy" - and the other, all the recent hoodoo about shifting entirely from origin basis to destination basis.
Then on Tuesday 8/29 I'll give a talk to the Hastings Law School faculty regarding my literature book and its chapter on E.M. Forster's Howards End. While that's not a public event and I won't be posting slides during the talk, I wrote slides to use as my own lecture notes and may post them afterwards.
Then back to NYC on Wednesday 8/30. I'll be blissfully detached from the start of the new semester, as I'm on sabbatical this fall. On September 18 I'll start 3 weeks at NYU Berlin, mainly just doing my own work while there. I'll fly to Amsterdam for a day to do a tax panel there for CEOs and such, and also to Ljubljana for the weekend at one point for purely touristic reasons, and then I'll spend a week teaching or really more discussing international tax policy with Vienna University's excellent DIBT graduate students. Then back home for a while.
I may actually complete my literature book this fall - the trick that makes this possible is my dividing it into two separate books so it wouldn't be unduly long. The first book ends with the late Gilded Age, and with all the horrors of the twentieth century that eased high-end inequality (World War I, the Great Depression, World War II, and then more benignly the continuation) still looming around the corner but as yet out of sight. Before starting Book 2, which carries us through to the present, I will probably write an international tax policy article. Rather than just rehashing past things I've said in the past, I do have a couple of relatively novel ideas that I might tackle in this. One concerns thinking about the welter of inconsistent policies that arguably underlie the current U.S. system - when they must be used, e.g., to define (whether legislatively, administratively, or judicially) "abuses" that are counter to its "policy" - and the other, all the recent hoodoo about shifting entirely from origin basis to destination basis.
Thursday, August 24, 2017
Tuesday, August 22, 2017
Say it and get out?
Despite my most recent blog post on music, not everything I listen to was released before some of my readers were even born. Indeed, my playing roster - which these days is more a function of Spotify than my CD collection - includes material from each decade since the 1950s, admittedly with a particular focus on the 1960s, 1970s, 1990s, and 2000s. (Less from the 1980s and 2010s.)
And while I don't listen to music at home as much as I used to (or at work at all - whereas I wrote my college senior thesis to the sound of Marquee Moon and Elvis Costello), my needing to cope with the extreme boredom of health club elliptical machine sessions means that I am always on the lookout for things that I would like to listen to. These include, not just new things, but also old favorites that I haven't played for a while. So there's a cycle of rediscovery that I try to keep going, although new fare is needed or else it will tend to run down.
Anyway, the last couple of days I've been listening to Lily Allen's two fine albums from the 2000s, which I hadn't played for quite a few years. She released them and then announced that she was quitting the music biz - although she's been back since with lesser impact culturally, artistically, and commercially.
Her retirement surprised me at the time, but in retrospect I understand it. Her methodology as a songwriter on those two albums seems to have involved her adopting a very clear topic and point of view for each song. In effect, they were short stories, essays, or character studies, and you could almost imagine her having had a topic sentence in mind for each before she started writing it. It doesn't feel as if she started each song with a riff, like Keef or something - although the melodies and hooks are often quite strong.
Sometimes the pitch sentence seems to have been thematic - e.g., addiction, consumerism, George W. Bush, or young single women living unsatisfying lives - but often it involved drawing a picture of a particular person. These included her father, grandmother, brother, and apparently a rogue's gallery of mainly disappointing boyfriends. (Important message: be very careful if you date a songwriter.) It's plausible that she simply ran out of good material, in addition to entering a life stage where slagging those around her (often an artistically promising approach) would grow increasingly costly.
"If you can't keep it up at the same level, quit" can be good advice aesthetically, but it's not always an optimizing strategy in career terms. It brings to mind an issue that we academics can face. If you spend enough years writing about a bunch of things, you can reach the point where you no longer have a lot to say that's as important or as interesting (to yourself as well as others) as what you said before. Of course, you can always keep on saying the same thing again and again (especially if you feel that a point you've discussed remains underappreciated), but this faces diminishing returns.
A lot of us in the biz have dealt with this issue in different ways. A key one for me, although also for some others whom I know, is to try decidedly new things. I've been happy with that approach on my current literature project (more on this shortly, perhaps), but it certainly can be an audience risk.
And while I don't listen to music at home as much as I used to (or at work at all - whereas I wrote my college senior thesis to the sound of Marquee Moon and Elvis Costello), my needing to cope with the extreme boredom of health club elliptical machine sessions means that I am always on the lookout for things that I would like to listen to. These include, not just new things, but also old favorites that I haven't played for a while. So there's a cycle of rediscovery that I try to keep going, although new fare is needed or else it will tend to run down.
Anyway, the last couple of days I've been listening to Lily Allen's two fine albums from the 2000s, which I hadn't played for quite a few years. She released them and then announced that she was quitting the music biz - although she's been back since with lesser impact culturally, artistically, and commercially.
Her retirement surprised me at the time, but in retrospect I understand it. Her methodology as a songwriter on those two albums seems to have involved her adopting a very clear topic and point of view for each song. In effect, they were short stories, essays, or character studies, and you could almost imagine her having had a topic sentence in mind for each before she started writing it. It doesn't feel as if she started each song with a riff, like Keef or something - although the melodies and hooks are often quite strong.
Sometimes the pitch sentence seems to have been thematic - e.g., addiction, consumerism, George W. Bush, or young single women living unsatisfying lives - but often it involved drawing a picture of a particular person. These included her father, grandmother, brother, and apparently a rogue's gallery of mainly disappointing boyfriends. (Important message: be very careful if you date a songwriter.) It's plausible that she simply ran out of good material, in addition to entering a life stage where slagging those around her (often an artistically promising approach) would grow increasingly costly.
"If you can't keep it up at the same level, quit" can be good advice aesthetically, but it's not always an optimizing strategy in career terms. It brings to mind an issue that we academics can face. If you spend enough years writing about a bunch of things, you can reach the point where you no longer have a lot to say that's as important or as interesting (to yourself as well as others) as what you said before. Of course, you can always keep on saying the same thing again and again (especially if you feel that a point you've discussed remains underappreciated), but this faces diminishing returns.
A lot of us in the biz have dealt with this issue in different ways. A key one for me, although also for some others whom I know, is to try decidedly new things. I've been happy with that approach on my current literature project (more on this shortly, perhaps), but it certainly can be an audience risk.
Friday, August 18, 2017
Correcting Krugman's latest column
In re. today’s Krugman column comparing
Trump to Caligula:
“Never mind tax reform [enacting
regressive tax cuts]. Congress has to act within the next few weeks to enact a
budget, or the government will shut down; to raise the debt ceiling, or the
U.S. will go into default; to renew the Children’s Health Insurance Program, or
millions of children will lose coverage.”
Thursday, August 17, 2017
"We Can Work It Out"
I've been ruminating lately about the above-named Beatles song, perhaps in part because we're at a time and in a place where things do not seem working out for our country or the world, on many levels, but also due to its own extraordinary merits, beauty, and pathos - despite its surface optimism - as a song.
There's a longstanding genre of popular songs in which the character played by the singer conspicuously doesn't get it, adding irony and pathos to his or her romantic plight. To name two examples from songs covered by the Beatles, in "Please, Mr. Postman" we know perfectly well that it isn't the postman's fault no letters are arriving from the loved one. The singer is deflecting his (or in the Marvelettes' original version her) anxiety away from the real source of the problem.
Likewise, in "Slow Down," the woman who's "moving way too fast," and who needs to "gimme a little loving ... if you want our love to last," plainly doesn't want it to last. She's got a "boyfriend down the street," after all. So the singer is petitioning her in vain, and misdiagnosing the problem because it's less painful than admitting straight up that she has dumped him.
"We Can Work It Out" is a subtler, less overt version of this self-deceiving narrator motif. The song (mainly written by McCartney) opens mid-argument - we don't hear what the argument is actually about - with the singer insisting that his girlfriend see it "my way," not hers. "Do I have to keep on talking till I can't go on?"
This is not generally a good way of bridging disagreements: You don't say to the other person: "your way" is wrong, stop exasperating me. And for that matter, the singer openly admits that "my way" offers no guarantees. They will either "get it straight or say good night," and "only time will tell if I am right or I am wrong."
So you get the infectious optimism of the singer's insistence that "we can work it out" - conveyed also by the vocal performance, yet undercut by the realization that they probably won't work it out, that he is approaching it the wrong way - without adequate sympathy, flexibility, or understanding - and that he pretty much realizes where they're likely headed, even as this remains the best he can do to try to head it off.
One of the song's widely noted merits is the back-and-forth between McCartney's verses, which I've been quoting so far, and Lennon's terse middle-eight ("Life is very short and there's no time / For fussing and fighting my friend"). That section provides a great change of pace and musical contrast, but it's not really pessimism undercutting optimism, so much as weariness and impatience undercutting the pretense of optimism. And the slowdown at its end into 3/4 time as they head back to the verse ("So I will ask you once again ...") adds to the sense of impatience, impending failure, and just being stuck.
"We can work it out / We can work it out," the song ends - the singer radiating enthusiasm that is clearly just a thin shell masking anxiety - followed by a striking minor-key chord run on the harmonium that's held for a few seconds.
There's a longstanding genre of popular songs in which the character played by the singer conspicuously doesn't get it, adding irony and pathos to his or her romantic plight. To name two examples from songs covered by the Beatles, in "Please, Mr. Postman" we know perfectly well that it isn't the postman's fault no letters are arriving from the loved one. The singer is deflecting his (or in the Marvelettes' original version her) anxiety away from the real source of the problem.
Likewise, in "Slow Down," the woman who's "moving way too fast," and who needs to "gimme a little loving ... if you want our love to last," plainly doesn't want it to last. She's got a "boyfriend down the street," after all. So the singer is petitioning her in vain, and misdiagnosing the problem because it's less painful than admitting straight up that she has dumped him.
"We Can Work It Out" is a subtler, less overt version of this self-deceiving narrator motif. The song (mainly written by McCartney) opens mid-argument - we don't hear what the argument is actually about - with the singer insisting that his girlfriend see it "my way," not hers. "Do I have to keep on talking till I can't go on?"
This is not generally a good way of bridging disagreements: You don't say to the other person: "your way" is wrong, stop exasperating me. And for that matter, the singer openly admits that "my way" offers no guarantees. They will either "get it straight or say good night," and "only time will tell if I am right or I am wrong."
So you get the infectious optimism of the singer's insistence that "we can work it out" - conveyed also by the vocal performance, yet undercut by the realization that they probably won't work it out, that he is approaching it the wrong way - without adequate sympathy, flexibility, or understanding - and that he pretty much realizes where they're likely headed, even as this remains the best he can do to try to head it off.
One of the song's widely noted merits is the back-and-forth between McCartney's verses, which I've been quoting so far, and Lennon's terse middle-eight ("Life is very short and there's no time / For fussing and fighting my friend"). That section provides a great change of pace and musical contrast, but it's not really pessimism undercutting optimism, so much as weariness and impatience undercutting the pretense of optimism. And the slowdown at its end into 3/4 time as they head back to the verse ("So I will ask you once again ...") adds to the sense of impatience, impending failure, and just being stuck.
"We can work it out / We can work it out," the song ends - the singer radiating enthusiasm that is clearly just a thin shell masking anxiety - followed by a striking minor-key chord run on the harmonium that's held for a few seconds.
Be it good or bad, let's stop calling it "tax reform"
The media pervasively uses the term "tax reform" to describe the income tax changes that the Republicans are seeking. And it pervasively compares these changes to 1986 tax reform. This should stop.
My reason for saying this is not just rhetorical - it's about using terms meaningfully to convey information. But I'll admit that the rhetorical aspect matters here. "Tax reform" sounds like it's a good thing. I happen to think that any tax changes that the Republican Congress passes and Trump signs will be horrendously bad - increasing the fiscal gap, hugely benefiting the top 0.1% at the expense of everyone else, and very possibly un-leveling the playing field (e.g., in favor of "business owners" at the expense of "employees"). But there's more than just rhetoric going on here - there's an implicit descriptive claim that appears to be false.
Historically, one thing that "tax reform" has meant is indeed "changes that I, the proponent, think are good." So by definition anyone who wants to change the tax laws is proposing "tax reform," and anyone who opposes those changes doesn't think that they constitute "tax reform."
But historically it has long had a more specific meaning than that, as I discussed in my 5/25/11 Tax Notes article, "1986-Style Tax Reform: A Good Idea Whose Time Has Passed." And the Republican plans aren't sufficiently well-related to this idea in order to be called "tax reform," other than in the "we think it's good, even if you think it's bad" sense.
From at least the 1950s through the early 1980s, "tax reform" tended to mean repealing income tax preferences, and broadening the tax base, so that the tax would become more progressive, with the high statutory rates at top income levels coming closer to be true effective rates.
Thus, for example, the Reagan changes in 1981 - mainly, greatly reducing income tax rates and speeding up cost recovery for business assets - weren't called "tax reform." Obviously, the proponents thought that these were good changes, but they didn't use a label that they knew meant something else.
Then the meaning of "tax reform" changed. A key moment was the introduction of Bradley-Gephardt by two Democrats, followed by Kemp-Kasten by two Republicans. The Reagan Administration Treasury I and Treasury II plans, followed by House and Senate bills that gave rise to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, cemented the new meaning.
Now "tax reform" meant broadening the base and lowering the rates, with the aim of being both revenue-neutral and distribution-neutral. So it was no longer about increasing progressivity, but it also wasn't about reducing it.
Whether or not this is a good model, it is what the term "tax reform" has generally meant for more than 30 years. (In the above-cited article, I argue that it's no longer a good model for how we should change the tax laws.) The line of argument for it, which is pretty compelling if one agrees that the "preferences" it would eliminate are bad, relies (perhaps naively) on horizontal equity between taxpayers along with inter-asset neutrality. The underlying political economy theory holds that stuff Congress put in that diverges from taxing all income the same is likely to reflect interest group politics, administrative problems, or something else other than good policymaking.
More recent Republican-led "tax reform" efforts have often aimed at something quite different: reducing not only tax rates but progressivity and net revenue. Not always - Dave Camp's international tax reform plan when he was House Ways and Means chair tried to do something akin to "tax reform" as typically defined. And Mitt Romney in 2012 at least gestured towards revenue and distributional neutrality, although he was rightly criticized because that was not realistically achievable under his parameters (which he had deliberately left vague).
Now, however, Republicans in both the Administration and Capital Hill are pretty clearly - although there is occasional lying about it - aiming to reduce business taxation, reduce progressivity, and reduce revenues. Reducing tax rates is now the main feature, rather than one of two paired features. There may be some offsetting items that at least arguably constitute base-broadening, but they will be greatly outweighed by the rest of it.
This also, notoriously, will no longer be a bipartisan process. The idea of being revenue-neutral and distribution-neutral was crucial to the once-bipartisan character of "tax reform." In effect, the Democrats and Republicans said to each other: "Since we disagree about distribution and revenue levels, let's take all that off the table and find things about which we can agree." One reason that the likes of McConnell are so vehement about excluding Democrats from the process is that it would push them towards retaining those features, which they now oppose.
BTW, just as an aside, in the academic community the chief focus of discussion and interest has long since moved past 1986-style exercises. When we talk about tax reform, we are usually focused (whether pro or con) on (a) partially or wholly switching from income taxation to consumption taxation, and/or (b) finding more neutral ways to tax business income, be it domestically or internationally. This often proceeds under the view that revenue and/or distributional neutrality should be a key feature of the switch, so as to keep the main focus on the structural issues.
Okay, back to the bottom line. The term "tax reform" has come to have a clear historical meaning, beyond simply "we think this is good," based on attributes that emerging Republican proposals in Washington are certain to lack. So let's drop any pretense that the term is properly descriptive, other than in the sense that the proponents of course are arguing that their proposals are good.
And let's drop the analogy to 1986, which involved a very different set of changes, adopted in a very different era through a very different process. It's not illuminating here.
My reason for saying this is not just rhetorical - it's about using terms meaningfully to convey information. But I'll admit that the rhetorical aspect matters here. "Tax reform" sounds like it's a good thing. I happen to think that any tax changes that the Republican Congress passes and Trump signs will be horrendously bad - increasing the fiscal gap, hugely benefiting the top 0.1% at the expense of everyone else, and very possibly un-leveling the playing field (e.g., in favor of "business owners" at the expense of "employees"). But there's more than just rhetoric going on here - there's an implicit descriptive claim that appears to be false.
Historically, one thing that "tax reform" has meant is indeed "changes that I, the proponent, think are good." So by definition anyone who wants to change the tax laws is proposing "tax reform," and anyone who opposes those changes doesn't think that they constitute "tax reform."
But historically it has long had a more specific meaning than that, as I discussed in my 5/25/11 Tax Notes article, "1986-Style Tax Reform: A Good Idea Whose Time Has Passed." And the Republican plans aren't sufficiently well-related to this idea in order to be called "tax reform," other than in the "we think it's good, even if you think it's bad" sense.
From at least the 1950s through the early 1980s, "tax reform" tended to mean repealing income tax preferences, and broadening the tax base, so that the tax would become more progressive, with the high statutory rates at top income levels coming closer to be true effective rates.
Thus, for example, the Reagan changes in 1981 - mainly, greatly reducing income tax rates and speeding up cost recovery for business assets - weren't called "tax reform." Obviously, the proponents thought that these were good changes, but they didn't use a label that they knew meant something else.
Then the meaning of "tax reform" changed. A key moment was the introduction of Bradley-Gephardt by two Democrats, followed by Kemp-Kasten by two Republicans. The Reagan Administration Treasury I and Treasury II plans, followed by House and Senate bills that gave rise to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, cemented the new meaning.
Now "tax reform" meant broadening the base and lowering the rates, with the aim of being both revenue-neutral and distribution-neutral. So it was no longer about increasing progressivity, but it also wasn't about reducing it.
Whether or not this is a good model, it is what the term "tax reform" has generally meant for more than 30 years. (In the above-cited article, I argue that it's no longer a good model for how we should change the tax laws.) The line of argument for it, which is pretty compelling if one agrees that the "preferences" it would eliminate are bad, relies (perhaps naively) on horizontal equity between taxpayers along with inter-asset neutrality. The underlying political economy theory holds that stuff Congress put in that diverges from taxing all income the same is likely to reflect interest group politics, administrative problems, or something else other than good policymaking.
More recent Republican-led "tax reform" efforts have often aimed at something quite different: reducing not only tax rates but progressivity and net revenue. Not always - Dave Camp's international tax reform plan when he was House Ways and Means chair tried to do something akin to "tax reform" as typically defined. And Mitt Romney in 2012 at least gestured towards revenue and distributional neutrality, although he was rightly criticized because that was not realistically achievable under his parameters (which he had deliberately left vague).
Now, however, Republicans in both the Administration and Capital Hill are pretty clearly - although there is occasional lying about it - aiming to reduce business taxation, reduce progressivity, and reduce revenues. Reducing tax rates is now the main feature, rather than one of two paired features. There may be some offsetting items that at least arguably constitute base-broadening, but they will be greatly outweighed by the rest of it.
This also, notoriously, will no longer be a bipartisan process. The idea of being revenue-neutral and distribution-neutral was crucial to the once-bipartisan character of "tax reform." In effect, the Democrats and Republicans said to each other: "Since we disagree about distribution and revenue levels, let's take all that off the table and find things about which we can agree." One reason that the likes of McConnell are so vehement about excluding Democrats from the process is that it would push them towards retaining those features, which they now oppose.
BTW, just as an aside, in the academic community the chief focus of discussion and interest has long since moved past 1986-style exercises. When we talk about tax reform, we are usually focused (whether pro or con) on (a) partially or wholly switching from income taxation to consumption taxation, and/or (b) finding more neutral ways to tax business income, be it domestically or internationally. This often proceeds under the view that revenue and/or distributional neutrality should be a key feature of the switch, so as to keep the main focus on the structural issues.
Okay, back to the bottom line. The term "tax reform" has come to have a clear historical meaning, beyond simply "we think this is good," based on attributes that emerging Republican proposals in Washington are certain to lack. So let's drop any pretense that the term is properly descriptive, other than in the sense that the proponents of course are arguing that their proposals are good.
And let's drop the analogy to 1986, which involved a very different set of changes, adopted in a very different era through a very different process. It's not illuminating here.
Friday, August 11, 2017
In memory of Harry Grubert
I am sad to pass on the news that Harry Grubert, longtime Senior Research Economist in the Office of Tax Analysis at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and also a friend I greatly admired, has died quietly from a long-term illness.
Harry had more knowledge about U.S. international taxation than any other living individual. I'm not referring to legal knowledge, of course, as he was an economist - albeit, an exceptionally well-informed one about the law. But his long years of research and study regarding U.S. multinational firms, based on tax data that he understood better than anyone else, made him an extraordinary resource, almost like a public utility in light of his kind generosity and willingness to share what he knew.
He was also a leading scholar who developed a number of interesting and important international tax reform ideas (often in coauthored work with Rosanne Altshuler), and one whose research yielded innumerable consequential empirical findings - for example, regarding the costs associated with U.S. multinationals keeping their funds tied up abroad.
I would generally see him a couple of times a year at research conferences, most recently in Oxford this past May. And he was a presenter at the NYU Tax Policy Colloquium, I believe three times. We wouldn't have kept asking him back if he hadn't combined excellent and important papers with being a great presenter and fount of knowledge as well as wisdom.
As a matter of style, Harry was a fox, not a hedgehog - he knew many things (and I do mean many), rather than being inclined to focus on one big thing. If you'd ask him, say, about Rule or Proposal X's effects, he'd say: Here are the 17 margins at which it has an impact. He could even snap at the hedgehogs a bit, when the mood took him (suitably to the metaphor, I suppose). But his kindness and generosity always prevailed, with all who engaged with him.
Harry had more knowledge about U.S. international taxation than any other living individual. I'm not referring to legal knowledge, of course, as he was an economist - albeit, an exceptionally well-informed one about the law. But his long years of research and study regarding U.S. multinational firms, based on tax data that he understood better than anyone else, made him an extraordinary resource, almost like a public utility in light of his kind generosity and willingness to share what he knew.
He was also a leading scholar who developed a number of interesting and important international tax reform ideas (often in coauthored work with Rosanne Altshuler), and one whose research yielded innumerable consequential empirical findings - for example, regarding the costs associated with U.S. multinationals keeping their funds tied up abroad.
I would generally see him a couple of times a year at research conferences, most recently in Oxford this past May. And he was a presenter at the NYU Tax Policy Colloquium, I believe three times. We wouldn't have kept asking him back if he hadn't combined excellent and important papers with being a great presenter and fount of knowledge as well as wisdom.
As a matter of style, Harry was a fox, not a hedgehog - he knew many things (and I do mean many), rather than being inclined to focus on one big thing. If you'd ask him, say, about Rule or Proposal X's effects, he'd say: Here are the 17 margins at which it has an impact. He could even snap at the hedgehogs a bit, when the mood took him (suitably to the metaphor, I suppose). But his kindness and generosity always prevailed, with all who engaged with him.
Thursday, August 03, 2017
Possibly near the end
Buddy, age 14 and a member of our household since he was 10 months old, is not looking good - this photo perhaps fails to capture the full dinginess and fatigue that you can see on him in person - and evidently is not feeling good. He just sits like this in one place all day, sometimes a sheltered place. He has multiple progressing medical conditions, including a tumor, a heart murmur, and most recently diabetes. We're not certain yet, but it appears today that he may have decided to stop eating.
Until recently he'd been sick only once in the entire time that we have had him. Energetic (one of the great escape artists of his generation), easygoing (albeit manically energetic as a kitten), and unfailingly benign in temperament, he has been a great companion for a very long time. He likes (liked?) to lick people he knows on the nose. It hurts to see him like this.
The vet will see him tomorrow, and perhaps we'll know more then.
UPDATE (8/6/17) - He's eating small quantities of things that are very fragrant and appealing (e.g., bonito flakes). The vet thinks the cancer may have spread to his lymph nodes; gives him a week or two. We're trying to keep him as happy and comfortable as possible in the interim.
UPDATE (8/14/17) - Buddy died tonight, hopefully without much pain. Tapped out about what to say, but a great cat who had I think a good life.
Until recently he'd been sick only once in the entire time that we have had him. Energetic (one of the great escape artists of his generation), easygoing (albeit manically energetic as a kitten), and unfailingly benign in temperament, he has been a great companion for a very long time. He likes (liked?) to lick people he knows on the nose. It hurts to see him like this.
The vet will see him tomorrow, and perhaps we'll know more then.
UPDATE (8/6/17) - He's eating small quantities of things that are very fragrant and appealing (e.g., bonito flakes). The vet thinks the cancer may have spread to his lymph nodes; gives him a week or two. We're trying to keep him as happy and comfortable as possible in the interim.
UPDATE (8/14/17) - Buddy died tonight, hopefully without much pain. Tapped out about what to say, but a great cat who had I think a good life.
Monday, July 31, 2017
Video of a recent talk
A month ago (on June 30), I gave a talk at the Oxford Summer Conference entitled "A U.S. View of the EU State Aid Cases." I briefly blogged about it here, and posted a link to my slides, which are available here.
The Oxford folks have now posted videos of all the sessions at the Sumer Conference, and a video of my talk is available here.
The Oxford folks have now posted videos of all the sessions at the Sumer Conference, and a video of my talk is available here.
Friday, July 28, 2017
The latest on "tax reform"
Six
Republicans in leadership positions with respect to tax policy - Ryan,
McConnell, Mnuchin, Cohn, Hatch, and Brady - have now issued a public statement regarding
their plans for significant tax legislation, which they call "tax
reform." It appears to promise a more open, conventional, and
committee-based process than that which the Republicans used with respect to
healthcare. Other than that, here is the key paragraph, broken down
sentence-by-sentence with my annotations after each:
"We have always been in agreement that tax relief for American
families should be at the heart of our plan." Comment: This
is standard boilerplate. "Tax relief for American families," in the
sense that this term is meant to have (e.g., middle-income two-parent
households with children), will get only a small percentage of the benefits, if
indeed they get any.
"We also believe there should be a lower tax rate for small
businesses so they can compete with larger ones, and lower rates for all
American businesses so they can compete with foreign ones." Comment: This appears to mean that the self-employed, even if they are
extremely high-income, will pay lower tax rates than employees. I've commented
previously on what a poor design feature this is. But there is admittedly an
underlying dilemma here. All else equal, it might make sense to align the tax
rates of small business and large business. And it might make sense to lower
the tax rates for internationally mobile capital income insofar as it is only
lowering the "normal" rate of return. But it makes no sense to tax
employees at higher tax rates than the self-employed, and it's also likely to
be extremely regressive. There are indeed ways out of the box, but they
generally would require more significant structural changes than these folks
appear to be contemplating at this point.
"The goal is a plan that reduces tax rates as much as possible,
allows unprecedented capital expensing, places a priority on
permanence, and creates a system that encourages American companies to
bring back jobs and profits trapped overseas." Comment:
They're not committing to how much they'll cut tax rates, but this
(unsurprisingly) means as a practical matter that the proposal will lose
revenue, requiring it to be phased out after 10 years unless they come up with
some trick to avoid that result. "Unprecedented capital expensing" is
a consumption tax-like result that would make more sense if accompanied by
interest deduction limits, on which they are at this point silent.
"Permanence" seems to mean they want to avoid the phaseout if
possible, by one means or another, but I think it will be impossible unless
they play games with the budget rules. "Bring back jobs" doesn't have
a definite meaning unless it refers to lowering the corporate rate. Shifting to
a territorial system (which I'd presume they'd want to do) is hard to square
with these words rhetorically. The reference to profits taxed overseas presumably means that they anticipate no longer taxing U.S. companies' dividends from foreign subsidiaries -
suggesting the enactment of territoriality - perhaps with a deemed
repatriation at the transition. I've for years advocated taxing deemed
repatriations, to address the foreign profits issue, but I suspect they'd have
a very low repatriation tax rate, because otherwise the taxpayers subject to it (who
have friends) might be unhappy.
"And we are now confident that, without transitioning to a
new domestic consumption-based tax system, there is a viable approach
for ensuring a level playing field between American and foreign companies and
workers, while protecting American jobs and the U.S. tax base. While we have
debated the pro-growth benefits of border adjustability, we appreciate that
there are many unknowns associated with it and have decided to set this policy
aside in order to advance tax reform." Comment: That one
speaks for itself. Buh-bye to the destination-based cash flow tax, at least for
now. Ryan and Brady would have been politically unwise to fight further on this
front.
Thursday, July 13, 2017
It all depends on how you look at it
The New York Mets must be the best team in baseball. They have an All-Star outfielder whom their manager doesn't even plan to play.
Somehow it doesn't sound as good if you say that they have a manager who doesn't even plan to play their All-Star outfielder.
Somehow it doesn't sound as good if you say that they have a manager who doesn't even plan to play their All-Star outfielder.
Speaker schedule for 2018 NYU Tax Policy Colloquium
We now have a tentative speaker schedule for the 2018 NYU Tax Policy Colloquium, which I will be co-teaching with Lily Batchelder. We'll be meeting on Tuesdays, from 4:10 to 6 pm, in Vanderbilt 208 (our usual room). It goes like this:
1. Tuesday, January 16 – Greg Leiserson.Washington
Center for Equitable Growth.
2. Tuesday, January 23 – Peter Dietsch,
University of Montreal Philosophy Department.
3. Tuesday, January 30 – Andrew Hayashi,
University of Virginia Law School.
4. Tuesday, February 6 – Gerald Auten,
U.S. Treasury Department.
5. Tuesday, February 13 – Vanessa
Williamson, Brookings Institution.
6. Tuesday, February 27 – Jacob Goldin,
Stanford Law School.
7. Tuesday, March 6 – Lisa Phillips,
Osgoode Hall Law School.
8. Tuesday, March 20 – Michelle Hanlon,
MIT Sloan School of Management.
9. Tuesday, March 27 – Damon Jones,
University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy.
10. Tuesday, April 3 – Ajay Mehrotra,
American Bar Foundation and Northwestern University School of Law.
11. Tuesday, April 10 – Jason Furman,
Harvard Kennedy School.
12. Tuesday, April 17 – Emily
Satterthwaite, University of Toronto Law School.
13. Tuesday, April 24 – Wolfgang Schon,
Max Planck Institute.
14. Tuesday, May 1 – Joshua Blank, NYU Law
School.
Leaving aside the horror of its being winter again at the time when the colloquium starts - and that will have happened anyway by then, colloquium or no colloquium - I'm looking forward to 14 interesting and diverse papers and discussions, and to another great semester.
Leaving aside the horror of its being winter again at the time when the colloquium starts - and that will have happened anyway by then, colloquium or no colloquium - I'm looking forward to 14 interesting and diverse papers and discussions, and to another great semester.
Sunday, July 02, 2017
Travel reading
The amount I read for pleasure on my travels was reduced by my also needing to read papers that were being presented, while also polishing my presentations and working on my literature book. But, during the Mexico City and Oxford trips, I did get to read most of (1) Chimamanda Adichie's Americanah, and (2) Henry Blake Fuller's With the Procession.
In Americanah, it's a bit depressing from the perspective of 2017 to read about the characters' response to Obama's election and inauguration. But it's a really excellent work of both narrative fiction and sociology. A friend suggested that I consider it for my literature book, in which I'm not absolutely set on all of my current-era choices. But while it deals with class, and while I ought to deal with U.S. race-class interactions at some point, I don't see it as sufficiently directed at my particular interests in the book (as distinct from, as an American living in our society today).
With the Procession was published by Fuller in 1894 and is set in Gilded Age Chicago. I had decided, after initial inquiry well short of a full read, not to include it among my 3 U.S. Gilded Age chapters (which will deal in turn with Twain & Warner's The Gilded Age, Dreiser's The Financier and The Titan, and Wharton's House of Mirth). But it's sharply satiric and quite good, and certainly makes the list of the next 3 that I would have done from this era if I were spending more chapters on it (the others being William Dean Howells' The Rise of Silas Lapham, which I like but don't love, and Booth Tarkington's quite interesting The Magnificent Ambersons).
For those who might be interested, With the Procession is available as a free Kindle download from Amazon, although for some reason it can be hard to find in this format on their website.
In Americanah, it's a bit depressing from the perspective of 2017 to read about the characters' response to Obama's election and inauguration. But it's a really excellent work of both narrative fiction and sociology. A friend suggested that I consider it for my literature book, in which I'm not absolutely set on all of my current-era choices. But while it deals with class, and while I ought to deal with U.S. race-class interactions at some point, I don't see it as sufficiently directed at my particular interests in the book (as distinct from, as an American living in our society today).
With the Procession was published by Fuller in 1894 and is set in Gilded Age Chicago. I had decided, after initial inquiry well short of a full read, not to include it among my 3 U.S. Gilded Age chapters (which will deal in turn with Twain & Warner's The Gilded Age, Dreiser's The Financier and The Titan, and Wharton's House of Mirth). But it's sharply satiric and quite good, and certainly makes the list of the next 3 that I would have done from this era if I were spending more chapters on it (the others being William Dean Howells' The Rise of Silas Lapham, which I like but don't love, and Booth Tarkington's quite interesting The Magnificent Ambersons).
For those who might be interested, With the Procession is available as a free Kindle download from Amazon, although for some reason it can be hard to find in this format on their website.
Comments on the EC state aid cases at the Oxford Summer Conference
On Friday I spoke at the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation's Summer Conference. This is a public event with a large audience, discussing matters of general tax policy interest, as distinct from the academic conference earlier in the week, which focuses on attendees' works in progress.
I discussed the EC state aid cases, with particular reference to the Apple-Ireland case, on a panel that was more generally focused on issues of tax uncertainty. My slides are available here. They're different and I think better than the slides I posted a few weeks ago when I discussed the same topic at a conference in Luxembourg. They generally aim to be balanced, fair, and above-the-fray.
I discussed the EC state aid cases, with particular reference to the Apple-Ireland case, on a panel that was more generally focused on issues of tax uncertainty. My slides are available here. They're different and I think better than the slides I posted a few weeks ago when I discussed the same topic at a conference in Luxembourg. They generally aim to be balanced, fair, and above-the-fray.
Thursday, June 29, 2017
Some photos and an odd fact
From a Liverpool Beatles tour that I did today, in between yesterday's end of the Oxford academic symposium and tomorrow's one-day Oxford summer conference:
1) Here's where Julia Lennon was killed in July 1958 by a bus, moments after saying goodbye to John at the Mendips house where he was living with his Aunt Mimi.
2) On a more cheerful note, this is Strawberry Fields. And here's an odd fact: according to my guide, when Mimi would tell John that he'd get in trouble for climbing over the wall to spend time here (which he did around the back, not at the front gate), he'd reply: "They won't hang me for it, you know." The guide suggests that this is (part of?) what he had in mind when he wrote the line "Nothing to get hung about."
3) And here's the Penny Lane roundabout. There's also a barber shop and bank nearby, both apparently the same storefronts but extensively remodeled since back in the day.
1) Here's where Julia Lennon was killed in July 1958 by a bus, moments after saying goodbye to John at the Mendips house where he was living with his Aunt Mimi.
2) On a more cheerful note, this is Strawberry Fields. And here's an odd fact: according to my guide, when Mimi would tell John that he'd get in trouble for climbing over the wall to spend time here (which he did around the back, not at the front gate), he'd reply: "They won't hang me for it, you know." The guide suggests that this is (part of?) what he had in mind when he wrote the line "Nothing to get hung about."
3) And here's the Penny Lane roundabout. There's also a barber shop and bank nearby, both apparently the same storefronts but extensively remodeled since back in the day.
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