Reminders of income tax law, amid my one-week beach vacation in New Jersey.
Wednesday, August 10, 2016
Saturday, July 30, 2016
The Democrats' new "strategy"
As the NY Times notes today, "Democrats marked a decisive turn in their campaign against Donald J. Trump this week, moving to recast the 2016 not as a conventional battle between left and right but as a national emergency that requires voters of all stripes to band together against a singularly menacing candidate.... [T]hey used their convention to portray Mr. Trump as a dangerously unstable figure and a friend of foreign despots like Vladimir V. Putin of Russia .... [and] suggested Mr. Trump might have authoritarian impulses of his own."
In my title for this blogpost, I put the word "strategy" in scare quotes because there's something quaint about calling it merely a "strategy" to point out something so important that appears so clearly to be true.
However, the advantages that I am hoping the "strategy" will have include the following:
1) It is widely recognized as true. Thus, the article swiftly pivots to quoting David Boaz, the Executive Vice President of the libertarian Cato Institute - hardly a hotbed of pro-Democratic or pro-Hillary sentiment. He says, of the critique of Trump: "I really don't think that's too over the top. We have one candidate who's not even pretending - he is promising to be a one-man ruler."
Many other conservative and/or Republican commentators, including both politicians and bloggers, journalists, etc., have been saying the same thing for months. The critique is not something the Democratic convention-planners cooked up in late-night strategy sessions. There has been a growing tidal wave of people of many different viewpoints coming to realize that it is true, and saying so.
2) Like all good campaign "strategies," it leverages the other candidate's political strengths against him. So much of what Trump does clearly fits the narrative that he will have trouble trying to disconfirm it without neutering himself. Plus, he may just go along decisively confirming it (as with his mid-Democratic convention call for Russian espionage against the United States government).
3) It puts pressure on the many people who are still backing Trump out of cynicism, opportunism, or convenience (i.e., who are not themselves committed authoritarians). One might think that the likes of a Mitch McConnell or a Paul Ryan wouldn't have to worry about having backed Trump if he loses the election. After all, he presumably can't destroy our way of life and system of government as a private citizen. So the fact that they supported something terrible, despite (I think) knowing, albeit perhaps not caring, about how terrible it is, would not have been directly proven to the general public. But the thing is this. Trump is going to stay in the news for a while after the election, even if he loses, and there is a good chance that he will act in an increasingly unhinged fashion. Think of Sarah Palin after the 2008 election. She remained a gigantic news story for several years afterwards, during which time she increasingly discredited herself and thereby shamed people who had been willing to support her for Vice President. Trump will be an even bigger story than she was, although not necessarily for longer. And even beyond growing increasingly verbally and behaviorally unhinged (if that's possible), he might also conceivably experience a humiliating financial crackup. So people who have backed Trump, even if they did it while holding their noses a bit, face the risk of having this thrown in their faces, to their political detriment, for several years at least.
Obviously, this is not an issue for Ted Cruz. So, if he were to run (or when he runs) in 2020, then outside of the Trump bitter-enders (who might still be important in the Republican primaries), he would be viewed as free of this particular taint. If he were to lose the general election, it would be for other reasons. But many other Republicans should know today that, even if Trump loses, they face the risk of being deeply tainted.
Then again, all this assumes that the "strategy" works, at least in the sense that (whether by reason of it or not) Trump loses the election. That in turn presupposes that enough voters both object to authoritarianism, and can recognize it as such despite all of the noise.
In my title for this blogpost, I put the word "strategy" in scare quotes because there's something quaint about calling it merely a "strategy" to point out something so important that appears so clearly to be true.
However, the advantages that I am hoping the "strategy" will have include the following:
1) It is widely recognized as true. Thus, the article swiftly pivots to quoting David Boaz, the Executive Vice President of the libertarian Cato Institute - hardly a hotbed of pro-Democratic or pro-Hillary sentiment. He says, of the critique of Trump: "I really don't think that's too over the top. We have one candidate who's not even pretending - he is promising to be a one-man ruler."
Many other conservative and/or Republican commentators, including both politicians and bloggers, journalists, etc., have been saying the same thing for months. The critique is not something the Democratic convention-planners cooked up in late-night strategy sessions. There has been a growing tidal wave of people of many different viewpoints coming to realize that it is true, and saying so.
2) Like all good campaign "strategies," it leverages the other candidate's political strengths against him. So much of what Trump does clearly fits the narrative that he will have trouble trying to disconfirm it without neutering himself. Plus, he may just go along decisively confirming it (as with his mid-Democratic convention call for Russian espionage against the United States government).
3) It puts pressure on the many people who are still backing Trump out of cynicism, opportunism, or convenience (i.e., who are not themselves committed authoritarians). One might think that the likes of a Mitch McConnell or a Paul Ryan wouldn't have to worry about having backed Trump if he loses the election. After all, he presumably can't destroy our way of life and system of government as a private citizen. So the fact that they supported something terrible, despite (I think) knowing, albeit perhaps not caring, about how terrible it is, would not have been directly proven to the general public. But the thing is this. Trump is going to stay in the news for a while after the election, even if he loses, and there is a good chance that he will act in an increasingly unhinged fashion. Think of Sarah Palin after the 2008 election. She remained a gigantic news story for several years afterwards, during which time she increasingly discredited herself and thereby shamed people who had been willing to support her for Vice President. Trump will be an even bigger story than she was, although not necessarily for longer. And even beyond growing increasingly verbally and behaviorally unhinged (if that's possible), he might also conceivably experience a humiliating financial crackup. So people who have backed Trump, even if they did it while holding their noses a bit, face the risk of having this thrown in their faces, to their political detriment, for several years at least.
Obviously, this is not an issue for Ted Cruz. So, if he were to run (or when he runs) in 2020, then outside of the Trump bitter-enders (who might still be important in the Republican primaries), he would be viewed as free of this particular taint. If he were to lose the general election, it would be for other reasons. But many other Republicans should know today that, even if Trump loses, they face the risk of being deeply tainted.
Then again, all this assumes that the "strategy" works, at least in the sense that (whether by reason of it or not) Trump loses the election. That in turn presupposes that enough voters both object to authoritarianism, and can recognize it as such despite all of the noise.
Friday, July 29, 2016
How many pomegranate seeds did Persephone eat anyway?
Because I like summer so much (even when it's been muggy, as in NYC recently), I found myself thinking: Why did Persephone have to eat those six pomegranate seeds when Hades was holding her prisoner in the Underworld, according to the Greek myth, causing us to have six green months and six barren months? Couldn't she at least have eaten fewer seeds, if not fasted altogether?
But when I checked online, I found a startling lack of consensus regarding just how many seeds she is supposed to have eaten. It appears alternatively to have been one, three, four, or six.
But when I checked online, I found a startling lack of consensus regarding just how many seeds she is supposed to have eaten. It appears alternatively to have been one, three, four, or six.
Thursday, July 28, 2016
The sphinx without a secret
Oscar Wilde has a short story called "The Sphinx Without a Secret," about a woman who appears to have a great mystery in her life - going to a private apartment at certain times in the week, etc. After she dies, someone who's fascinated with her investigates, and finds out that the great secret is there was no secret - it was just a sham to create the appearance of mystery and excitement.
Donald Trump's Russian connection isn't quite the same as this - he isn't trying to create a mystery regarding whether he is a foreign agent. But the underlying truth here is, I think, as unmysterious as hers. I believe one can predict it with confidence, although obviously verifying (or modifying) it would be desirable.
Here's the basic model for understanding it. U.S. politicians often have big donors who give them lots of money, and with whom they have close relationships and shared understandings, while generally avoiding express quid pro quos. (Plus, each side in such a relationship does in fact have multiple allies, along with multiple parameters guiding its behavior.)
Not to pick on Republicans here relative to Democrats, but a classic example would be Scott Walker's relationship with the Koch brothers. They've given him lots of money, he tends to pursue their objectives, but he could honestly say that he'd do so anyway. He tends not to talk to them much directly (a liberal Boston radio jock embarrassed him by calling him on the phone and pretending to be a Koch; Walker fell for it and spoke with him very accommodatingly). Part of the donor's game is simply to exert influence over the donee's worldview, plus of course they have selected each other based on prior compatibility.
I would start with this as my model for Trump and the Russians, only there are some differences.
1) The Koch brothers are American citizens with strong views about U.S. policy. Russia is a foreign power whose leader regards the U.S., in large degree though not always, as an enemy. Putin recognizes that we have some common interests and foes, but his chief foreign policy goal is to restore Russian-U.S. parity or better, including Russian dominance in its territorial sphere at the expense of NATO allies. Hurting the U.S. is generally good from his standpoint, all else equal, and he would certainly like to expel us from as much of Europe as he can.
2) Scott Walker, I presume, has lots of funding sources. By contrast, I gather that there is substantial evidence that Trump has been heavily reliant on Russian financing for more than a decade. Other than Credit Suisse, I gather that few if any banks active in the U.S. credit market will fund him anymore, because he has proven to be too bad-faith a business partner.
3) Scott Walker knows and understands the norms of U.S. politics, e.g., regarding how you moderate the degree of quid pro quo. (And again, there are Democrats and their financial backers whom I could sub in here.) Trump, needless to say, doesn't understand this, and has zero inclination to try to learn it.
4) Scott Walker is within the psychologically normal range of human nature. Trump is an extreme narcissist. So the fact that these guys are his "friends," and have been helping him out and working with him for so many years, means that they and everything they want (unless directly at his expense) are by definition good.
I suspect that mostly covers it. I think that, if you asked Putin, under truth serum, is Trump your stooge, he would say Yes, and we've worked hard for many years to make him one. If you asked Trump under truth serum, he would say: No (obviously, this would be unacceptably hurtful to his self-esteem), but he would add that the Russians are really good people, they've helped me out, and I sympathize with them and understand their needs.
Is there an implicit threat that they'd pull the funding if he didn't give them what they want? I don't doubt that they would, but I presume he is not focused on that, and may even be naive about it. (Why would his friends, who are such nice guys, ever do that to him?) There's often an iron fist under the velvet glove of an ongoing relationship - but that doesn't mean that express blackmail threats are being regularly (or ever) issued.
Does this sound too stupid and naive on Trump's part? I don't think so. Josh Marshall of Talking Points Memo, who has played an important role in developing this story, has been very cautious here, as he should be, but what he hasn't done at all here is invoke what he calls "Trump's Razor." This is the proposition that, in trying to figure things out about Trump, one should always "ascertain the stupidest possible scenario that can be reconciled with the available facts."
Trump's Razor hasn't failed Marshall yet in this election cycle, and I don't think it would it fail him here if he thus invoked it.
Donald Trump's Russian connection isn't quite the same as this - he isn't trying to create a mystery regarding whether he is a foreign agent. But the underlying truth here is, I think, as unmysterious as hers. I believe one can predict it with confidence, although obviously verifying (or modifying) it would be desirable.
Here's the basic model for understanding it. U.S. politicians often have big donors who give them lots of money, and with whom they have close relationships and shared understandings, while generally avoiding express quid pro quos. (Plus, each side in such a relationship does in fact have multiple allies, along with multiple parameters guiding its behavior.)
Not to pick on Republicans here relative to Democrats, but a classic example would be Scott Walker's relationship with the Koch brothers. They've given him lots of money, he tends to pursue their objectives, but he could honestly say that he'd do so anyway. He tends not to talk to them much directly (a liberal Boston radio jock embarrassed him by calling him on the phone and pretending to be a Koch; Walker fell for it and spoke with him very accommodatingly). Part of the donor's game is simply to exert influence over the donee's worldview, plus of course they have selected each other based on prior compatibility.
I would start with this as my model for Trump and the Russians, only there are some differences.
1) The Koch brothers are American citizens with strong views about U.S. policy. Russia is a foreign power whose leader regards the U.S., in large degree though not always, as an enemy. Putin recognizes that we have some common interests and foes, but his chief foreign policy goal is to restore Russian-U.S. parity or better, including Russian dominance in its territorial sphere at the expense of NATO allies. Hurting the U.S. is generally good from his standpoint, all else equal, and he would certainly like to expel us from as much of Europe as he can.
2) Scott Walker, I presume, has lots of funding sources. By contrast, I gather that there is substantial evidence that Trump has been heavily reliant on Russian financing for more than a decade. Other than Credit Suisse, I gather that few if any banks active in the U.S. credit market will fund him anymore, because he has proven to be too bad-faith a business partner.
3) Scott Walker knows and understands the norms of U.S. politics, e.g., regarding how you moderate the degree of quid pro quo. (And again, there are Democrats and their financial backers whom I could sub in here.) Trump, needless to say, doesn't understand this, and has zero inclination to try to learn it.
4) Scott Walker is within the psychologically normal range of human nature. Trump is an extreme narcissist. So the fact that these guys are his "friends," and have been helping him out and working with him for so many years, means that they and everything they want (unless directly at his expense) are by definition good.
I suspect that mostly covers it. I think that, if you asked Putin, under truth serum, is Trump your stooge, he would say Yes, and we've worked hard for many years to make him one. If you asked Trump under truth serum, he would say: No (obviously, this would be unacceptably hurtful to his self-esteem), but he would add that the Russians are really good people, they've helped me out, and I sympathize with them and understand their needs.
Is there an implicit threat that they'd pull the funding if he didn't give them what they want? I don't doubt that they would, but I presume he is not focused on that, and may even be naive about it. (Why would his friends, who are such nice guys, ever do that to him?) There's often an iron fist under the velvet glove of an ongoing relationship - but that doesn't mean that express blackmail threats are being regularly (or ever) issued.
Does this sound too stupid and naive on Trump's part? I don't think so. Josh Marshall of Talking Points Memo, who has played an important role in developing this story, has been very cautious here, as he should be, but what he hasn't done at all here is invoke what he calls "Trump's Razor." This is the proposition that, in trying to figure things out about Trump, one should always "ascertain the stupidest possible scenario that can be reconciled with the available facts."
Trump's Razor hasn't failed Marshall yet in this election cycle, and I don't think it would it fail him here if he thus invoked it.
Monday, July 25, 2016
Another brick in place
I seem to have completed a draft of chapter 7 of my literature book, concerning Anthony Trollope's The Way We Live Now. Here is the layout so far:
7. Don’t Blame Them? Plutocrats, Capitalism, and
Foreigners in Anthony Trollope’s The Way
We Live Now
PART
1: WHY THE SUPER-RICH, AND WHY LITERATURE?
1.
Introduction
2.
The Mapmaker’s Dilemma in Evaluating High-End Inequality
PART
2: ENGLAND AND FRANCE DURING THE AGE OF REVOLUTION
Introduction
to Part 2
3.
Why Aren’t Things Better Than This? Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice
4.
A Rising Tide Rocks All Boats: The Threat of Rising Prosperity in Stendhal’s Le Rouge et le Noir
5.
The Arriviste as Morally Compromised Cat’s Paw: Balzac’s Le Père
Goriot and La Maison Nucingen
Summing
Up Part 2
PART
3: ENGLAND FROM THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY THROUGH THE START OF WORLD WAR I
Introduction
to Part 3
6. Art, Heart, and “Schmart” in Charles Dickens’
A Christmas Carol
Chapter 8, which will conclude Part 3, is almost certainly going to discuss E.M. Forster's Howards End. I have thought about discussing Saki's The Unbearable Bassington, which I love, but choosing Forster is probably preferable on multiple grounds.
Sunday, July 24, 2016
The Hungry Tiger
I once (as an adult) read The Wizard of Oz, which (as books can be) is fuller than the movie, but you can also see that the 1938 filmmakers did a great job of compressing and tightening the plot to increase its dramatic impact. Then I read Book 2 (I haven't read the other twenty or so), which also was fun and had a memorable character called the Hungry Tiger. Per Wikipedia:
The Hungry Tiger is a massive beast who is friends with the Cowardly Lion. He is always hungry no matter how much he eats, and longs to eat a "fat baby," though he never would because his conscience will not allow him to do so. He asks Nanda for permission to eat her and when she declines, he asks for a large quantity of beefsteaks, potatoes, and ice cream. He wishes that a dentistcould remove his appetite. At the banquet in the Emerald City at the end of Ozma of Oz, he acknowledges that he is finally full.
My memory of the Hungry Tiger, from Book 2, is that he is always saying to people: I'm so hungry I almost feel like eating you, but what would be the point, I'd just be hungry again in an hour anyway. This in turn now brings to mind Buddy - the fellow shown here below - although he is fortunately far too small to think of us as food, other than as its suppliers via the crunchies we give him.
The thing about Buddy is how opposite in temperament he is to the Hungry Tiger. Even if he had human-like anticipation and foresight, he would NEVER fuss along the lines of "What's the point? I'll just be hungry again soon." He is far too buoyant and (if one can say this of a cat) essentially optimistic to despond like that - even as he gets older and creakier, and thus generally starts to feel much worse physically.
So he'll whine for food if he thinks it might work, even if you just fed him five minutes ago. But, unless he's exceptionally hungry, if it doesn't work he just figures: That's fine, plenty of other nice things to do (such as going to one of his favored napping spots).
Whenever I get agitated about something, say about the election, I realize what a valuable lesson about temperament and mood one could try to learn (if such things were learnable) from Buddy.
Friday, July 22, 2016
Greg Mankiw on universal basic income
Easy writing versus hard writing
The tax and social justice paper that I mentioned in an earlier post took me just over three days. The slightly shorter Jane Austen chapter for my literature book has taken (so far) hundreds of hours, spread out over multiple drafts and a couple of years.
Whistling (if not quite singing) in the rain
In last night's RNC speech, Trump was almost commendably up-front about the fact that he is proposing to replace the U.S. legal and political order with a Putinist dictatorship. By squinting a bit, however, I can discern three silver linings:
1) Prognosticators generally see a 60% to 80% chance that he will lose the election.
2) If he wins, we don't know for sure that the institutional barriers will fail. This depends on other politicians in both parties, on Executive Branch employees and the military if (when?) they get illegal and improper orders, and on civil society institutions including the press.
3) We also don't know for sure that he means it. If not, it wouldn't be the first time that purchasers of Trump products failed to get what they were promised.
1) Prognosticators generally see a 60% to 80% chance that he will lose the election.
2) If he wins, we don't know for sure that the institutional barriers will fail. This depends on other politicians in both parties, on Executive Branch employees and the military if (when?) they get illegal and improper orders, and on civil society institutions including the press.
3) We also don't know for sure that he means it. If not, it wouldn't be the first time that purchasers of Trump products failed to get what they were promised.
Thursday, July 21, 2016
Tax and social justice paper
I noted in an earlier blog post that I am writing a short piece for the tax and social justice conference that is upcoming at NYU in late September. The piece now has a title - "Interrogating the Relationship Between 'Legally Defensible' Tax Planning and Social Justice" - and I've actually written it, or at least a 10,000 word first draft. It went really fast, verging on writing itself. And it does indeed take the unusual form, for the last 80 percent, of a dialogue between two fictional individuals with somewhat differing viewpoints. At the moment, although one always must distrust the infatuation associated with something you have just written and that came together easily, I rather like it.
I'm not planning to post it before September, but here is the abstract:
I'm not planning to post it before September, but here is the abstract:
"Large-scale tax
avoidance by wealthy individuals and large companies that is legally defensible
under relevant national tax laws can nonetheless have major adverse effects on
social justice and/or public morale.
However, its legal defensibility complicates analyzing its ethical
implications, as compared to the more straightforward case of committing tax
fraud. Legal defensibility also
complicates the analysis of the extent to which advocates of human rights
principles and policies should focus on such desiderata as “good corporate tax
behavior” and the ethics of tax professionals.
"Much of this
complexity pertains to (1) issues of ex ante legal uncertainty regarding
whether a defensible position would actually be upheld if closely scrutinized,
(2) the multifaceted character both of tax professionals’ ethical obligations
and of their incentives, and (3) the ambiguity of people’s personal ethical
obligations to act altruistically, rather than just self-interestedly. It also is hard to judge the tactical
questions associated with focusing on these issues, rather than on the tax
rules’ content. Ethical challenges may
help to undermine social acceptance of current practices, but also may distract
from legal reform efforts."
Interpreting last night's Cruz-Trump set-to
I haven't been watching the Republican Convention - shambolic versions of the Nuremberg Rallies aren't my thing - but Martin Longman's distinctive take on what happened seems to capture an important aspect, missing in most of the other accounts that I've seen.
It appears that the Trump camp (1) had full notice of what Cruz was planning to do, (2) organized the response of booing him off the stage and having Trump crowd his exit, and (3) informed him that this was their plan.
They may have hoped that he would find this intolerable and back down, but they couldn't have been counting on this, at least not 100%. What I think they were counting on is that, if he stuck to his plan and they stuck to theirs, the media takeaway would be "Cruz is punished and shamed for breaking his pledge" - making it a pro-unity moment, no less than when Trotsky was escorted over the Soviet border.
Since it didn't play out that way in the media, did they learn anything? I would say, all they learned is something that they already knew: that this is what can happen when, unlike Putin, you are still subject to the bias of an "unfair" media.
UPDATE: Right on cue, Trump said exactly what I thought he would say about the "dishonest" media's reporting of the Cruz speech.
It appears that the Trump camp (1) had full notice of what Cruz was planning to do, (2) organized the response of booing him off the stage and having Trump crowd his exit, and (3) informed him that this was their plan.
They may have hoped that he would find this intolerable and back down, but they couldn't have been counting on this, at least not 100%. What I think they were counting on is that, if he stuck to his plan and they stuck to theirs, the media takeaway would be "Cruz is punished and shamed for breaking his pledge" - making it a pro-unity moment, no less than when Trotsky was escorted over the Soviet border.
Since it didn't play out that way in the media, did they learn anything? I would say, all they learned is something that they already knew: that this is what can happen when, unlike Putin, you are still subject to the bias of an "unfair" media.
UPDATE: Right on cue, Trump said exactly what I thought he would say about the "dishonest" media's reporting of the Cruz speech.
Health club blues (and glitter rock)
Ever since recurrent nagging injuries forced me off the tennis court, probably for good, I've relied on elliptical machines (plus diet) as the lead weapon in my hand-to-hand combat against the aging process (aka, very slow and orderly retreat). The problem is that I keep having to find music to listen to while I'm plodding through my 35 minutes. I have a 50+ year back catalog to draw on, but it has to be something I like hearing right now, that's sufficiently up-tempo, and it can't be too new to me (for a new album - and I do still think in "album" terms - I still need 2 or 3 conventional listens before it can work for me at the health club).
Today's successful re-discovery was Roxy Music's classic 1975 concept album - the Sergeant Pepper of painful romantic self-delusion - Siren. Highly recommended if you like 1960s or 1970s rock, or for that matter Radiohead.
Today's successful re-discovery was Roxy Music's classic 1975 concept album - the Sergeant Pepper of painful romantic self-delusion - Siren. Highly recommended if you like 1960s or 1970s rock, or for that matter Radiohead.
Wednesday, July 20, 2016
Presented without comment (due to Godwin's Law)
From an email I just got from Eric Trump: "Across the world right now, people laugh at us! They think we are too soft."
Tuesday, July 19, 2016
New territory?
I admire David Cay Johnston's investigative work. He has been a NY Times reporter on the tax beat, gave the Tillinghast International Tax Lecture at NYU once, and recently has been publishing in the Daily Beast, among other places. A number of his recent columns, such as this one most recently. concern tax and other matters relating to Donald Trump, whose history Johnston has been investigating for some years (predating the 2016 campaign). He has a book on Trump coming out shortly. Among the topics I presume it will cover is Trump's mob ties, which he has discussed, for example, here.
Given the unique times that we are living through these days, I seriously wonder: What happens to unfriendly investigative reporters if Trump wins the election? That's not the sort of question I've ever thought it necessary to ask before, in the U.S. context - even Nixon's enemies list seems to have been largely a matter of venting.* But we are in new territory, with a candidate who likes to talk about loosening the libel laws, and who threatened Amazon and Jeff Bezos because he didn't like some articles in the Washington Post, and who openly admires Vladimir Putin.
_________________________________________________________________________________
*Of course, we'll never really know what Nixon's second term might have looked like, had he kept on riding high after the POWs came home, instead of getting consumed by Watergate. But aides such as Haldeman appear to have been fairly vigilant about limiting the crazy stuff that he actually did.
Given the unique times that we are living through these days, I seriously wonder: What happens to unfriendly investigative reporters if Trump wins the election? That's not the sort of question I've ever thought it necessary to ask before, in the U.S. context - even Nixon's enemies list seems to have been largely a matter of venting.* But we are in new territory, with a candidate who likes to talk about loosening the libel laws, and who threatened Amazon and Jeff Bezos because he didn't like some articles in the Washington Post, and who openly admires Vladimir Putin.
_________________________________________________________________________________
*Of course, we'll never really know what Nixon's second term might have looked like, had he kept on riding high after the POWs came home, instead of getting consumed by Watergate. But aides such as Haldeman appear to have been fairly vigilant about limiting the crazy stuff that he actually did.
Monday, July 18, 2016
Jotwell posting on Branko Milanovic's "Global Inequality"
This year, for (I think) the fourth time, I've written a brief laudatory review of a recent publication on Tax Jotwell, which stands for "journal of things we like (lots)." My subject this year was Branko Milanovic's Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization (2016).
You can find my review here.
You can find my review here.
Friday, July 15, 2016
Upcoming "Human Rights and Tax" conference at NYU Law School
On September 22-23, the Centre for Human Rights and Social Justice will be holding a conference at NYU Law School called "Human Rights and Tax in an Unequal World." They issued a call for papers here, although the deadline has passed and various people were invited upfront, so the organizers could structure panels on particular topics. Afterwards they will publish a conference volume containing papers from the sessions.
The conference offers the possibility of creating interesting synergies from bringing distinct groups together. Tax people and human rights people generally are not in dialogue with each other. Even where members of both groups are concerned about the same issues - for example high-end inequality - it's fair to say that they come at it from very different angles. In tax practice, "human rights" sometimes refers (rather inaptly, I would say) to efforts by EU tax counsel to resist, on behalf of corporate clients, document discovery that is sought by the tax authorities.
I talked with the organizers at the planning stage, and will be writing a short paper and giving a talk about it at Session Four, meeting on Friday, 9/23, from 10:30 to 11:45 AM. The session's title is "Private Actors and the Public Purse: The Roles of Corporations, Lawyers, and Accountants in Tax Abuse." My paper doesn't have a title yet, but I've written the abstract (which I may post after I've had a chance to mull it over a bit more) and am starting to map out the piece, at least in my mind.
I'm going to look at a bunch of issues as to which there are really two sides, reflecting complexities that relate, for example, to the relevance of legal uncertainty (and the audit lottery), and to how one should think about the underlying ethical issues, both from a tax professional's standpoint and that of an individual planning his or her professional life.
With the idea of trying something a bit different (and I hope fun and interesting), I am thinking of writing the paper in the form of a dialogue between two thoughtful individuals who take conflicting views (although with overlap, since both are reasonable) of the main points of contention that I will be addressing.
The conference offers the possibility of creating interesting synergies from bringing distinct groups together. Tax people and human rights people generally are not in dialogue with each other. Even where members of both groups are concerned about the same issues - for example high-end inequality - it's fair to say that they come at it from very different angles. In tax practice, "human rights" sometimes refers (rather inaptly, I would say) to efforts by EU tax counsel to resist, on behalf of corporate clients, document discovery that is sought by the tax authorities.
I talked with the organizers at the planning stage, and will be writing a short paper and giving a talk about it at Session Four, meeting on Friday, 9/23, from 10:30 to 11:45 AM. The session's title is "Private Actors and the Public Purse: The Roles of Corporations, Lawyers, and Accountants in Tax Abuse." My paper doesn't have a title yet, but I've written the abstract (which I may post after I've had a chance to mull it over a bit more) and am starting to map out the piece, at least in my mind.
I'm going to look at a bunch of issues as to which there are really two sides, reflecting complexities that relate, for example, to the relevance of legal uncertainty (and the audit lottery), and to how one should think about the underlying ethical issues, both from a tax professional's standpoint and that of an individual planning his or her professional life.
With the idea of trying something a bit different (and I hope fun and interesting), I am thinking of writing the paper in the form of a dialogue between two thoughtful individuals who take conflicting views (although with overlap, since both are reasonable) of the main points of contention that I will be addressing.
Monday, July 11, 2016
Readings on meritocracy
Per the Arts & Letters Daily, which I scan regularly in search of interesting items, today I found a link to a piece from the Hedgehog Review, a triennial publication that "offers critical reflections on contemporary culture." Their current issue features three short articles on "Meritocracy and Its Discontents," one of them by Robert Frank, with whom I am co-teaching the NYU inequality colloquium late this fall.
Another of the three short articles, and the one linked by the Arts & Letters Daily, is by Helen Andrews, a researcher (not previously known to me) at a conservative and pro-free market Australian think tank. It contains the following provocative passages that, given their concise crispness, I am thinking I should quote from, in one of the two opening chapters of my literature book on high-end inequality:
Another of the three short articles, and the one linked by the Arts & Letters Daily, is by Helen Andrews, a researcher (not previously known to me) at a conservative and pro-free market Australian think tank. It contains the following provocative passages that, given their concise crispness, I am thinking I should quote from, in one of the two opening chapters of my literature book on high-end inequality:
"Meritocracy
began by destroying an aristocracy; it has ended in creating a new one. Nearly
every book in the American anti-meritocracy literature makes this charge, in
what is usually its most empirically reinforced chapter. Statistics on the
decline of social mobility are not lacking. In 1985, less than half of students
at selective colleges came from families in the top income quartile; in 2010,
67 percent did.... [Data show the] growing tendency of the members of America’s cognitive elite
to marry each other, live near each other in “Super Zips,” and launch their
children into the same schools, and thence onto the same path to worldly
success.... 'Our
new multiracial, gender-neutral meritocracy has figured out a way to make itself
hereditary.' ....
"[Yet n]ot since the
Society of the Cincinnati has a ruling elite so vehemently disclaimed any
resemblance to an aristocracy. The structure of the economy abets the elite in
its delusion, since even the very rich are now more likely to earn their money
from employment than from capital, and thus find it easier to think of
themselves basically as working stiffs. As cultural consumers they are careful
to look down their noses at nothing except country music.... 'It is as if the new
elite are saying, ‘Look! We are not some exclusive club. If anything, we are
the most democratized of all groups.’”
Friday, July 08, 2016
A new NYU colloquium
This fall, during the second half of the semester (on Mondays from October 24 through December 5, from 4:10 to 6 pm), I will be participating in a brand-new NYU colloquium, entitled the Colloquium on High-End Inequality. My co-teacher will be Robert H. Frank, the eminent economist who is the Henrietta Johnson Louis Professor of Management, and a Professor of Economics, at Cornell University. Frank is well-known for his work addressing positional externalities and rising high-end wealth concentration, among other topics.
The structure will be just like of that of the tax policy colloquia that I have been doing for more than twenty years, except for its being in the fall semester and just over its last seven weeks. Thus, we'll have an interdisciplinary approach, a weekly paper and author, a morning session with just the students (although authors are invited to this), and an afternoon session with the author and students that is open to the public, followed by a small-group dinner, I am hoping that a wide range of people in the New York area who are interested in high-end inequality will come to the afternoon sessions.
Here is our schedule. Titles not in quotes indicate that we know the topic, but not necessarily the identity of the particular paper.
The structure will be just like of that of the tax policy colloquia that I have been doing for more than twenty years, except for its being in the fall semester and just over its last seven weeks. Thus, we'll have an interdisciplinary approach, a weekly paper and author, a morning session with just the students (although authors are invited to this), and an afternoon session with the author and students that is open to the public, followed by a small-group dinner, I am hoping that a wide range of people in the New York area who are interested in high-end inequality will come to the afternoon sessions.
Here is our schedule. Titles not in quotes indicate that we know the topic, but not necessarily the identity of the particular paper.
October 24
– Robert Frank, Cornell University. Either
“Falling Behind” or “Success and Luck.”
October 31
– Kate Pickett, Department of Health Sciences, University of York. Issues in health and inequality. [Pickett is the co-author, with Richard G. Wilkinson, of "The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger."]
November 7
– Daniel Shaviro, NYU Law School. “The
Mapmaker’s Dilemma in Evaluating High-End Inequality.”
November 14
– Alan Viard, American Enterprise Institute.
Progressive consumption taxation. {Viard is the co-author, with Robert Carroll, of "Progressive Consumption Taxation: The X-Tax Revisited."]
November 21
– Ilyana Kuziemko, Princeton University Economics Department. “Support for
Redistribution in an Age of Rising Inequality: New Stylized Facts and Some
Tentative Explanations.”
November 28
– Adair Morse, Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley. “Trickle-Down Consumption.”
December 5
– Daniel Markovits, Yale Law School. “Meritocracy
and Its Discontents.”
Thursday, July 07, 2016
The academy [or at least some members of it] fights back, part 2
In a recent blog post, I mentioned that I am among 25 legal academics who recently signed either of two amicus briefs that were filed with the Ninth Circuit in the appeal of the Tax Court's Altera decision. As I noted in that post, even apart from the merits of the particular issues, our decisions thus to express ourselves (when there are plenty of other demands on one's time) reflected - at least in my case - "realiz[ing] that a whole lot of money has been flowing into challenging Treasury regulations ... and that no one with money to spend has an incentive to support the government's side." This can create a dangerous imbalance in both the judicial process and the political process.
That consideration also influenced my decision to sign two comments that multiple law professors recently submitted to the Treasury Department, expressing support for two proposed regulations that were recently issued under Code section 385 in the context of inversion transactions. This comment addresses the recent proposed rule that would recharacterize certain related party debt as equity. This one addresses the so-called "serial inverter" rule, affecting companies that engage in multiple inversion transactions over a three-year period.
The analysis in these comments is terser than that in the amicus briefs, reflecting the difference between the two contexts. But I suspect that few of the other comments that end up being submitted, with regard to these regulations, will set forth, as we do, the grounds for believing that the rules at issue both serve important policy goals and are within the Treasury's authority.
NYU Tax Policy Colloquium, spring 2017
In the first few
months of 2017, I will be co-teaching the NYU Tax Policy Colloquium for the 22nd
time. My colleague will be Rosanne
Altshuler of the Rutgers Economics Department, and we’ll be meeting on Mondays
(apart from one Tuesday, due to Presidents Day) from 4:00 to 5:50 pm, in the
main NYU Law School building. Here is
our schedule:
1. Monday, January 23 – Lily Batchelder,
NYU Law School
2. Monday, January 30 – Mark Gergen,
Berkeley Law School
3. Monday, February 6 – Alan Auerbach, Berkeley Economics Department
3. Monday, February 6 – Alan Auerbach, Berkeley Economics Department
4. Monday, February 13 – Allison Christians,
McGill Law School
5. Tuesday, February 21 – Jason Oh, UCLA
Law School
6. Monday, February 27 – Stephen Shay,
Harvard Law School
7. Monday, March 6 – Scott Dyreng, Duke
Business School
8. Monday, March 20 – Daniel Hemel,
University of Chicago Law School
9. Monday, March 27 – Leonard Burman,
Urban Institute
10. Monday, April 3 – Kathleen Delaney Thomas,
University of North Carolina Law School
11. Monday, April 10 – Julie Cullen, UC
San Diego Department of Economics
12. Monday, April 17 – Miranda Perry
Fleischer, University of San Diego Law School
13. Monday, April 24 – Joel Slemrod,
University of Michigan Business School
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