U.S. international taxation

Today at NYU Law School we held the session on international taxation mentioned in my blog entry from yesterday, with Jim Hines presenting his new paper, “Reconsidering the Taxation of Foreign Income,” followed by comments from Alan Auerbach, Mitchell Kane, and Stephen Shay, followed by general discussion. The following is a partial report and some very preliminary thoughts. (I am likely to publish about this topic at some point down the road.) But let me just mention up front that the event seemed (to my biased eyes at least) to be a big success - 70 attendees, lively discussion that could have kept right on going if people didn't have to leave, and most importantly it may have advanced people's thinking about the issues, as it certainly did mine.

Jim argues that U.S. (and other countries’) tax policy with respect to outbound investment should be guided by capital ownership neutrality (CON) rather than capital export neutrality (CEN), with the claimed implication in practice that the U.S. should exempt active business income earned abroad by U.S. corporations. Under CEN, the prescription would instead be to move towards full U.S. taxation of all worldwide income of resident corporations (and individuals), albeit subject to allowing foreign tax credits.

CON focuses on not distorting ownership patterns, as would happen if a German firm rather than a U.S. firm owned a given investment in China, despite the U.S. firm’s expecting a higher pre-tax return from the investment, because the German company earns more after-tax by reason of Germany’s imposing less tax than the U.S. does on top of whatever China levies. CON advances worldwide efficiency by increasing pre-tax profitability, taxes being ignored for this purpose as they are a cost to the taxpayer but a transfer from the social perspective (since the taxing government gets the money and does something with it). CON is understood to matter a lot in a world where the theory of the firm, as pioneered by Ronald Coase, suggests that ownership arrangements are economically very important. (You have a firm instead of arm’s length market arrangements between partners in the productive process where this increases efficiency.)

CEN focuses on not distorting where investments are made. If Ireland has a lower tax rate than the U.S., investment will tend to shift from the U.S. towards Ireland, leading to the selection of some Irish investments that are more appealing after-tax than their U.S. alternatives despite having lower expected pre-tax returns. Same point about pre-tax profitability being the proper guide since taxes are a transfer not a social cost.

So why should we think the CON margin is more worth pursuing than the CEN margin? Not because it is inherently more important, which Jim doesn’t claim (noting only that CON is indeed important), but on the ground that the U.S. can benefit from unilaterally pursuing CON but not CEN. This is a part of the analysis that needs to be developed more.

Proponents of CEN usually define unilateral pursuit of national self-interest by invoking national neutrality (NN), under which the home country would fully tax outbound investment by its companies without foreign tax credits – permitting only deductibility for foreign taxes paid. The foreign tax credits then emerge either out of benevolence or (more plausibly) reciprocity between nations. As I argued in my recent Tax Law Review piece on international taxation, moving towards CEN by increasing the U.S. tax burden on multinationals is often defensible in terms of national self-interest because it also moves towards NN.

Jim rejects this nationalistic ground for moving towards CEN and NN via what I am inclined to call the “musical chairs” or “row of shops” hypothesis. NN is motivated by the concern that, if we tax outbound investment by U.S. companies less than their domestic investment, we lose revenue because their investments relocate from the US to abroad. But suppose the amount that will be invested in the U.S. is fixed so far as the U.S. tax regime for U.S. firms is concerned. If the U.S. tax rules induce a U.S. firm to invest abroad, someone else will make the investment here. Or the U.S. firm will raise more capital in worldwide capital markets and make both investments, not just one or the other. He invokes recent empirical research in support of this view, suggesting that home and foreign investment by U.S. multinationals seem to be complements rather than substitutes.

I call this the musical chairs theory because it’s as if the music is playing, and the companies are marching around all the chairs (i.e., investment choices), and everyone ends up getting a seat somewhere. If we induce the U.S. firm not to take the seat here, someone else will take it instead. This is of course the benign (or should I say progressive schools) version of musical chairs, where you have just enough for everyone rather than being one short.

The row of stores metaphor for this story is inspired by Bleecker Street, which I sometimes pass on my way from home to school, in which every storefront is bound to be rented by someone – it’s just a question of who ends up where. Bad theory so far as Bleecker Street is concerned, by the way – there are lots of boarded-up storefronts still seeking tenants, some of which have been there for years. (A puzzle: why are the rents apparently so high if so many stay vacant for so long?)

Again, Jim doesn’t deny that low taxes attract investment. The claim here is that, if the U.S. tries to move towards CEN, rather than everyone doing it, all it does is create clientele effects, whereby other nations’ firms replace U.S. firms as the makers of particular foreign investments. So no motivation for the U.S. to address CEN alone, and indeed we get a piece of the worldwide CON welfare loss if U.S. firms (still these days predominantly owned by U.S. individuals) make a bit less money due to the inefficient reallocations. Unclear how much we gain from following CON, however, even granting that in this model we have nothing to gain from unilaterally following CEN.

Jim rejects distributional or fairness-based reasons for taxing the worldwide income of U.S. firms by analogy to tax-exempt bonds. Say the interest rate on taxable bonds is 10%, the marginal tax rate (MTR) is 30%, and tax-free municipal bonds pay 7%. Then there is no distribution problem by reason of the preference (assuming the pre-tax interest rate is fixed), because muni bond holders pay a 30% implicit tax that is the same as everyone else’s explicit tax. All earn 7% after-tax. By analogy, investment in low-tax Ireland pays an implicit tax in the form of a lower pre-tax return (by reason of the CEN-violating shift of investment into Ireland), so there’s no reason for distributional concern about its being (to exaggerate relative to actual Ireland) tax-exempt.

The big problem with the muni bond argument is that it only works with a single MTR for all investors. So, if in actuality we taxed corporate income on outbound investment at the individual level, so we could apply Bill Gates’ MTR to his investments and a lower rate to yours and mine, exemption for foreign source income would involve sacrificing this potential to apply the desired MTR to each investor. But since we generally tax outbound corporate equity investment purely at the flat corporate rate, we aren’t getting that rate differentiation anyway under the current system or even one revised to accord more with CEN.

There is lots more one could say (and that I perhaps will say) about the paper and the topic – including details of excellent comments by Auerbach, Kane, and Shay – but given the length of this post I will omit them at least for now. But one last point concerns passive income, earned through portfolio investment. Jim agrees that the U.S. should tax all worldwide income of U.S. residents. This is potentially a big concession, making one wonder about the broader principle. It has a rationale, relating to the point that passive income doesn’t have a meaningful location in the same sense as active business investment (e.g., there is no limit to the funds that could be described to the tax authorities as deposited in Caymans banks). So the musical chairs hypothesis does not apply. But still, it might have big implications for the overall analysis – especially considering the murkiness of the active-passive distinction (which Jim conceptualizes as, “does ownership or control matter here?” – a matter of degree, of course) – and considering as well the murkiness of the source concept.

Source is not an economically well-defined idea. Consider, for example, the synergies obtained by operating as a multinational rather than through arm’s length dealings between firms in different nations. Where exactly does the synergy income arise? And this is not just an implementation question – it undermines the underlying idea on which source-based taxation ostensibly rests.

International tax session at NYU Law School

On Wednesday, November 14 (tomorrow as I write this), from 12 to 2 pm, we will be having a really interesting session at NYU Law School on international tax issues. Jim Hines of the University of Michigan Business School and Law School will be presenting a new and as yet unpublished (perhaps even unposted?) paper entitled "Reconsidering the Taxation of Foreign Income." Commentators will be Alan Auerbach, Mitchell Kane, and Stephen Shay. If I do say so myself despite having arranged the event, this is a really strong group of people with diverse backgrounds and viewpoints.

I am expecting a very lively and enjoyable session. Jim argues for significantly changing the policies and policy benchmarks that have prevailed for several decades in U.S. international tax policy. The panelists' level of agreement may well top out at 50 percent while in some cases being significantly lower. But all agree about seeking light not heat.

Interested individuals who will be in the area and who were not previously aware of the event (or at least have not previously responded) should let me know, and I can offer fuller information about it.

Budget hypocrites threaten to strike again

Courtesy of Paul Caron's TaxProf blog, I note that the White House is threatening to veto the one-year AMT patch being considered by Congress. Specifically:

"The Administration does not believe the appropriate way to protect 21 million additional taxpayers from 2007 AMT liability is to impose a tax increase on other taxpayers. Accordingly, if H.R. 3996 were presented to the President in its current form, the President’s senior advisors would recommend he veto the bill."

How exactly does the White House rationalize counting AMT revenues towards its multi-year deficit forecasts, under this view? They're counting net revenues that they insist must be lost, not replaced.

UPDATE: Stan Collender, in his "Budget Battles" analysis of the AMT squall, puts it a bit more crisply:

"On one hand, the White House says that paying for a one-year "patch" on the AMT is unnecessary, so an offsetting tax increase isn't needed. As he has done with everything else Congress is considering that he doesn't like, the president is threatening to veto any AMT fix that is revenue neutral.

"On the other hand, congressional Republicans have been insisting that the Democrats maintain their pledge to live up to pay-as-you-go budget rules by offsetting the AMT fix so that it has no impact on the budget.

"The Republican positions clearly are not defensible.... [given] the glaring, inherent conflict between saying that the AMT fix doesn't have to be paid for and demanding that PAYGO, which applies to taxes, be maintained."

Collender notes as well how utterly (and I would add characteristically) incompetent the Congressional Democrats have been in letting the Republicans paint them into this corner, and in failing to explain why the AMT fix isn't a tax cut but the offsets are somehow tax increases.

Could those guys win a poker hand if they had four aces and the other side had face-up junk? I am starting to think not.

Newly published or forthcoming

My article "Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in Tax Policy?", 60 Tax L. Rev. 155-178 (2007), has now been published. Hard-copy reprints are available to anyone who still wants so old-fashioned a thing.

Another forthcoming article of mine, "Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus," should be appearing very shortly in issue 4 of Volume 60 of the Stanford Law Review.

Finally, within the next few weeks my article "Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to Corporate Tax Shelters" should be appearing in Wolfgang Schon (ed.), Tax and Corporate Governance, to be published by Springer Science. This volume contains the papers from a conference that was held in Munich in December 2006, and other authors whose papers should be in the volume include, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, Steve Bank, and Mihir Desai.

Radiohead redux

They're not a natural band for me to espouse. I'm a bit suspicious of the popularity, although the Beatles model says that in the ideal world the best band is also the most popular. But then there's the U2-ish, prog-rock sound and the keening mournfulness of Yorke's lead vocals, neither to my typical taste.

Still, in varying degrees I like most of their albums, previously OK Computer best of all, and to date I would call In Rainbows the best album of 2007.

UPDATE: I've also come to like the new Fiery Furnaces album, after initial skepticism. Eval of Jens Lekman, highly touted by pitchforkmedia.com and others, remains open.

Buffoon in chief

A stopped clock is right twice a day, but not Cheney - he is wrong 100% of the time, defying the law of averages. Latest bit is that he has apparently demanded 100% loyalty by the Bush Administration to Musharraf, in lieu of any thought of steering an independent course.

State of the play academically on wealth transfer taxation

Yesterday I went to a session at Columbia Law School where my colleague, Lily Batchelder, was presenting her paper, "How Should an Ideal Consumption Tax or Income Tax Treat Wealth Transfers?" Lily is doing excellent and important work in this area, ranging from her actual policy proposal as part of the Hamilton Project to the more theoretical inquiries she is pursuing now. But even apart from any one individual's distinctive view of the area, I think it's important to say something about the current state of the play, which Lily helps make her clear both through her own contributions and through the prior empirical literature she cites.

Ten years ago, I would have said the jury is out in the academic and tax policy literature, so far as the merits of wealth transfer taxation are concerned. E.g., there is no particular reason one should favor wealth transfer taxation just because it's progressive, given that in principle equal progressivity could be obtained with or without it, through adjustments to other tax instruments.

From a 2007 perspective, however, I think the case for wealth transfer taxation has pretty much been made. A key point that Lily's work makes clear is that inheritance taxation - where the tax depends on the circumstances of the recipient - is theoretically superior on informational grounds both to estate taxation - where it depends on the size of the bequest - and to no tax at all on wealth transfers. The inheritance tax option uses more distributionally relevant information than do the other mechanisms. E.g., my wellbeing clearly depends on the wealth transfers I receive, plus other stuff I have or can earn, so the tax system is depriving itself of distributionally relevant information if it ignores the wealth transfers or fails to interact them with what else I have.

Now for a refinement, potentially reversing the seeming import of what I just said. The clear superiority, on informational grounds, of inheritance taxation over the alternatives does not tell us that the inheritance tax rate should be positive. This depends on a whole raft of relevant inputs, including (as Lily's work makes clear) the case for subsidizing gratuitous transfers due to the "altruistic externality" that Louis Kaplow may have been the first to emphasize. So to say we should have an inheritance tax isn't to say we should burden inheritance relative to not having a wealth transfer tax - just that in theory it ought to be taken into account somehow, which straight exemption fails to do.

But here is what I would argue is the clincher in terms of a positive inheritance tax rate (again, recognizing that there are complicated multiple inputs). Recent empirical research concerning bequest motives and practices, including, e.g., work by Wojciech Kopszuk of Columbia University, suggests that "accidental bequests" (those reflecting imperfect lifecycle saving and annuitization rather than bequest motives) are a sufficiently large piece of the whole to suggest that the distortionary effects of taxing wealth transfers, e.g., the discouragement of work and saving by future decedents (which we all are), are likely to be substantially lower than they would be if bequest motives were doing more of the work. So there are likely to be substantial efficiency advantages to this device for taxing work and saving, relative to the use of standard annual income or consumption taxation.

All this is not just high theory, of course. The estate tax is actually scheduled to disappear in 2010 and then re-appear in its pre-2001 form in 2011. This is a crazy and implausible sequence of rule changes, leaving aside the fascinating "throw momma from the train" research opportunities that it would offer empirically minded economists. So something is bound to be done. It thus is well worth knowing how strong the academic case for some type of wealth transfer taxation, especially an inheritance tax, now appears to be.

I myself would combine inheritance taxation in some form with a progressive consumption tax in lieu of the current income tax, but this is a topic for another day (actually for a past not a future day as I have written about income and consumption taxation quite a lot in recent years).

What did Rudy actually do on 9/11?

Since I was there at the time, I remember. The answer is: one thing, and one thing only. He was a heckuva good TV talk show host over the period of several days right afterwards.

I don't want to minimize this too much. It actually mattered to a degree. A key virtue is that he was actually calm. With all the grief and shock in the air, he helped New Yorkers to feel better.

But that was it. So far as actual emergency management is concerned, the less said the better. Think of the lost command post that he put on top of the WTC, possibly as a love nest. Or the dead firemen who would have survived if they could have communicated by radio with the police. Or the lack of health precautions for people at the site, who are still getting sick due to his negligence. Or the fact that he spent more hours at Yankee games between 9/11 and the end of that year than at the site (not that he was really needed there).

Good talk show host for a few days. Period. Via a completely different persona than his mad dog spewings on the campaign trail these days. And again, this was genuinely valuable and I still appreciate it. But it is a slim reed for a Presidential campaign.

Invidious comparison

I felt slightly bad about rooting for the higher-budget, bigger-bully Red Sox, an involuntary reflex reflecting all the years of counting on them (faute de mieux) to stop the Yankees. I also wanted the thing to end already, so I wouldn't have to keep on staying up late.

If you think the World Series outcome was inevitable, even after 8 innings of Game 4, think back to game 4 of the 2004 ALCS. It's difficult to draw any distinction between the Yankees' degree of dominance (and seeming inevitability) through that point in 2004, and that for the Red Sox this time around. E.g., the Yankees in 2004 had outscored the Red Sox by 36-19 through the 8th inning of game 4, versus 29-10 for the Sox this time around.

Only, Rivera blew it and Papelbon didn't.

New tax bill introduced by Congressman Rangel

House Ways & Means Chair Rangel has introduced a major tax bill, the "Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007." Zero chance of enactment - probably zero chance of passage, but even if passed it would be vetoed by Bush - but it matters for two reasons. First, revenue-raisers in it might be used to pay for extending AMT relief. Second, all of its provisions automatically land on the shelf full of items that might be considered in the future, e.g., in 2009 under a Democratic President. (Which is not to say that Hillary or any of the others would actually take much from this bill - it would simply add to the background list of options.)

Clear discussion of the bill would be helpful but is unlikely to emerge in the political process. I gather no Democrats wanted to co-sponsor. Republicans will presumably yammer centrally furnished talking points about how it's a huge tax increase (a lie - it's a mix of tax increases and cuts), reflecting once again that they behave more like a Bolshevik-style cabal than like the type of political party one really would expect to find in a country with several centuries' worth of democratic traditions. But I am hopeful that thoughtful conservative commentators will take it seriously - there actually are parts of it that they ought to like, although they might quite reasonably dislike it on balance.

Anyway, here is a quick summary of several main features with my thoughts about them.

1) Lower-income tax reductions - The bill would cut taxes for lower-income Americans via about $86 billion (over 10 years) worth of increases to the standard deduction, earned income tax credit, and refundable child credit. This is a straight distribution issue. I'm sympathetic, but readers can evaluate it for themselves (the counter-argument is that it gives infra-marginal rate cuts that need financing via distortionary taxes).

2) AMT shuffle - interesting methodology here to try to pay for AMT repeal. Complete AMT repeal, costing $795B over 10 years, is financed by a "limitation of benefits of individual AMT repeal" provision (raising $831B). This is simply a rate increase of 4% initially, then 4.6%, on groups at income levels with a lot of AMT exposure. Amusing that the top rate gets back to exactly its pre-2001 level of 39.6%. Substantively, the idea is to raise top rates in lieu of having the AMT. Semantically, the idea is to call this a mere limitation of the benefits of AMT repeal. As a political or semantic matter, I don't think it will work. Substantive merits are mixed - getting rid of the AMT may be good but in part this amounts to higher marginal rates instead of indirectly denying state and local tax deductions. Further marginal rate increase here, although as a "bubble rate" not at the very top, from restoring the phaseout of personal exemptions. I would argue that personal exemptions are appropriate at all income levels, so the best rationale for this is an optimal income tax thing about not putting the highest rates at the very top.

3) Business, including international - Top corporate rate is cut from 35% to 30.5%. (Republicans will of course ignore this.) 90% of the revenue loss from this is offset by the revenue gain from (a) repealing the idiotic special lower tax rate for domestic production activities, (b) denying deductions related to foreign source income that is not currently taxable, until such income is actually repatriated & thus becomes taxable here, and (c) barring the use of LIFO accounting for inventories. This is a good package that almost any good-faith independent observer ought to like, with the possible exception of (b). I tend to think (b) probably is good policy - preventing what is effectively better-than-exempt treatment for foreign source income - but I feel a need to hear more about this issue from people who know more about the intimate institutional details.

One interesting effect, if you put it all together, is that marginal tax rates for individuals become much higher than for corporations if all this is enacted - 39.6%, plus more in the personal exemption phase-out range, versus 30.5%. I gather that the 15% dividend rate would be allowed to expire. Never mind, in an era when double taxation of corporate income is ever easier to avoid through sophisticated planning, this seems likely to make the corporate tax a net benefit rather than a net burden. All those economists doing incidence studies of the burden of the corporate tax (a subject I've been studying and writing about for my latest academic project) are going to have to turn around and write new papers about the incidence of the benefit from the corporate tax.

4) Other - about a gazillion one-year extenders. Not the fault of the Rangel bill, but I find it pretty unedifying to have all this stuff on regular extenders needing annual lobbying infusions to get them renewed for another year. This is a case where Congress and the lobbyists may be colluding to screw the lobbyists' clients. But again I don't lay this on Rangel or the bill - the extenders simply bring this preexisting situation to mind.

Among other features, the bill would take on carried interests, put "economic substance" in the Internal Revenue Code (which at least would stop Scalia & Thomas from saying, in any event prospectively, that there is no such doctrine), and address various little planning tricks that the staffers on Capital Hill have evidently learned about.

On the whole, I would definitely take this package over present law. Not going to happen, of course. Even apart from the lack of votes, and the Republican noise machine lying about it, it's inherently pretty hard to enact a break-even package with hundreds of billions of dollars worth of tax cuts and tax increases both, because the losers tend to screech more than the winners. Certainly a good try, in most respects, to throw out the AMT in a fiscally responsible manner and to improve the corporate tax rules through the classic combination of rate cuts and base-broadening.

Interesting National Bureau of Economic Research study of the Iraq "surge"

According to Michael Greenstone of the MIT Economics Department, in his new NBER working paper, "Is the 'Surge' Working? Some New Facts" (NBER Working Paper 13458, 10/07), while various on-the-ground Iraqi indicators are mixed, perhaps the most salient fact is that Iraq's bonds have declined by 40% since the surge started. He concludes:

"This decline signals a 40% increase in the market's expectation that Iraq will default. This finding suggests that, to date, the Surge is failing to pave the way toward a stable Iraq and may in fact be undermining it."

Bond prices reflect, of course, people betting real money for real payoffs down the road, either good or bad. This market, unlike that for Washington punditry, is one in which it actually pays off to be right, rather than wrong.

Current reading

I've just finished Ken Kalfus' A Disorder Peculiar to the Country, a black comedy about a divorce from hell, set in NYC on 9/11 and the ensuing months. For the first two-thirds I liked it, though sometimes I had to make myself pick it up, what with the themes being what they are. Often very dark and painfully funny. But it turned too episodic and scattershot, didn't build quite as I would have expected, and at the end took a sharp turn into a sarcastic historical fantasy ending that is the sort of thing I ought to like, but that I didn't feel built on or went with what had come before. So the potential effect, for me, was lost.

Next, Alexander Waugh's Fathers and Sons.

Just asking

If Bush sought legislation permitting him to throw the entire Democratic Congressional leadership in jail, would they support it? I rather think they would.

Strange alliance

Although obviously I am no fan of the Christian right, I must say I am encouraged by recent talk (to the extent one believes it) that they will take major steps to block Giuliani's candidacy. I don't know anyone in New York who doesn't regard the prospect of his becoming President with a mixture of astonishment and trepidation. This includes people (such as me) who believe he was in many respects a successful mayor.

As a Presidential candidate, Giuliani stands for two things: war and dictatorship. In a mayor, such inclinations don't matter so much. As President, they would go well beyond making him the living embodiment of the Peter Principle. Anyone who can block him, on any grounds, is doing a good thing whether or not for the right reasons.

What's so funny?

If you want your Halloween chills a couple of weeks early, check out the video of Bush smiling and giggling as he raises the idea of World War III with Iran.

If you know you've decided to attack, I suppose it's funny, at least to a certain type of mentality.

There's no magic bullet reason for doing this - a similar rat's nest of reasons, I would think, to those for attacking Iraq. Finding it fun and exciting is certainly one of the reasons.

For another, consider how the media will play it, and how the Democrats will react, if the Iranians take any violent counter-measures, be they in the U.S., in Iraq, or elsewhere. The Administration can only win from ratcheting up the tensions, having "America under attack," etcetera.

War with Iran?

From today's NY Times coverage of Bush's press conference:

“If Iran had a nuclear weapon, it’d be a dangerous threat to world peace,” Mr. Bush said. “So I told people that if you’re interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing them from having the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon.”

If I am interpreting this correctly, Bush is suggesting that Iran should be attacked unless there are other means of "preventing them from having the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon.”

This mere "knowledge" standard appears to be much lower than the standard supposedly applied to Iraq, where the Administration claimed that Saddam actually had WMD including an active nuclear program. It does not, for example, appear to require any sort of access to bomb-making materials.

I personally put the odds of an attack at greater than 50 percent. The only arguments I have heard against the likelihood of its happening are that (a) it would be insane, and (b) people (whether the public, the military, or Secretary Gates) wouldn't stand for it. I can't see that (a) matters to this crew, or that the public will stop it, or that the military can stop it given the principle of civilian control plus generals' craven careerism. I fear that means we're down to Secretary Gates.

Presidential line item veto

The Republican Presidential candidates are having a little spat about the line item veto, which Rudy as Mayor successfully sued to have struck down on constitutional separation of powers grounds. Attacked for this at the last debate, he took the extremely bizarre position - for a Republican Presidential candidate - that it actually matters whether something is constitutional or not.

By the way, I read about all this in newspapers and blogs. If there is one rule I live by, it is never to watch either Republican or Democratic Presidential candidate debates. Doctor's advice, or at least it would be if I asked him after properly laying out the facts.

Anyway, today McCain renewed the attack, although I think it started from Romney, saying that no true fiscal conservative could oppose the line item veto. And this is not necessarily a purely hypothetical debate, since conceivably clever structuring could create something rather like the line item veto that would withstand constitutional scrutiny. (Even leaving aside whether the "unitary executive" types on today's Court would vote differently.)

But one small problem here. As I point out in my recent book, Taxes, Spending, and the U.S. Government's March Toward Bankruptcy, it is theoretically ambiguous whether a line item veto will increase or decrease government spending, budget deficits, or the fiscal gap - whichever one chooses as the operative measure. It all depends on how the president uses it.

There are decent political economy arguments for the view that presidents will typically have a lower preference than members of Congress for lots of small handouts to this interest group or that. (Although Bush never minded earmarks or other pork until the first Wednesday of November 2006.) But presidents also tend to like really big-ticket projects - monuments to their "great leadership," perhaps - much more than do the members of Congress. This is pretty much a constant across presidents.

Give a president the line item veto, and while there is reason to think that anyone except for Bush from 2001-2006 will occasionally use it to lop off egregious handouts here and there, there is also reason to think that they will see it as a bargaining chip, the threat of which can help them win extra votes for the really big items they are struggling to press through.

So I think it is plausible that the line item veto would exacerbate rather than ease problems of fiscal discipline.

There may be some empirical evidence from the state level supporting the more conventional view. But there is a big difference between presidents and governors regarding the incentive to swing for the fences with really big "historic" programs.

Extremely lucky travel day

Today I flew roundtrip NYC - Boston to present my new paper on tax and accounting at Boston College Law School, where I saw various old friends in the biz (Diane Ring, Jim Repetti, David Walker, Marjorie Kornhauser). Given the storm sweeping up the East Coast, I was astonishingly lucky in how it played out for me - I could easily have spent hours in the airport but actually saved time due to the travel delays. On a normal travel day I would have returned on the 3:30 shuttle, but because the 2:30 was delayed I managed to board it and leave Boston at 3. Back in NYC the Marine Air Terminal (where the Delta shuttle lands) was an absolute horror show, jammed with people and with one of the longest airport cab lines I've ever seen. But I caught a ride back with a limo driver who had lost his scheduled pick-up due to the wall-to-wall canceled flights from DC and Chicago, and who also proved a wizard at the sort of shortcuts through backed-up traffic that I resent when I am one of the other drivers. Plus I heard his very interesting life story, or at least the dramatic highlights.

Either I'm living right or the gods are making up for the pulled hamstring I suffered while playing tennis last week. Or else perhaps neither. (And do I owe the gods for those gnats in Cleveland game 2?)

One thing I like about my paper, in the course of presenting it, is that the proposal I offer (a 50% adjustment of companies' taxable income towards their financial accounting income, with a few miscellaneous bells and whistles) has some interesting pluses and minuses that - rightly, I think, from an expositional standpoint - I don't fully explore in my paper, as they would make it too long and ponderous. Maybe others will choose to write about the proposal if it gets off the ground sufficiently. I am also increasingly persuaded that it makes basic sense, at least enough to get off the ground as a serious contender even if in the end one might choose not to adopt it. (Although I myself would adopt it.)

How much did I pay for the new Radiohead album?

$ 5 U.S.

UPDATE: Pretty good album, by the way. Would certainly have been worth full price.

Today's Krugman column

He argues today that the Republicans have always been as they are now under Bush. I disagree. His analysis is a bit like saying that someone who has gone stark raving mad with a 105 fever was always just like this because back in the day he had an infected toenail. Yes, Barry Goldwater did some bad things, and the Reagan Administration did Iran-Contra. But they also worked in a bipartisan and responsible way with the Democrats on tax and budget policy in 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985-86, and 1988. They effectively admitted that the "riverboat gamble" had failed within 6 months of trying it. And, despite the Beirut fiasco, which of course is far from the worst blunder our country has ever perpetrated, they certainly did nothing like Iraq, Blackwater, the sinister plans for Iran, etc., etc.

No one is a saint in politics, not the Republicans at any time and certainly not the Democrats at any time. But our institutions can't survive for much longer with the Republicans that we have now, and it's worth remembering that they were never like this, more than just a little bit perhaps, before 1994.