Yesterday at the colloquium, Steve Shay presented an early draft
of an article (being coauthored with Cliff Fleming and Bob Peroni) that
critically reviews the House GOP proposal to replace the existing income tax on
corporate and individual business income with what many call the
"DBCFT" (destination-based cash flow tax). The draft is still
preliminary, so I'm not posting a link or even the abstract. But here are some
thoughts on how one might parse the main issues that the paper discusses: I won't
try to offer a full assessment of the DBCFT here - that would require a very long article.
As it happens, many others are writing such articles (including Shay et al). Given how well it's already being covered, the only way in which I plan to enter this fray via conventional publication is from somewhat of an angle. On June 1, I am giving a talk in Haikko Borga, Finland at the annual meeting of the Nordic Tax Research Counsel, in which I'll discuss how the U.S. ended up considering going this way, how the plan relates to what other countries have done, in particular with VATs, what light it sheds on where we and they might want to get in the long run,etcetera. This piece I believe will end up being published in a Nordic tax journal, but also perhaps in the US if it develops in a direction that I deem compatible with this. It differs from what people have been writing these days in that it might involve looking at the thing from a distance and with an effort at historical perspective, rather than focusing on how it might work or whether, taking all the parts together as given, it's on the whole good or bad.
As it happens, many others are writing such articles (including Shay et al). Given how well it's already being covered, the only way in which I plan to enter this fray via conventional publication is from somewhat of an angle. On June 1, I am giving a talk in Haikko Borga, Finland at the annual meeting of the Nordic Tax Research Counsel, in which I'll discuss how the U.S. ended up considering going this way, how the plan relates to what other countries have done, in particular with VATs, what light it sheds on where we and they might want to get in the long run,etcetera. This piece I believe will end up being published in a Nordic tax journal, but also perhaps in the US if it develops in a direction that I deem compatible with this. It differs from what people have been writing these days in that it might involve looking at the thing from a distance and with an effort at historical perspective, rather than focusing on how it might work or whether, taking all the parts together as given, it's on the whole good or bad.
Okay, enough of that detour; back to some of the main issues that Shay,
Fleming, and Peroni are evaluating:
(1) Distributional effects – The House GOP tax plan as a whole is extremely
regressive, and meant to be so, especially when one adds in the financing for
the tax cuts that, while not currently being provided for, the Speaker no doubt
intends. He wants to massively slash tax rates on rich people and pay for it by
massively slashing benefits for poor people. But let's hold all that to one
side - the DBCFT itself raises more interesting, complex, and potentially
ambiguous distributional issues than this clear underlying intent might have
led one to expect.
Since it's a compound proposal, I think one has to analyze it
distributionally in multiple pieces. And for each piece, one must analyze both
the transition effects of repeal and the long-term effects. These can be quite
different. E.g., even if one were to conclude that the corporate income tax is
mainly borne by labor rather than capital, a surprise overnight repeal would
offer a huge transition gain to shareholders.
Anyway: here is one way of organizing the pieces one needs to
think about, in terms of both the transition and the long-term incidence. BTW,
I'm just looking here at the tax side. Obviously, if net revenues change, one
must also look at what changes end up resulting on the spending side.
(a) repeal the corporate income tax (and other business income
taxes insofar as they are replaced by this).
(b) enact an origin-basis VAT. I put this here as a separate stage
to distinguish between (a) the shift to expensing, and an R-based system in
which financial flows are ignored, and (b) the destination basis piece, which
could end up being called off.
(c) convert the VAT from origin basis to destination basis,
(d) add a wage deduction to the VAT. People have been calling this
a wage subsidy, which is fair enough, but since wages are being taxed under the
individual income tax one really needs to think about them as a whole. Note
that in, say, David Bradford's X-tax, there was a much tighter connection than
there seems to be here between the wage subsidy and the wage tax. There the
idea was to match the business rate to the top individual rate, which only
applied to wages; hence a straightforward net wage subsidy applied until one
reached the top bracket (at which point it became a wash).
(e) replace the exclusion of financial flows under a true VAT with
a rule apparently including them, subject to disallowing net interest
deductions.
(2) Expensing doesn’t automatically yield neutrality – Expensing is commonly lauded as
permitting the tax system to be neutral between assets, and also between
businesses. But the proponents don't plan to make losses refundable, as they
are in a VAT. Instead, they'll offer interest, which is fine (any cash flow
problems aside) if one is going to have enough net "income"
eventually, but otherwise may disadvantage small and medium sized businesses.
Net losses should be especially common here, in contrast to under a VAT, due to
the wage deduction plus, in early years, expensing for new assets plus (one
presumes, as a transition rule) continued depreciation deductions for
pre-enactment assets. There may be a lot of distortionary transactions that end up being used to provide effective refundability.
(3) WTO illegality – It seems to be little disputed these days that the system
would be immediately and successfully challenged as illegal under the WTO, even though an
equivalent instrument (in which the wage subsidy was handled separately) would
presumably be legal. Passing a law that one knows is going to have to be
changed or repealed in a few years is pretty crazy. But if one wanted to look
at it in a positive light, the idea might be: as soon as it's held to be
illegal (which will presumably take a couple of years at least), and before any
sanctions start taking effect, change the system then. Only, we'd have to feel
good about the feasibility of doing this. I don't feel so good about this given
the low health level of our political system, but it could conceivably become a
path to having a conventional VAT.
(4) Hard to tax inbound – We in the US are late to the game, and hence are inclined
to think that VATs are much better administratively than our various tax
instruments. But while this is probably still true, VATs' workability has been
undermined by the rise of e-commerce and global service industries. So finding
and taxing inbound consumer items, by notionally policing the
"border," is much more problematic today than it was when most major
VATs came into force. While the OECD and various countries are trying to
address this, it's unclear how successful they'll be. Would the DBCFT
eventually need to include a use tax that was collected directly from
households? Our income tax treaties may impede requiring exporters to the US,
if they lack a U.S. permanent establishment,
(5) Hard to trace "true" outbound – This is the flip side of the
inbound problem.
(6) Multiple tax rates – Most prior proposal in the DBCFT's ballpark had a single
business rate. Here you have instead a bit of a mess, with different rates for
passthroughs and C corporations, continued income taxation at the individual
level, etc. The multiple rates can raise a host of problems - relating,
for example, to related party transactions and, for that matter, to exactly how
the currency adjustment would play out. The proponents would also need to
figure out and execute rules pertaining to tax-exempts.
(7) Treatment of interest expense – A true R-based system is so much
simpler and cleaner than taxing financial income but disallowing net interest
deductions. For example, the DBCFT would presumably cause taxpayers to prefer
interest income to other income, since it can be used to soak up interest
deductions. We have various such problems under present law, but they're hardly
a good thing. Note also the need to figure out how to tax financial institutions - more urgent here than under VATs, because the countries with VATs also have corporate income taxes that apply to financial institutions, whereas we would be jettisoning that backup.
(8) How would other countries respond? – Apart from filing WTO claims, via tax
competition? Emulation? Taxing US companies more on a source basis, given that
treaty reciprocity had ceased to matter and the US had abandoned the
outbound-taxation field? If the thing is enacted, which I consider unlikely, we
will certainly find out.
(9) No tax on domestic but "outbound' rents - Countries with significant natural
resources often like to tax domestic extraction for export. Also, U.S.
companies that develop valuable IP may create rents that they realize through
foreign sales. One should always want to tax outbound rents domestically, for
two reasons. If they're earned by foreigners, it's efficient and the foreigners
will actually bear the incidence of the tax. If they're earned by domestic
individuals, it's still efficient and inclusion may be desirable from a
distributional standpoint. This point tends to be conceded by DBCFT advocates,
whom I have heard say (a) we could have a special rule for natural resources,
and (b) we're not currently doing a great job with the likes of Apple and
Google anyway. But why give up altogether? That's a clear defect, even if outweighed by other features that one considered clear advantages of the DBCFT.
One irony here, by the way, is that after all the huffing and
puffing in the Treasury White Paper about how only the U.S. can tax the profits
that Apple purported to stash in Ireland, because it's U.S. source income and
the Europeans should keep their hands off, the DBCFT would actually define that income (which pertained to EU sales) as foreign source. So much for self-righteous vehemence.
(10) A very tough transition in multiple dimensions – The rush to enact this thing - if
it gets enacted - is bound, I think, to end badly. The IRS isn't ready for it,
state and local governments aren't ready for it, taxpayers are desperately
scrambling to get ready for it, there's unlikely to be any stress-testing or a
multi-stage process like that which gave rise to the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
last-minute dark deals on obscure aspects are likely to occur, there may not be
enough staff with enough time (and treated with enough respect) to get enough of it
right, technical corrections may be politically impossible, etcetera. So even if this thing can in principle be done well enough to be worth
doing, don't count on its actually happening that way, if it happens.
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