Last Thursday we discussed Lily Batchelder's new draft paper (still a work in progress), which argues that savings incentives in the tax code are poorly designed to advance insurance objectives for poorer individuals. She notes low responsiveness to the rules in present law, and their generally providing larger incentives to higher-income individuals who arguably are saving enough already. Thus, she proposes either (a) changing defaults so people automaticallty save for retirement through their employment, but with opt-out and no tax benefit for saving, or (b) a refundable saver's credit that's phased out based on income. Absent opt-out, the savings accounts would automatically convert shortly before retirement to fixed real life annuities.
Alan Auerbach and I were more inclined than Lily to think of saving enough and having enough insurance of various kinds as very different things. Suppose you know with certainty (a) your entire future earnings profile, (b) your exact life expectancy, and (c) anything you need to know about consumer prices, your consumption preferences, and rates of return on saving until the day you die. In this scenario there's no uncertainty about any of these inputs, hence no need whatsoever for insurance so far as any of them are concerned. Yet it would still be vital to save enough to smooth your lifetime consumption path optimally, and people who were myopic or had self-control problems would fall short of optimizing. Hence, we might want to require or induce more saving in order to increase their welfare (and also to save us from having to "rescue" them later on if they depart too far from the optimal path).
Likewise, consider in these terms Social Security. In large part it is simply a device to force a minimum level of retirement saving given one's lifetime income (net of taxes and transfers, including its own). Indeed, though it is always called social insurance for purely formal reasons (e.g., its purporting to have dedicated financing, which in fact aren't much like insurance premiums), its sole insurance feature (redistribution in the program aside) is the fixed real life annuity.
Suppose that we knew everyone's exact lifespan. We'd still need Social Security, but we'd be able to substitute term annuities, equal in length for each retiree to her remaining lifespan, for the life annuities. Now it wouldn't be insurance at all, yet it would still be pretty similar to what we now have. So insurance is not really a huge part of Social Security, despite the semantic convention that supposes it to be a core case.
If we limited the "social insurance" label to programs that actually are economically insurance, and furnished by the government due either to adverse selection problems or people's under-appreciating the value of being insured, the preeminent case would be the income tax plus welfare system, which provide insurance against income risk. But these of course are the programs that no one calls insurance and that indeed were the very ones the inventors of the "social insurance" label were trying to distinguish from their favored programs. (See my Social Security book for a fuller discussion.)
Anyway, the main payoff of all this to Alan and myself was disagreeing about the extent to which savings incentives and insurance objectives should actually be considered a natural match.
The other main quibble we had pertained to the proposal for default saving with free opt-out. Lily wants the opt-out, rather than mandatory saving beyond that in Social Security, because otherwise we might be requiring someone to over-save relative to what was truly optimal for them. Our objection was that we don't really have good reason to tilt the default towards more saving unless one thinks people are otherwise likely to be saving too little. But if we think they mostly are, why allow the opt-out?
The reason for allowing it would be clear if we expected the "right" people to opt out while the ones we wanted to save more stayed at the default level. But what if it was the other way around? It's hard to know why the opt-out would be exercised primarily by those who actually would be saving too much otherwise, rather than by those who want to under-save relative to what's optimal.
Sunday, April 05, 2009
Tuesday, March 31, 2009
The real problem with Twitter
To do it right takes too long. How can you be interesting, fun, & worth reading in only 140 characters without taking all day? (time’s up)
Tax policy colloquium on Emmanuel Saez's "Details Matter"
Last Thursday, we started our post-spring break Tax Policy Colloquium final stretch run with Emmanuel Saez's "Details Matter: The Impact of Presentation and Information on the Take-Up of Financial Incentives for Retirement Saving." The paper analyzes a large-scale real world field experiment with H&R Block in St. Louis several years back, in which randomly selected but generally lower-income customers were offered a cash incentive for establishing an IRA account with Block. Some got no incentive, a second group got a 50% match (e.g., put in $600 and Block would add $300 to the account), and a third group got a 33% credit (e.g., put in $900 and Block would send you a check for $300).
Take-up of the IRAs was generally low, even though the two incentive plans offered free money given that, despite early withdrawal penalties, one would come out ahead if one closed the account in a year. This point was not emphasized, however, and the low take-up even with incentives reinforced the difficulty of encouraging what we might think is optimal retirement saving by lower-income workers. (Either that, or else they perhaps rightly didn't like this particular savings vehicle, which had high annual fees relative to value for small accounts.)
The main finding of the study was that the match proved more popular than the credit, even though, as the above example shows, they are arithmetically equivalent IF putting down more cash now (typically out of one's refund) and waiting two weeks for a check that one then has to cash is assumed to be cost-free.
In part, people seem to have responded to the nominally larger size of a 50% match compared to a 33% credit, even though they're actually identical since the base for computing the percentages differs as between the two of them. But there's also some reason to think that people like the match structure better than the credit structure even when they're effectively identical. My proposed explanation was that the match looks like free money, while the credit looks simply like a price break, which still leaves the question of whether the price is good enough to justify a purchase. Or, hyperbolic discounting could be doing the work if people think of the match as immediately effective (though in fact it takes a couple of weeks, and one is saving the money in the account anyway) and the cash back as in the future. Neither of these is a rational explanation, of course.
I more generally wonder to what extent incentives (at least relative to applying the regular income tax treatment of saving) can generate the sort of retirement preparation that we believe is in most cases optimal. One is appealing to rational calculation in a setting where it's generally thought not to work so well. Beyond the use of defaults so people have to opt out of retirement saving, I think the better answer lies in a Social Security-style mandatory approach(government takes money from you now and gives it back with interest later, or else simply makes you wait for transfers later). This isn't perfect either (e.g., as Louis Kaplow notes, it can affect work incentives, given the preference for immediate consumption, even if one demonstrably gets fair value back). But I see it as more promising than the income-conditioned saver's credit or match approach that motivated the Saez experiment.
Take-up of the IRAs was generally low, even though the two incentive plans offered free money given that, despite early withdrawal penalties, one would come out ahead if one closed the account in a year. This point was not emphasized, however, and the low take-up even with incentives reinforced the difficulty of encouraging what we might think is optimal retirement saving by lower-income workers. (Either that, or else they perhaps rightly didn't like this particular savings vehicle, which had high annual fees relative to value for small accounts.)
The main finding of the study was that the match proved more popular than the credit, even though, as the above example shows, they are arithmetically equivalent IF putting down more cash now (typically out of one's refund) and waiting two weeks for a check that one then has to cash is assumed to be cost-free.
In part, people seem to have responded to the nominally larger size of a 50% match compared to a 33% credit, even though they're actually identical since the base for computing the percentages differs as between the two of them. But there's also some reason to think that people like the match structure better than the credit structure even when they're effectively identical. My proposed explanation was that the match looks like free money, while the credit looks simply like a price break, which still leaves the question of whether the price is good enough to justify a purchase. Or, hyperbolic discounting could be doing the work if people think of the match as immediately effective (though in fact it takes a couple of weeks, and one is saving the money in the account anyway) and the cash back as in the future. Neither of these is a rational explanation, of course.
I more generally wonder to what extent incentives (at least relative to applying the regular income tax treatment of saving) can generate the sort of retirement preparation that we believe is in most cases optimal. One is appealing to rational calculation in a setting where it's generally thought not to work so well. Beyond the use of defaults so people have to opt out of retirement saving, I think the better answer lies in a Social Security-style mandatory approach(government takes money from you now and gives it back with interest later, or else simply makes you wait for transfers later). This isn't perfect either (e.g., as Louis Kaplow notes, it can affect work incentives, given the preference for immediate consumption, even if one demonstrably gets fair value back). But I see it as more promising than the income-conditioned saver's credit or match approach that motivated the Saez experiment.
Fraud and cheating synergies
From an ABC News story on AIG renegade executive Joseph Cassano, the infamous head of their Financial Products Division:
"Cassano set up some dozens of separate companies, some off-shore, to handle the transactions, effectively keeping them off the books of AIG and out of sight of regulators in the U.S. and the United Kingdom.
"'This is the other very important issue underneath the AIG scandal,' said Blum. 'All of these contracts were moved offshore for the express purpose of getting out from under regulation and tax evasion.'"
This is pretty much the point Mihir Desai makes in his work on taxes and corporate governance. Once there is a planning excuse for complex structures, they can be used for multiple nefarious purposes, e.g., tax fraud, avoiding internal and market as well as formal regulatory oversight, looting the company, etcetera.
Complex structures kill transparency. At the limit, they make corporate governance impossible and genuinely profitable activity by publicly traded companies a pipe dream. To some extent, this is a problem of financial not "real" activity, as the latter is much easier to observe. E.g., Apple Computers and General Motors both are presumably well-judged by the market because to a considerable extent one can see how well or poorly they are doing. But even companies engaged in real productive activity often have such large finance wings (think GMAC historically, or GE's recent problems) that the virus of non-transparency extends well beyond the pure banking and finance sector.
"Cassano set up some dozens of separate companies, some off-shore, to handle the transactions, effectively keeping them off the books of AIG and out of sight of regulators in the U.S. and the United Kingdom.
"'This is the other very important issue underneath the AIG scandal,' said Blum. 'All of these contracts were moved offshore for the express purpose of getting out from under regulation and tax evasion.'"
This is pretty much the point Mihir Desai makes in his work on taxes and corporate governance. Once there is a planning excuse for complex structures, they can be used for multiple nefarious purposes, e.g., tax fraud, avoiding internal and market as well as formal regulatory oversight, looting the company, etcetera.
Complex structures kill transparency. At the limit, they make corporate governance impossible and genuinely profitable activity by publicly traded companies a pipe dream. To some extent, this is a problem of financial not "real" activity, as the latter is much easier to observe. E.g., Apple Computers and General Motors both are presumably well-judged by the market because to a considerable extent one can see how well or poorly they are doing. But even companies engaged in real productive activity often have such large finance wings (think GMAC historically, or GE's recent problems) that the virus of non-transparency extends well beyond the pure banking and finance sector.
Tuesday, March 24, 2009
Payback from China continues
The head of China's central bank is now calling for the dollar to be dethroned as the world's reserve currency and replaced by a new IMF-controlled benchmark.
I doubt anything will come of this right away, and if I were the Chinese I might not even want immediate adoption of this proposal (which could devalue their vast dollar holdings), but this may well be the way we are headed. The U.S. has simply been over-exploiting the economic value of being the reserve currency, and at some point the golden calf perishes, so to speak.
My guess is that the Chinese are trying to scare us into taking more responsible measures so as to head off this kind of scenario. It's a tricky game, since until they've lowered their dollar holdings they don't really want to scare the world's investors more than they scare us - it has to be the other way around for them to benefit. But the fact that they are doing this shows how concerned they understandably are. And I don't know how responsive political constraints will permit U.S. policymakers to be, though I don't doubt that high-up Obama Administration officials have heard and understood the message.
I doubt anything will come of this right away, and if I were the Chinese I might not even want immediate adoption of this proposal (which could devalue their vast dollar holdings), but this may well be the way we are headed. The U.S. has simply been over-exploiting the economic value of being the reserve currency, and at some point the golden calf perishes, so to speak.
My guess is that the Chinese are trying to scare us into taking more responsible measures so as to head off this kind of scenario. It's a tricky game, since until they've lowered their dollar holdings they don't really want to scare the world's investors more than they scare us - it has to be the other way around for them to benefit. But the fact that they are doing this shows how concerned they understandably are. And I don't know how responsive political constraints will permit U.S. policymakers to be, though I don't doubt that high-up Obama Administration officials have heard and understood the message.
Monday, March 23, 2009
Reasons to visit Washington
My family went site-seeing in Washington D.C. while I was going to a conference at the Washington University in St. Louis. Conceptual togetherness even when apart? They returned with this lovely photo, which they rightly surmised that I would enjoy.
On the same theme, I got to talk while at WULS with a former senior economist in the Nixon and Reagan Administrations, a very nice and interesting man. At lunch one day, I couldn't resist asking him about Nixon. He said Nixon was exceptionally intelligent but a strange person with an overwhelming aversion against ever taking the simple, direct, straightforward route to any objective. For example, if there was a public document to release, Nixon would insist on leaking it somehow as a means of rewarding friends in the media or punishing foes. Reagan, he said, was very pleasant but clearly regarded everyone working for him in the government (even people as high up as Jim Baker) as hired hands - you could see the contrast when Jimmy Cagney and Patrick O'Brien came in for a White House film screening and were greeted very differently.
Saturday, March 21, 2009
Washington University Law School budget conference
I am sitting in a hotel lounge (better-appointed than the available ones at the airport) waiting for the departure time of a flight out of St. Louis, where I just spent the last two days at a budget conference organized by Cheryl Block of WULS. Lots of interesting sessions, on topics ranging from automatic budgetary changes (such as entitlements cuts) to restore fiscal sustainability, to how the Presidential and legislative budget processes do and should function (e.g., use of budget resolutions or automatic sunset rules), to the practical political feasibility of "saving" Social Security surpluses, to the relevance of the tax expenditure debate, to issues of capital budgeting (amortizing items with long-term benefit) and how to measure the budgetary cost of bailouts.
I was there to present my current paper on the fiscal gap, its generational equity and efficiency consequences, etc. I'll probably get to rewrite this paper, using more recent CBO estimates and changing the emphasis a bit, as Cheryl is planning to create a conference volume, or perhaps something better than a conference volume in that it emphasizes organizing new knowledge without being limited to what people happened to present.
One thing that became clear to me in re. my paper is that the financial crisis has opposite implications for the apparent relevance of my paper than I realized when I started writing it. As I noted in a prior post about someone's colloquium paper, it can be kind of awkward or inconvenient when current events, such as the financial crisis, overtake one while one is writing a given paper (e.g., if one is lauding universal home ownership). When the financial crisis hit while I was in mid-draft, I had a bit of the feeling that it was rhetorically inconvenient because the short-term emphasis has to be on pulling the economy out of its nosedive, rather than immediately restoring long-term balance. So while I could rightly point out in my draft that the financial crisis makes the long-term problems worse, I had to acknowledge that the current mess has to be dealt with first.
But especially in lieu of the Chinese prime minister's recent remarks about U.S. solvency, it became clear to me (perhaps with a little help from my friends) that the positive links between the two issues are stronger than I had recognized. If you're going to be borrowing $2 trillion a year for the next few years, you had damn well better take steps to reassure prospective lenders that you are on a course to assure your own long-term solvency.
One way of putting it is that the Washington MSM conventional wisdom, as usual, is 180 degrees wrong. Obama isn't tackling too much - healthcare and energy policy/ cap and trade permits are actually even more urgent given the crisis than they would be otherwise. Rather, he is tackling too little, in that he hasn't done enough so far to show that the U.S. will be trying to tack back towards the path of solvency. Which is not to say that his or his advisors' political judgment was wrong if they concluded this would be unfeasible. But certainly in terms of the correct policies to follow, by failing to address long-term solvency sufficiently yet (apart from a couple of tantalizing hints), one could argue that he needs to put more on his plate, not less.
I was there to present my current paper on the fiscal gap, its generational equity and efficiency consequences, etc. I'll probably get to rewrite this paper, using more recent CBO estimates and changing the emphasis a bit, as Cheryl is planning to create a conference volume, or perhaps something better than a conference volume in that it emphasizes organizing new knowledge without being limited to what people happened to present.
One thing that became clear to me in re. my paper is that the financial crisis has opposite implications for the apparent relevance of my paper than I realized when I started writing it. As I noted in a prior post about someone's colloquium paper, it can be kind of awkward or inconvenient when current events, such as the financial crisis, overtake one while one is writing a given paper (e.g., if one is lauding universal home ownership). When the financial crisis hit while I was in mid-draft, I had a bit of the feeling that it was rhetorically inconvenient because the short-term emphasis has to be on pulling the economy out of its nosedive, rather than immediately restoring long-term balance. So while I could rightly point out in my draft that the financial crisis makes the long-term problems worse, I had to acknowledge that the current mess has to be dealt with first.
But especially in lieu of the Chinese prime minister's recent remarks about U.S. solvency, it became clear to me (perhaps with a little help from my friends) that the positive links between the two issues are stronger than I had recognized. If you're going to be borrowing $2 trillion a year for the next few years, you had damn well better take steps to reassure prospective lenders that you are on a course to assure your own long-term solvency.
One way of putting it is that the Washington MSM conventional wisdom, as usual, is 180 degrees wrong. Obama isn't tackling too much - healthcare and energy policy/ cap and trade permits are actually even more urgent given the crisis than they would be otherwise. Rather, he is tackling too little, in that he hasn't done enough so far to show that the U.S. will be trying to tack back towards the path of solvency. Which is not to say that his or his advisors' political judgment was wrong if they concluded this would be unfeasible. But certainly in terms of the correct policies to follow, by failing to address long-term solvency sufficiently yet (apart from a couple of tantalizing hints), one could argue that he needs to put more on his plate, not less.
AIG bonus update
I now feel a bit more knowledgeable about the AIG bonus situation than the last time I posted about it, so here are some follow-up thoughts:
1) Words sure matter. If they hadn't called these things "bonuses," obviously no trouble. The underlying situation seems to have been as follows. These guys were getting what I'd call fake or misdirected incentive compensation. Fake in that, as we actually learned in the event, if the payoff from the incentive payments disappeared they would simply be compensated in some other way instead. So to a degree it was, as usual, "heads we win, tails you lose." Once there were no profits from their trading to share they simply got paid a flat fee instead. That said, I gather the salary cut they got was more than 50%, so there wasn't zero "incentive" element. But of course the incentive was misdirected even insofar as they actually faced variance, since the profits they shared in were akin to that from insuring 100% of New Orleans' hurricane risk before Katrina and hence taking home lots of money each year until it hit, whereupon the company got wiped out without actually being able to pay on its customers' insurance claims. Not a great incentive structure to induce people to pretend for a while the company is making money through these things.
2) Given the fixed pay they were receiving in lieu of "incentive" pay, there really was a retention element. Specifically, rather than getting paid more regularly they'd have to stay around for several months at a time in order to get their pay for the period only when it was over. So in that sense it wasn't really a bonus, so much as a plan to make them stay on instead of quitting sooner to get the salary they were otherwise earning (which wouldn't otherwise have been called a bonus, hence eliminating the entire political blowup).
3. Why pay these guys to stay? Who'd want them? What could be their opportunity cost of staying given (a) what they had done and (b) the down economy in financial services especially. I gather there actually is a decent answer to this question. While it's hard for me to judge how hard it would have been for someone else to unwind the AIG positions, these guys had economic value to other employers until the unwind was completed, for the simple reason that, having constructed the positions, they knew what the positions were. Someone who wanted to squeeze AIG (or rather the federal government) on the other side of the transactions could have made money off knowing just what the positions were. Or at least so I'm told. So by this light it was prudent to pay these guys something to stick around so they wouldn't quit and use their knowledge to help someone else cash in (along the lines of Long-Term Capital Management, which got hosed in the unwind some years back partly because counter-parties had figured out their positions and knew they had liquidity needs that would make them sell right away for whatever they could get in a thin market.
So there's underlying bad behavior at various levels here, but arguably the bonuses (a) weren't really that and (b) were worth paying from the government's position. Though I should stress that none of this interpretation is based on my own personal & direct knowledge - it comes rather from what I've read and heard, so in legal trial terms it's hearsay.
4. I gather that the blowup over the "bonuses" is already creating extreme reluctance by private parties to participate in ongoing and new government bailout programs that might subject them to similar firestorms in the future. Then again, given the extremely dim view that many have, for example, for Geithner's new bank bailout program (e.g., see Krugman here), maybe that's not as bad as it sounds. Suppose it forced the adoption of better-conceived bailout policies.
5. The 90% tax may conceivably face a serious constitutional challenge notwithstanding Larry Tribe's assurances to the contrary. Not a surprise, perhaps, as Tribe can be a bit political in his bottom line constitutional judgments. One source of possible trouble could be a NY state case from a few years back, Pataki v. Con Ed, in which a provision denying rate adjustments to the Con Ed shareholders for the blunders that had led to the Indian Point nuclear power plant problems was struck down as a bill of attainder. Obviously, the 90% tax is being drafted with an eye to avoiding the same fate, by causing it to apply more generally. But in the Con Ed case, the court cited legislative history showing that the legislators were specifically angry at Con Ed for its bad deeds and wanted to inflict punishment (hardly unreasonably, but that's not the point when the question of law is bill of attainder). Needless to say, the record of enactment for the 90% tax (if it goes through) is hardly lacking in evidence that the legislators were specifically interested in nailing AIG. Not to say that this is necessarily fatal, and it is presumably being drafted with a keen eye to the problem, but there's precedent for treating the clear intent as adverse evidence on the constitutionality question.
1) Words sure matter. If they hadn't called these things "bonuses," obviously no trouble. The underlying situation seems to have been as follows. These guys were getting what I'd call fake or misdirected incentive compensation. Fake in that, as we actually learned in the event, if the payoff from the incentive payments disappeared they would simply be compensated in some other way instead. So to a degree it was, as usual, "heads we win, tails you lose." Once there were no profits from their trading to share they simply got paid a flat fee instead. That said, I gather the salary cut they got was more than 50%, so there wasn't zero "incentive" element. But of course the incentive was misdirected even insofar as they actually faced variance, since the profits they shared in were akin to that from insuring 100% of New Orleans' hurricane risk before Katrina and hence taking home lots of money each year until it hit, whereupon the company got wiped out without actually being able to pay on its customers' insurance claims. Not a great incentive structure to induce people to pretend for a while the company is making money through these things.
2) Given the fixed pay they were receiving in lieu of "incentive" pay, there really was a retention element. Specifically, rather than getting paid more regularly they'd have to stay around for several months at a time in order to get their pay for the period only when it was over. So in that sense it wasn't really a bonus, so much as a plan to make them stay on instead of quitting sooner to get the salary they were otherwise earning (which wouldn't otherwise have been called a bonus, hence eliminating the entire political blowup).
3. Why pay these guys to stay? Who'd want them? What could be their opportunity cost of staying given (a) what they had done and (b) the down economy in financial services especially. I gather there actually is a decent answer to this question. While it's hard for me to judge how hard it would have been for someone else to unwind the AIG positions, these guys had economic value to other employers until the unwind was completed, for the simple reason that, having constructed the positions, they knew what the positions were. Someone who wanted to squeeze AIG (or rather the federal government) on the other side of the transactions could have made money off knowing just what the positions were. Or at least so I'm told. So by this light it was prudent to pay these guys something to stick around so they wouldn't quit and use their knowledge to help someone else cash in (along the lines of Long-Term Capital Management, which got hosed in the unwind some years back partly because counter-parties had figured out their positions and knew they had liquidity needs that would make them sell right away for whatever they could get in a thin market.
So there's underlying bad behavior at various levels here, but arguably the bonuses (a) weren't really that and (b) were worth paying from the government's position. Though I should stress that none of this interpretation is based on my own personal & direct knowledge - it comes rather from what I've read and heard, so in legal trial terms it's hearsay.
4. I gather that the blowup over the "bonuses" is already creating extreme reluctance by private parties to participate in ongoing and new government bailout programs that might subject them to similar firestorms in the future. Then again, given the extremely dim view that many have, for example, for Geithner's new bank bailout program (e.g., see Krugman here), maybe that's not as bad as it sounds. Suppose it forced the adoption of better-conceived bailout policies.
5. The 90% tax may conceivably face a serious constitutional challenge notwithstanding Larry Tribe's assurances to the contrary. Not a surprise, perhaps, as Tribe can be a bit political in his bottom line constitutional judgments. One source of possible trouble could be a NY state case from a few years back, Pataki v. Con Ed, in which a provision denying rate adjustments to the Con Ed shareholders for the blunders that had led to the Indian Point nuclear power plant problems was struck down as a bill of attainder. Obviously, the 90% tax is being drafted with an eye to avoiding the same fate, by causing it to apply more generally. But in the Con Ed case, the court cited legislative history showing that the legislators were specifically angry at Con Ed for its bad deeds and wanted to inflict punishment (hardly unreasonably, but that's not the point when the question of law is bill of attainder). Needless to say, the record of enactment for the 90% tax (if it goes through) is hardly lacking in evidence that the legislators were specifically interested in nailing AIG. Not to say that this is necessarily fatal, and it is presumably being drafted with a keen eye to the problem, but there's precedent for treating the clear intent as adverse evidence on the constitutionality question.
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
How did people understand the brain before computers?
On the tennis court recently, I had been playing very well, then I lost my strokes and floundered horribly for a couple of sessions, then I was able to find them again and played very well this week.
The analogy that seems utterly compelling to me is that of a computer file somewhere in your system that you need to locate and access quickly in order to run a particular program in real time. Maybe with the additional detail that it needs to be on your "Recent Applications" list in order for you to find it effectively. But one couldn't have conceptualized it this way until PCs came into common usage.
The analogy that seems utterly compelling to me is that of a computer file somewhere in your system that you need to locate and access quickly in order to run a particular program in real time. Maybe with the additional detail that it needs to be on your "Recent Applications" list in order for you to find it effectively. But one couldn't have conceptualized it this way until PCs came into common usage.
Tuesday, March 17, 2009
AIG bonus tax
I was angered by the AIG bonuses. Sure, it's a bit of a pop symbolism issue, but I found it odious that these Typhoid Marys of finance - who ought to be unemployable for life, other than asking if you want fries with that, after all that they've done to their shareholders and the world economy - should get all those million dollar bonuses out of federal money, supposedly so they won't leave, when some already have and the rest probably should. Plus my anger reflected my belief that over-the-top executive compensation, as it's developed in the last decade, has not just been wasteful and misguided, but a primary cause of the global economic disaster. Burning the money would have been better for the U.S. and world economy than letting the people in these sorts of positions "earn" it by pulling monkeyshines that involved phony income plus all too real downside economic risk.
But a 100% "tax" on a specific group of individuals with respect to items paid before enactment of the "tax" certainly makes me uneasy. (Scare quotes because - though I am no constitutional law expert - the narrowly targeted 100% rate seems to put it on the wrong side of the amorphous line between a tax and a Fifth Amendment taking.)
Frankly, it doesn't bother me in the slightest if the 100% tax applies just this one time to just these people. They would appear to deserve it many times over. But one can never be sure that one isn't creating a precedent with legs. Might the device someday be used against someone else who just happens to be unpopular?
I'd actually like to make an example of these guys - as the French would say, "pour encourager les autres," as well as for general public morale. But I'd prefer a better way of doing it, such as investigating them for looting and fraud, which might have been amply justified even without the bonuses.
But a 100% "tax" on a specific group of individuals with respect to items paid before enactment of the "tax" certainly makes me uneasy. (Scare quotes because - though I am no constitutional law expert - the narrowly targeted 100% rate seems to put it on the wrong side of the amorphous line between a tax and a Fifth Amendment taking.)
Frankly, it doesn't bother me in the slightest if the 100% tax applies just this one time to just these people. They would appear to deserve it many times over. But one can never be sure that one isn't creating a precedent with legs. Might the device someday be used against someone else who just happens to be unpopular?
I'd actually like to make an example of these guys - as the French would say, "pour encourager les autres," as well as for general public morale. But I'd prefer a better way of doing it, such as investigating them for looting and fraud, which might have been amply justified even without the bonuses.
Friday, March 13, 2009
This is how it starts
Alternative title: "Well, duh."
From the New York Times:
"The Chinese prime minister, Wen Jiabao, spoke in unusually blunt terms on Friday about the 'safety' of China’s $1 trillion investment in American government debt, the world’s largest such holding, and urged the Obama administration to offer assurances that the securities would maintain their value.
"Speaking ahead of a meeting of finance ministers and bankers this weekend near London to lay the groundwork for next month’s Group of 20 summit meeting of the nations with the 20 largest economies, Mr. Wen said that he was 'worried' about China’s holdings of United States Treasury bonds and other debt, and that China was watching economic developments in the United States closely....
"In January, Mr. Wen gave a speech criticizing what he called an 'unsustainable model of development characterized by prolonged low savings and high consumption.' There was little doubt that he was referring to the United States."
If I were Wen, I'd be worried too.
This is how a nation's credit reputation starts unraveling.
From the New York Times:
"The Chinese prime minister, Wen Jiabao, spoke in unusually blunt terms on Friday about the 'safety' of China’s $1 trillion investment in American government debt, the world’s largest such holding, and urged the Obama administration to offer assurances that the securities would maintain their value.
"Speaking ahead of a meeting of finance ministers and bankers this weekend near London to lay the groundwork for next month’s Group of 20 summit meeting of the nations with the 20 largest economies, Mr. Wen said that he was 'worried' about China’s holdings of United States Treasury bonds and other debt, and that China was watching economic developments in the United States closely....
"In January, Mr. Wen gave a speech criticizing what he called an 'unsustainable model of development characterized by prolonged low savings and high consumption.' There was little doubt that he was referring to the United States."
If I were Wen, I'd be worried too.
This is how a nation's credit reputation starts unraveling.
Tax policy colloquium on David Duff's "Tax Fairness and the Tax Mix"
Yesterday we had our ninth session of the year, and last before spring break, discussing the above article by David Duff, who has long been at the University of Toronto Law School but is moving to the University of British Columbia Law School, in Vancouver. (In weather terms, this is a bit like trading Boston for Seattle, which sounds pretty good to me after the 3-and-counting monstrously brutal winter months that we've had here in New York.)
The paper posits that different fairness norms apply to different elements in the tax structure. On reading the paper, this struck me as requiring one to deny or disregard the fungibility of money. But, as often happens at the colloquium lunches in advance of the sessions, we discerned that he actually meant something a bit different.
David classifies himself in philosophical terms as a liberal egalitarian, opposed to the welfarist and libertarian traditions, but he disclaims what at times can be the vindictive face of liberal egalitarianism - its suggestion, in some proponents' hands, that we should turn our backs on people who have made mistakes, rather than trying to help them out, because somehow this "respects" them more as moral agents. I personally am quite willing to suffer "disrespect" in the form of compassionate rescue if I ever need it. Another occasional implication of liberal egalitarianism that he disclaims is that equalizing opportunity downward is just as good as doing so upward. (This led to the retort at one conference I once attended that the best possible way of implementing equal opportunity is through global thermonuclear war - then we'd never have to worry again about some people having better opportunities than others.) What he does mean by liberal egalitarianism, however, was less clear - though this was partly our fault not his, because as usual we didn't get to the phantom "Topic 3" on our discussion list.
The paper perplexed me a bit by arguing that, wholly without regard to distributional issues, a VAT with an exemption amount would be the right way to pay for public goods. To me, it would seem that the only reason for having high earners pay more than low earners is distributional. David gets there by following Blum and Kalven to the effect that we should totally ignore benefit from public spending and pretend it was wasted, for purposes of deciding who should pay. He then argues for equalizing individuals' total sacrifice, as a loosely libertarian-style privileged baseline - from which (unlike the libertarians) he would then be willing to redistribute as well, but in his mind through a fundamentally different exercise.
I argued in response, inter alia, that "total sacrifice" is incoherent. E.g., just because we can't measure benefits going the other way doesn't mean that we should counter-factually pretend that they're zero. More generally, there simply is no meaningful baseline of "public goods without financing" - his revision to the libertarians' supposed state of nature - from which to measure total sacrifice. Nor would I find the exercise normatively motivated even if I thought it was coherently definable. But to each his own, and one need not always agree to have a civil and productive discussion.
The paper posits that different fairness norms apply to different elements in the tax structure. On reading the paper, this struck me as requiring one to deny or disregard the fungibility of money. But, as often happens at the colloquium lunches in advance of the sessions, we discerned that he actually meant something a bit different.
David classifies himself in philosophical terms as a liberal egalitarian, opposed to the welfarist and libertarian traditions, but he disclaims what at times can be the vindictive face of liberal egalitarianism - its suggestion, in some proponents' hands, that we should turn our backs on people who have made mistakes, rather than trying to help them out, because somehow this "respects" them more as moral agents. I personally am quite willing to suffer "disrespect" in the form of compassionate rescue if I ever need it. Another occasional implication of liberal egalitarianism that he disclaims is that equalizing opportunity downward is just as good as doing so upward. (This led to the retort at one conference I once attended that the best possible way of implementing equal opportunity is through global thermonuclear war - then we'd never have to worry again about some people having better opportunities than others.) What he does mean by liberal egalitarianism, however, was less clear - though this was partly our fault not his, because as usual we didn't get to the phantom "Topic 3" on our discussion list.
The paper perplexed me a bit by arguing that, wholly without regard to distributional issues, a VAT with an exemption amount would be the right way to pay for public goods. To me, it would seem that the only reason for having high earners pay more than low earners is distributional. David gets there by following Blum and Kalven to the effect that we should totally ignore benefit from public spending and pretend it was wasted, for purposes of deciding who should pay. He then argues for equalizing individuals' total sacrifice, as a loosely libertarian-style privileged baseline - from which (unlike the libertarians) he would then be willing to redistribute as well, but in his mind through a fundamentally different exercise.
I argued in response, inter alia, that "total sacrifice" is incoherent. E.g., just because we can't measure benefits going the other way doesn't mean that we should counter-factually pretend that they're zero. More generally, there simply is no meaningful baseline of "public goods without financing" - his revision to the libertarians' supposed state of nature - from which to measure total sacrifice. Nor would I find the exercise normatively motivated even if I thought it was coherently definable. But to each his own, and one need not always agree to have a civil and productive discussion.
We may have waited too long to clone Shadow ...
Followers of my cats will be glad to hear that Ursula, knock on wood, is doing a lot better. She's overcome her kidney infection and now just needs a couple of water shots a week. She's silky and active as ever, and has a better appetite than she's had for months if not years.
Ursula is cautious and doesn't like strangers, but it's nice to be one of her favorites. If she hears me on the floor exercising (attempting to stave off the 6 main injuries I periodically get from playing tennis), she will come up, purring and fluttering, rolling on the floor, bashing her head against my hand, leg, or head, etcetera. She also seems to really like it when I shave - perhaps the electric shaver sounds as if I'm purring.
She's remarkably astute about figuring out when I'm on the verge of grabbing her for a water shot. Turn your head for one second and she's gone. Luckily, she only has about 5 main hiding places. Once I get her, she simply issues a piteous mew and shrinks down, rather than fighting, but with her heart beating madly. There are no hard feelings afterwards, however.
Shadow, at age 18, is not doing so well as Ursula at age 7.
Wednesday, March 11, 2009
Should the U.S. restate past years' GDP?
At one point during my book session at the Urban Institute today, I made the comment that, just as the SEC sometimes makes companies restate past years’ income which turns out to have been partly sham, so maybe the U.S. should have to restate GDP for the last few years. Think about it – the financial sector was nominally producing 8% of the total, and much of this appears in retrospect to have been wealth transfers unaccompanied by the actual performance of services or creation of value.
E.g., suppose a firm made tons of money by purporting to insure 100% of New Orleans’ hurricane risk. The premiums go into GDP on the view that they are not just transfer payments but reflect the value of the insurance. Then Katrina hits and the firm goes bust since it’s totally unable to cover the undiversified risk. Was there ever really national income from the insurance premiums, or was this (take your pick) theft or the equivalent of a transfer payment?
That, of course, is basically the story of AIG. “We didn’t know a hurricane would actually hit New Orleans – our climate model, based on the previous 5 years’ results, showed no severe hurricanes in New Orleans whatsoever.”
OK, I’m engaging in a bit of snark here, not to mention argument by anecdote. But the underlying point is a serious one. Think of all the CDOs that were being swapped around for billions of nominal dollars. There was perhaps some genuine value creation mixed in there – diversifying within mortgages and creating risk tranches wasn’t entirely worthless – but due to the bubble economy the market prices grossly outweighed the actual value creation.
If there’s one thing we try to avoid in measuring GDP, it is making subjective evaluations of value rather than simply looking at prices and transactions. But what ultimately matters is the subjective underlying stuff – the actual creation of things people value. If there’s one thing we’ve learned in the bubble economy of the last few years – other than the facts that transparency is far lower and managerial incentive problems far graver than we realized – it is that prices really can go far, far away from the underlying subjective fundamentals that we care about.
I don’t, of course, seriously propose that we restate past years’ GDP. But it’s important to keep in mind that, even before the crash hit, we were not as rich as we thought we were, and in judging this conventional economic measures can lead us far astray.
E.g., suppose a firm made tons of money by purporting to insure 100% of New Orleans’ hurricane risk. The premiums go into GDP on the view that they are not just transfer payments but reflect the value of the insurance. Then Katrina hits and the firm goes bust since it’s totally unable to cover the undiversified risk. Was there ever really national income from the insurance premiums, or was this (take your pick) theft or the equivalent of a transfer payment?
That, of course, is basically the story of AIG. “We didn’t know a hurricane would actually hit New Orleans – our climate model, based on the previous 5 years’ results, showed no severe hurricanes in New Orleans whatsoever.”
OK, I’m engaging in a bit of snark here, not to mention argument by anecdote. But the underlying point is a serious one. Think of all the CDOs that were being swapped around for billions of nominal dollars. There was perhaps some genuine value creation mixed in there – diversifying within mortgages and creating risk tranches wasn’t entirely worthless – but due to the bubble economy the market prices grossly outweighed the actual value creation.
If there’s one thing we try to avoid in measuring GDP, it is making subjective evaluations of value rather than simply looking at prices and transactions. But what ultimately matters is the subjective underlying stuff – the actual creation of things people value. If there’s one thing we’ve learned in the bubble economy of the last few years – other than the facts that transparency is far lower and managerial incentive problems far graver than we realized – it is that prices really can go far, far away from the underlying subjective fundamentals that we care about.
I don’t, of course, seriously propose that we restate past years’ GDP. But it’s important to keep in mind that, even before the crash hit, we were not as rich as we thought we were, and in judging this conventional economic measures can lead us far astray.
Urban Institute event on Decoding the Corporate Tax
This morning, I attended a book event at the Urban Institute discussing my corporate tax book. Good crowd, maybe about 80 people, apparently plus a webcast audience. My PowerPoint slides for my portion of the event are available here.
Greg Ip of the Economist was the moderator, and the discussants were Rosanne Altshuler of Urban/Rutgers Economics, Dan Halperin of Harvard Law School, and Pam Olson of Skadden Arps (formerly Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).
While the discussants naturally focused on the policy proposals I make at the end of Decoding, I mainly devoted my comments to an overview of the whole thang, as I believe its main and most enduring value relates to the broad question of how one should think about and understand the corporate tax.
Rosanne emphasized the difficulties of deciding where to head in U.S. international taxation as between the worldwide and territorial approaches, and noted that her burden-neutral proposal (with Harry Grubert) to repeal deferral, which I propose to extend to foreign tax credits as well, needs a lot more fleshing out than any of us have given it as yet. She also noted the importance of the U.S.’s having an usually high marginal corporate tax rate by worldwide standards, even if our effective rates are considerably more within the norm.
Dan made an excellent point that the book at least rhetorically underplays a bit, namely that many of the problems raised by corporate integration would apply as well to lowering the U.S. corporate rate. For example, effects on debt-equity choices, the use of corporate tax preferences, and whether we want to use the corporate tax in order to impose an indirect levy on tax-exempts such as Harvard University (his example) really are common to both. This leaves, however, the difference that lowering the entity-level rate applies to inbound investment by foreign corporations, and affects incentives to transfer-price international income into, as opposed to out of, the United States.
Pam addressed corporate governance issues and book-tax conformity in income measurement. While she questioned my exact proposal (50% conformity between taxable income and an adjusted measure of book income), she joins what I think is a growing consensus (at least outside the accounting profession) that the gap between companies’ book and taxable income is too troubling to be dismissed with the airy statement that, gee, the two systems are just different.
Greg asked me about a comment I had made in chat before the start to the effect that I questioned the Obama Administration’s budgetary claim to have $200 billion of revenue to be garnered out of “reforming” deferral by U.S. multinationals. I explained that I was skeptical that the money will turn out to be there either as a matter of legislative politics or straight revenue-raising, and that it’s questionable how much more money we can try to get out of U.S. multinationals when the underlying thing we are taxing – the decision to classify one’s investments as made through a U.S. corporate resident – is so trivial and, over the long term, easily changed.
Greg Ip of the Economist was the moderator, and the discussants were Rosanne Altshuler of Urban/Rutgers Economics, Dan Halperin of Harvard Law School, and Pam Olson of Skadden Arps (formerly Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).
While the discussants naturally focused on the policy proposals I make at the end of Decoding, I mainly devoted my comments to an overview of the whole thang, as I believe its main and most enduring value relates to the broad question of how one should think about and understand the corporate tax.
Rosanne emphasized the difficulties of deciding where to head in U.S. international taxation as between the worldwide and territorial approaches, and noted that her burden-neutral proposal (with Harry Grubert) to repeal deferral, which I propose to extend to foreign tax credits as well, needs a lot more fleshing out than any of us have given it as yet. She also noted the importance of the U.S.’s having an usually high marginal corporate tax rate by worldwide standards, even if our effective rates are considerably more within the norm.
Dan made an excellent point that the book at least rhetorically underplays a bit, namely that many of the problems raised by corporate integration would apply as well to lowering the U.S. corporate rate. For example, effects on debt-equity choices, the use of corporate tax preferences, and whether we want to use the corporate tax in order to impose an indirect levy on tax-exempts such as Harvard University (his example) really are common to both. This leaves, however, the difference that lowering the entity-level rate applies to inbound investment by foreign corporations, and affects incentives to transfer-price international income into, as opposed to out of, the United States.
Pam addressed corporate governance issues and book-tax conformity in income measurement. While she questioned my exact proposal (50% conformity between taxable income and an adjusted measure of book income), she joins what I think is a growing consensus (at least outside the accounting profession) that the gap between companies’ book and taxable income is too troubling to be dismissed with the airy statement that, gee, the two systems are just different.
Greg asked me about a comment I had made in chat before the start to the effect that I questioned the Obama Administration’s budgetary claim to have $200 billion of revenue to be garnered out of “reforming” deferral by U.S. multinationals. I explained that I was skeptical that the money will turn out to be there either as a matter of legislative politics or straight revenue-raising, and that it’s questionable how much more money we can try to get out of U.S. multinationals when the underlying thing we are taxing – the decision to classify one’s investments as made through a U.S. corporate resident – is so trivial and, over the long term, easily changed.
Friday, March 06, 2009
Tax policy colloquium on Michael Doran's "Managers, Shareholders, and the Double Corporate Tax"
Yesterday's discussion returned to more traditional law school tax policy fare, concerning corporate integration and the Bush Administration's partly failed 2003 attempt to accomplish it via dividend exemption. Michael's thesis in his paper is that the political economy story developed in prior work, such as the well-known article by Jennifer Arlen and Deborah Weiss, needs to be revised. Arlen-Weiss emphasize agency costs, in the form of managers not really caring about the transition windfall to shareholders that unanticipated adoption of dividend exemption would provide, and preferring instead to get incentives for new investment plus an excuse not to incur tax burdens by making dividend distributions.
I like the Arlen-Weiss paper, though my views differ a bit in emphasis since I give greater relative importance to (a) the "populist" problem of people thinking that corporations are "people" and should pay tax plus shareholders are wholly separate people and should also pay tax, plus (b) the interest group problem in which managers are aligned with shareholders to prefer targeted tax breaks for their own industries rather than a general corporate-sector improvement in tax treatment. [Actually, diversified shareholders might rationally prefer general corporate tax reform after all, but as shareholders of a given company their interests arguably are aligned with managers regarding targeted giveaways.] But this isn't a big disagreement, just a difference in shading or emphasis.
Anyway, Michael posits that the Arlen-Weiss story is too simple [note: Jennifer Arlen might not agree with how her story is characterized] and needs to be overhauled to give much more pride of place to the issue of heterogeneity. Lots of different players are affected by corporate integration in different ways. E.g., for a given integration proposal, those in some industries might be aided while others are hurt, depending on differences in industry, effective tax rate, shareholder clientele base, etc. Michael reviews the 2003 story, and sees it as all about heterogeneity creating gridlock, rather than the managers defecting from being the shareholders' faithful agents.
As lead commentator, Alan Auerbach emphasized that heterogeneity exists on all sorts of issues yet legislation happens, and presumably exists worldwide with respect to corporate integration yet it has frequently happened everywhere else around the world (albeit that it's been in retreat lately in Europe due to EU problems). So why is this issue special and why is the U.S. different on this issue?
Further discussion pushed us (or at least me) towards the view that the 2003 issue is a bit of a simpler story (and less of a change to Arlen-Weiss) than generalized heterogeneity. The 2003 dividend exemption would have been a substantial blow to the value of corporate tax preferences because it only offered dividend exemption to previously taxed corporate income. This meant that, if you used tax preferences to avoid corporate-level tax, you would get hit at the shareholder level by distributions. Companies that use lots of tax preferences (such as the low-income housing credit) screamed bloody murder and got House Ways and Means Chair Thomas on their side, whereupon it was game over. The proposal went to a 15% rather than a 0% dividend rate, and the feature requiring previous corporate-level tax payment on the distributed income disappeared.
As a general matter, I happen to like reducing the value of corporate-level tax preferences. But it seems clear that, due to this feature, the 2003 dividend exemption was not pure corporate integration. It was corporate integration PLUS corporate-level base-broadening. A pure corporate integration approach would have been "ceasefire in place" regarding the value and usefulness to taxpayers of corporate-level preferences. It's no big surprise that base-broadening faces heavy political obstacles, so what we really had in 2003 was a standard interest group story, much more than a broader heterogeneity story about corporate integration or dividend exemption in general.
CLARIFICATION: After sidebar conversations with a reader who disagreed with my apparent statement that "pure" corporate integration means keeping the preferences, I should emphasize that what I meant above is not (a) that "pure" integration means having tax preferences, but rather (b) that, given where we are now, changing the corporate tax rules purely on the integration dimension would mean ceasefire in place as to the tax preferences. Again, I'd greatly prefer corporate integration with smaller tax preferences than with the same ones, but I would then regard myself as having changed two dimensions.
One further interesting point that came up in the discussion concerned the reasons for U.S. exceptionalism with regard to the double corporate tax. People in the audience noted that U.S. shareholding in public companies is much more diversified than, say, in Europe, where family corporations play a much bigger role. So the publicly traded sector in the U.S. does less to fight for corporate integration than it would in the family firm scenario (basically for Arlen-Weiss reasons). But then it was further noted that there are plenty of closely-held businesses in the U.S.; only, they can generally avoid falling into the C corporation tax world, even if they want limited liability for owners, as they can elect to be taxed on a flowthrough basis as S corporations, or can be LLCs that elect to be taxed as partnerships. Other countries don't have the S corporation route as such. So the hypothesis is that the U.S. is less politically unusual than it seems (or rather is unusual only in having a distinctive institutional twist). If this view is correct, we have simply let the closely held firms opt out of the double tax on the side and hence faced less political pressure to let out the rest.
I like the Arlen-Weiss paper, though my views differ a bit in emphasis since I give greater relative importance to (a) the "populist" problem of people thinking that corporations are "people" and should pay tax plus shareholders are wholly separate people and should also pay tax, plus (b) the interest group problem in which managers are aligned with shareholders to prefer targeted tax breaks for their own industries rather than a general corporate-sector improvement in tax treatment. [Actually, diversified shareholders might rationally prefer general corporate tax reform after all, but as shareholders of a given company their interests arguably are aligned with managers regarding targeted giveaways.] But this isn't a big disagreement, just a difference in shading or emphasis.
Anyway, Michael posits that the Arlen-Weiss story is too simple [note: Jennifer Arlen might not agree with how her story is characterized] and needs to be overhauled to give much more pride of place to the issue of heterogeneity. Lots of different players are affected by corporate integration in different ways. E.g., for a given integration proposal, those in some industries might be aided while others are hurt, depending on differences in industry, effective tax rate, shareholder clientele base, etc. Michael reviews the 2003 story, and sees it as all about heterogeneity creating gridlock, rather than the managers defecting from being the shareholders' faithful agents.
As lead commentator, Alan Auerbach emphasized that heterogeneity exists on all sorts of issues yet legislation happens, and presumably exists worldwide with respect to corporate integration yet it has frequently happened everywhere else around the world (albeit that it's been in retreat lately in Europe due to EU problems). So why is this issue special and why is the U.S. different on this issue?
Further discussion pushed us (or at least me) towards the view that the 2003 issue is a bit of a simpler story (and less of a change to Arlen-Weiss) than generalized heterogeneity. The 2003 dividend exemption would have been a substantial blow to the value of corporate tax preferences because it only offered dividend exemption to previously taxed corporate income. This meant that, if you used tax preferences to avoid corporate-level tax, you would get hit at the shareholder level by distributions. Companies that use lots of tax preferences (such as the low-income housing credit) screamed bloody murder and got House Ways and Means Chair Thomas on their side, whereupon it was game over. The proposal went to a 15% rather than a 0% dividend rate, and the feature requiring previous corporate-level tax payment on the distributed income disappeared.
As a general matter, I happen to like reducing the value of corporate-level tax preferences. But it seems clear that, due to this feature, the 2003 dividend exemption was not pure corporate integration. It was corporate integration PLUS corporate-level base-broadening. A pure corporate integration approach would have been "ceasefire in place" regarding the value and usefulness to taxpayers of corporate-level preferences. It's no big surprise that base-broadening faces heavy political obstacles, so what we really had in 2003 was a standard interest group story, much more than a broader heterogeneity story about corporate integration or dividend exemption in general.
CLARIFICATION: After sidebar conversations with a reader who disagreed with my apparent statement that "pure" corporate integration means keeping the preferences, I should emphasize that what I meant above is not (a) that "pure" integration means having tax preferences, but rather (b) that, given where we are now, changing the corporate tax rules purely on the integration dimension would mean ceasefire in place as to the tax preferences. Again, I'd greatly prefer corporate integration with smaller tax preferences than with the same ones, but I would then regard myself as having changed two dimensions.
One further interesting point that came up in the discussion concerned the reasons for U.S. exceptionalism with regard to the double corporate tax. People in the audience noted that U.S. shareholding in public companies is much more diversified than, say, in Europe, where family corporations play a much bigger role. So the publicly traded sector in the U.S. does less to fight for corporate integration than it would in the family firm scenario (basically for Arlen-Weiss reasons). But then it was further noted that there are plenty of closely-held businesses in the U.S.; only, they can generally avoid falling into the C corporation tax world, even if they want limited liability for owners, as they can elect to be taxed on a flowthrough basis as S corporations, or can be LLCs that elect to be taxed as partnerships. Other countries don't have the S corporation route as such. So the hypothesis is that the U.S. is less politically unusual than it seems (or rather is unusual only in having a distinctive institutional twist). If this view is correct, we have simply let the closely held firms opt out of the double tax on the side and hence faced less political pressure to let out the rest.
Wednesday, March 04, 2009
Amazon availability
Decoding the Corporate Tax is now available on Amazon, though bn.com isn't up yet.
An Amazon purchaser reminds me that the price of the book is just barely high enough to ensure free shipping even if you don't purchase anything else. Such a deal.
An Amazon purchaser reminds me that the price of the book is just barely high enough to ensure free shipping even if you don't purchase anything else. Such a deal.
Tuesday, March 03, 2009
Paging Walter Blum
Walter Blum, an eminent tax scholar and professor of law at the University of Chicago when I arrived there in 1987 who was also a great mentor to me, used to say to his Tax I class, at the beginning of Day 1, that the Dean had just raised his salary. But the problem was that this would put him in a higher tax bracket. Didn't this mean that he should ask the Dean to rescind the raise?
Wally was a classic (though humane) Socratic-style teacher, so for this to work he had to find someone who would actually get it wrong and believe that the answer was yes, whereupon he could poke gentle fun for a while until the point emerged that this was just the marginal rate on the last dollar he earned - so he'd be ahead after tax from an extra dollar of salary no matter what.
Among the reasons I would never try this myself, in my Tax I class, is that I know I would get the right answer, preventing the gambit from working for me pedagogically as it did for Wally. Given this problem, a Chicago colleague once asked Wally how he made it work. He answered "I just look around the room until I see someone who I know is going to get it wrong." (This at the start of the first class of the semester, mind you.)
Well, apparently Wally was not the only one capable of finding someone who would get the marginal rate question wrong. ABC News found someone as well, and decided to hire her and give her a platform as a reporter on budget issues. Emily Friedman, it's time for your closeup. She has now posted a column guilty of exactly this fallacy, and therefore positing that lots of rich families will respond to the Obama budget plan by trying to drive their incomes below $250,000.
You even can vote, if you like, on whether doing this is "fair"!
Jon Chait of the New Republic calls this the dumbest news report he's ever seen, admittedly a high standard.
As hilarious as Friedman's bonehead blunder itself is the classic reportorial method she uses to establish it. The article starts with a bunch of interview quotes from people who evidently are guilty of the marginal rate fallacy and are consequently making plans to get rid of clients and patients, etcetera. Then she quotes an expert who discusses the feasibility of getting below $250,000, but then says it won't really matter if you're at $249,999 or $250,001. This is not well explained or picked up on, however. Then Friedman goes with another "expert" who posits that Obama's proposal will lead to class warfare. Finally, back to the bonehead taxpayers who misunderstand how the proposal works, to close with a heart-tugging bit about how they're overtaxed.
In conventional mainstream media terms, the article is fine. After all, it is merely a viewpoint (albeit a true one) that the Obama tax plan would work as it actually works. It is also a viewpoint that it works differently from how it actually works. Friedman names her sources and leads with the ones who are more fun. Even if she knew the right answer, I suppose it wouldn't be "objective reporting" by her lights if she said so.
Wally was a classic (though humane) Socratic-style teacher, so for this to work he had to find someone who would actually get it wrong and believe that the answer was yes, whereupon he could poke gentle fun for a while until the point emerged that this was just the marginal rate on the last dollar he earned - so he'd be ahead after tax from an extra dollar of salary no matter what.
Among the reasons I would never try this myself, in my Tax I class, is that I know I would get the right answer, preventing the gambit from working for me pedagogically as it did for Wally. Given this problem, a Chicago colleague once asked Wally how he made it work. He answered "I just look around the room until I see someone who I know is going to get it wrong." (This at the start of the first class of the semester, mind you.)
Well, apparently Wally was not the only one capable of finding someone who would get the marginal rate question wrong. ABC News found someone as well, and decided to hire her and give her a platform as a reporter on budget issues. Emily Friedman, it's time for your closeup. She has now posted a column guilty of exactly this fallacy, and therefore positing that lots of rich families will respond to the Obama budget plan by trying to drive their incomes below $250,000.
You even can vote, if you like, on whether doing this is "fair"!
Jon Chait of the New Republic calls this the dumbest news report he's ever seen, admittedly a high standard.
As hilarious as Friedman's bonehead blunder itself is the classic reportorial method she uses to establish it. The article starts with a bunch of interview quotes from people who evidently are guilty of the marginal rate fallacy and are consequently making plans to get rid of clients and patients, etcetera. Then she quotes an expert who discusses the feasibility of getting below $250,000, but then says it won't really matter if you're at $249,999 or $250,001. This is not well explained or picked up on, however. Then Friedman goes with another "expert" who posits that Obama's proposal will lead to class warfare. Finally, back to the bonehead taxpayers who misunderstand how the proposal works, to close with a heart-tugging bit about how they're overtaxed.
In conventional mainstream media terms, the article is fine. After all, it is merely a viewpoint (albeit a true one) that the Obama tax plan would work as it actually works. It is also a viewpoint that it works differently from how it actually works. Friedman names her sources and leads with the ones who are more fun. Even if she knew the right answer, I suppose it wouldn't be "objective reporting" by her lights if she said so.
Tax policy colloquium on Leslie McCall's "Americans' Social Policy Preferences in the Era of Rising Inequality."
Last Thursday, we followed our recent once-a-year tradition of having a paper by a political scientist, in this case Leslie McCall of Northwestern & Princeton concerning American public attitudes towards progressive redistribution. Main takeaways: (1) Americans are more redistributive (and less different in this regard from Europeans) than has widely been thought, (2) in general, concern about income inequality grew in the 1990s with actual inequality, and (3) such concern tended not to produce support for more progressive income tax rates or a larger welfare system because people were skeptical about those two institutions. Instead, it was largely channeled into support for education (believed, perhaps erroneously, to lead towards more equal results) and regulatory issues such as immigation, the minimum wage, and CEO pay.
Generally the story was convincing, although there's only limited data (from large-scale surveys undertaken over the last 20 years). Some of the points we made at the session concerned (a) the difference between addressing the rich and aiding the poor in how people in the middle think about inequality, (b) the importance of whether one's own income is rising or stagnant to how one thinks about those who are getting a lot richer, and (c) the lack of any strong reason for expecting, not withstanding the median voter hypothesis, that our political system will produce increased redistribution even if the median voter wants it.
Generally the story was convincing, although there's only limited data (from large-scale surveys undertaken over the last 20 years). Some of the points we made at the session concerned (a) the difference between addressing the rich and aiding the poor in how people in the middle think about inequality, (b) the importance of whether one's own income is rising or stagnant to how one thinks about those who are getting a lot richer, and (c) the lack of any strong reason for expecting, not withstanding the median voter hypothesis, that our political system will produce increased redistribution even if the median voter wants it.
Friday, February 27, 2009
The recession hits home
The first restaurant I chose for one of our upcoming post-Tax Policy Colloquium dinners turned out to have gone out of business. I first went to it almost 20 years ago. It had been a West Village fixture, and it did a large remodeling not that long ago.
The second place I tried, which as recently as last summer was one of the hot spots in the Meatpacking District, is only open 3 nights a week now. Evidently they're hunkered down and trying to survive the storm. I don't think they'll make it.
The second place I tried, which as recently as last summer was one of the hot spots in the Meatpacking District, is only open 3 nights a week now. Evidently they're hunkered down and trying to survive the storm. I don't think they'll make it.
Some quick preliminary thoughts on President Obama's federal budget
1) Changing the official baseline to include the costs of patching the AMT and funding the Iraq and Afghanistan wars greatly increases the honesty and transparency of the document. As time goes on, it’s going to be interesting to try to give fair credit while also noting the inevitable instances in which there is still less than 100% straightforwardness and candor. GW B*sh – I don’t think I should print in full here ugly 4-letter curse words – set the bar for honesty so low – 20 feet underground or so – that it’s hard to get back to normal evaluation. And I feel it’s the job of someone like me to hold the new Administration’s feet to the fire a bit, and demand more than one could really politically expect. But they should also be credited for the dramatic change in norm.
2) It’s true that putting the above things into the baseline means one doesn’t have to pay for them in order to maintain the acknowledged baseline. But that perhaps would set the bar a little too high at this early stage.
3) While there are serious empirical questions about the revenue to efficiency payoff from raising top marginal rates, my own judgment is to be fine with going back to 39.6%. Reducing the tax benefit from top-bracket itemized deductions is a step in the right direction as well.
4) The Making Work Pay credit in the current stimulus package reaches too high in the income range to be effective stimulus – it would be much more cost-effective if cut off sooner. Its permanent retention in the budget raises different sorts of issues. Essentially, it lowers marginal tax rates (MTRs) in the lower brackets by a more convoluted mechanism than simply cutting down the Social Security payroll tax. Budgetary accounting in the Social Security Trust Fund is the reason for the indirect methodology. Despite the Making Work Pay credit’s name, I think of its rationale as stronger in distributional than efficiency terms (i.e., it benefits recipients more than it improves overall work incentives since it will often be inframarginal).
5) Turning to the items listed as loophole closers:
--I’m certainly fine with the carried interest change, much discussed in this blog and elsewhere a couple of summers ago, but the devil is in the details – it could easily be (mis-)drafted to accomplish nothing. Senator Schumer a couple of years ago proposed applying the change more broadly than just to hedge funds and the like – e.g., to real estate and oil and gas partnerships. Viewed by many at the time as a deliberate poison pill, this was also clearly a desirable change in the proposal if actually adoptable. I don’t know yet how broadly the Administration is proposing to implement the change.
--Eliminating various oil and gas company preferences also is all to the good. An amusing bit of history for me is the proposal to raise two to six million dollars per year, starting in 2011, by eliminating the oil and gas “working interest” exception to the passive loss rules. I was working on the Joint Committee of Taxation staff in 1986 when this exception was added to the Senate Finance Committee tax reform bill. Trivial though it was, we were told that failing to adopt it would change the committee vote on fundamental tax reform from 20-0 in favor – all to the tune of speeches about how this was the greatest tax bill in history – to at least 11-9 against. I’m almost reminded of the old joke about academics, saying that the fights are so bitter because the stakes are so low.
--Repealing LIFO inventory accounting is probably a good thing as well, despite the view that LIFO provides indirect partial inflation indexing.
--Codifying the economic substance doctrine gets a revenue estimate (rising swiftly to almost a billion dollars in 2019) that seems to be a bit high, given that I regard the change as almost a ceasefire in place, apart from its (a) preventing courts from saying there is no such doctrine and (b) tilting the scales a bit towards a tougher rather than a looser interpretation of the doctrine. I believe past revenue estimates were even higher, however.
--“Implement international enforcement, reform deferral, and other tax reform policies” gets scored at $70 billion for the next 5 years and $140 billion for the five years after that. Sounds a bit ambitious. Most academics in the international tax policy area, including me, are skeptical about both the merits and the feasibility of attempting significantly to increase the taxes paid by U.S. multinationals on investment abroad. Corporate residence (since the outbound taxes only apply to what are treated as U.S. resident corporations) is too weak a reed to bear so heavy a weight. This one bears close watching as the details emerge.
--Extend low tax rates for dividends and capital gains, but put them at 20 percent rather than 15 percent. This is about where I would go as well. As per my book,, while there’s little rationale for the corporate double tax, and in particular for taxing dividends (other than as a backstop to the corporate level tax), it’s probably better to focus any tax reduction on the entity rather than the shareholder level. Capital gains are one case where Laffer curve considerations actually do emerge within the politically and administratively feasible set of tax rates. 20 percent is still well below the revenue maximizing rate (and one would want to be below that). They score this as a revenue loss because the baseline is expiration of the Bush tax cuts, but presumably the change from 15 to 20 percent raises non-trivial revenue.
2) It’s true that putting the above things into the baseline means one doesn’t have to pay for them in order to maintain the acknowledged baseline. But that perhaps would set the bar a little too high at this early stage.
3) While there are serious empirical questions about the revenue to efficiency payoff from raising top marginal rates, my own judgment is to be fine with going back to 39.6%. Reducing the tax benefit from top-bracket itemized deductions is a step in the right direction as well.
4) The Making Work Pay credit in the current stimulus package reaches too high in the income range to be effective stimulus – it would be much more cost-effective if cut off sooner. Its permanent retention in the budget raises different sorts of issues. Essentially, it lowers marginal tax rates (MTRs) in the lower brackets by a more convoluted mechanism than simply cutting down the Social Security payroll tax. Budgetary accounting in the Social Security Trust Fund is the reason for the indirect methodology. Despite the Making Work Pay credit’s name, I think of its rationale as stronger in distributional than efficiency terms (i.e., it benefits recipients more than it improves overall work incentives since it will often be inframarginal).
5) Turning to the items listed as loophole closers:
--I’m certainly fine with the carried interest change, much discussed in this blog and elsewhere a couple of summers ago, but the devil is in the details – it could easily be (mis-)drafted to accomplish nothing. Senator Schumer a couple of years ago proposed applying the change more broadly than just to hedge funds and the like – e.g., to real estate and oil and gas partnerships. Viewed by many at the time as a deliberate poison pill, this was also clearly a desirable change in the proposal if actually adoptable. I don’t know yet how broadly the Administration is proposing to implement the change.
--Eliminating various oil and gas company preferences also is all to the good. An amusing bit of history for me is the proposal to raise two to six million dollars per year, starting in 2011, by eliminating the oil and gas “working interest” exception to the passive loss rules. I was working on the Joint Committee of Taxation staff in 1986 when this exception was added to the Senate Finance Committee tax reform bill. Trivial though it was, we were told that failing to adopt it would change the committee vote on fundamental tax reform from 20-0 in favor – all to the tune of speeches about how this was the greatest tax bill in history – to at least 11-9 against. I’m almost reminded of the old joke about academics, saying that the fights are so bitter because the stakes are so low.
--Repealing LIFO inventory accounting is probably a good thing as well, despite the view that LIFO provides indirect partial inflation indexing.
--Codifying the economic substance doctrine gets a revenue estimate (rising swiftly to almost a billion dollars in 2019) that seems to be a bit high, given that I regard the change as almost a ceasefire in place, apart from its (a) preventing courts from saying there is no such doctrine and (b) tilting the scales a bit towards a tougher rather than a looser interpretation of the doctrine. I believe past revenue estimates were even higher, however.
--“Implement international enforcement, reform deferral, and other tax reform policies” gets scored at $70 billion for the next 5 years and $140 billion for the five years after that. Sounds a bit ambitious. Most academics in the international tax policy area, including me, are skeptical about both the merits and the feasibility of attempting significantly to increase the taxes paid by U.S. multinationals on investment abroad. Corporate residence (since the outbound taxes only apply to what are treated as U.S. resident corporations) is too weak a reed to bear so heavy a weight. This one bears close watching as the details emerge.
--Extend low tax rates for dividends and capital gains, but put them at 20 percent rather than 15 percent. This is about where I would go as well. As per my book,, while there’s little rationale for the corporate double tax, and in particular for taxing dividends (other than as a backstop to the corporate level tax), it’s probably better to focus any tax reduction on the entity rather than the shareholder level. Capital gains are one case where Laffer curve considerations actually do emerge within the politically and administratively feasible set of tax rates. 20 percent is still well below the revenue maximizing rate (and one would want to be below that). They score this as a revenue loss because the baseline is expiration of the Bush tax cuts, but presumably the change from 15 to 20 percent raises non-trivial revenue.
Thursday, February 26, 2009
Upcoming D.C. panel on "Decoding the Corporate Tax"
Here is a link for a forthcoming event in Washington, D.C., at the Urban Institute (2100 M Street) on Wednesday, March 11, from 9:00 to 10:30 am, discussing my new book on corporate taxation.
Official description of the event is as follows:
Significant reform of the U.S. tax system must include changes in the complex and inefficient way we tax corporations. What direction should reform take? Many have embraced the idea of integrating the corporate and individual tax. But in his forthcoming Urban Institute Press book, Decoding the U.S. Corporate Tax, Daniel Shaviro argues that there are more promising directions for 21st century corporate tax reform. He considers significantly lowering the corporate rate, embracing international tax simplification, and requiring partial conformity between tax accounting and financial income. Panelists will debate these provocative ideas in a lively discussion of Shaviro’s prescriptions for corporate tax reform.
Panelists:
• Rosanne Altshuler, Senior Fellow, Urban Institute and codirector of the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center
• Daniel Halperin, Stanley S. Surrey Professor of Law, Harvard Law School and Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center (visiting)
• Gregory Ip, U.S. economics editor, The Economist, (moderator)
• John Samuels, General Electric, Vice President and Senior Counsel for Tax Policy
• Daniel Shaviro, Wayne Perry Professor of Taxation, New York University School of Law
Official description of the event is as follows:
Significant reform of the U.S. tax system must include changes in the complex and inefficient way we tax corporations. What direction should reform take? Many have embraced the idea of integrating the corporate and individual tax. But in his forthcoming Urban Institute Press book, Decoding the U.S. Corporate Tax, Daniel Shaviro argues that there are more promising directions for 21st century corporate tax reform. He considers significantly lowering the corporate rate, embracing international tax simplification, and requiring partial conformity between tax accounting and financial income. Panelists will debate these provocative ideas in a lively discussion of Shaviro’s prescriptions for corporate tax reform.
Panelists:
• Rosanne Altshuler, Senior Fellow, Urban Institute and codirector of the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center
• Daniel Halperin, Stanley S. Surrey Professor of Law, Harvard Law School and Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center (visiting)
• Gregory Ip, U.S. economics editor, The Economist, (moderator)
• John Samuels, General Electric, Vice President and Senior Counsel for Tax Policy
• Daniel Shaviro, Wayne Perry Professor of Taxation, New York University School of Law
Wednesday, February 25, 2009
Interview concerning my new book
A brief NYU interview concerning my new book, Decoding the Corporate Tax, is now available here.
AEI session on Viard (ed.), Tax Policy: Lessons from the 2000s
This morning I appeared as a discussant at an AEI book panel in Washington, concerning the above book. I offered comments on 3 excellent papers, by (1) Alan Viard and John Diamond concerning unfinanced tax cuts, (2) Dhammika Dharmapala concerning the 2003 dividend tax cuts, and (3) Alan Auerbach and Kevin Hassett concerning the dividend tax cuts and bonus depreciation.
Power Point slides for my comments, which I tried to make reasonably lively, can be found at the upper right hand side of the webpage here. Among other things, I explore the "Three Bears" theory of the stimulative effects of bonus depreciation, and disagree with Laurence Kotlikoff (a commentator on one of three papers) regarding the definition of rationality.
Power Point slides for my comments, which I tried to make reasonably lively, can be found at the upper right hand side of the webpage here. Among other things, I explore the "Three Bears" theory of the stimulative effects of bonus depreciation, and disagree with Laurence Kotlikoff (a commentator on one of three papers) regarding the definition of rationality.
U.S. fiscal situation
Having found the time to read the Auerbach-Gale fiscal gap paper more carefully than when I recently posted about it, the following points seem especially pertinent:
(1) We have a really huge fiscal sustainability problem that the financial crisis has made significantly worse, but that the stimulus legislation, if its provisions generally expire in a couple of years as expected, affects only slightly. In my recent article about the fiscal gap, what I considered the most reasonable projections (in terms of projected current policy for future years) from the perspective of mid-2008 placed it at $103 trillion, whereas a similar Auerbach-Gale estimate now places it at $118 trillion. This may not be entirely apples to apples, however. Current stimulus initiatives are trivial compared to this if they are indeed temporary.
(2) Paul Krugman and his acolytes like to say that we don’t really have a budget crisis, but rather a healthcare crisis. My common response has been – why would it be just one or the other, when clearly it’s both? The twin crises relate to each other like overlapping circles in a Venn diagram. Medicare, Medicaid, and other healthcare subsidies fit into both, but each also has lots of independent elements (e.g., Social Security and unsustainable tax cuts for the fiscal crisis, employer-provided plans’ long-term feasibility for the healthcare crisis). Against this background, Auerbach and Gale note that the Bush-era tax and spending changes added about as much to the fiscal gap as everything attributed to healthcare does. (This may involve counting Medicare prescription drugs towards both, as it was a Bush-era policy change.)
(3) Deficit accounting for TARP and other Fed or Treasury interventions presents an interesting topic that perhaps has received too little attention. Two alternative methods, as always when we are thinking about deficit accounting versus true long-term accounting, are cash flow on the one hand and economic accrual on the other. The Fed’s activities appear to be getting accounted for on the basis of whichever is lower as between the two. TARP is being accounted for on a present value basis, with only the present value subsidy being added to the deficit. This led to $461 billion of TARP outlays as being scored at only $184 billion, reflecting the present value of expected future recoveries. Fair enough, but the Fed has also extended more than $1 trillion in financial support to banks, corporations, etc., scored at zero on the view that these are just loans, but in fact exposing the Federal government to significant downside risks that presumably have a present value (these are not arm’s length commercial loans) and yet that are ignored for deficit measurement purposes.
(4) It’s stunning to read in Auerbach-Gale that the market for 5-year senior U.S. Treasury bonds is now, for the first time in known history, pricing in a non-trivial default risk. They estimate the market’s perceived default risk for Treasury bonds – within the next 5 years, mind you – at about 6 percent. This estimate admittedly reflects disputable assumptions, e.g., about the percentage recovery people expect in the event of a Treasury default. Arguably, the true figure is either higher or lower. But the world is changing faster than we thought if the prospect of a U.S. Treasury default is already starting to affect world financial markets.
At this point, nasty world capital market events such as a run on the dollar can no longer reasonably be considered impossible even within the relatively short term.
(1) We have a really huge fiscal sustainability problem that the financial crisis has made significantly worse, but that the stimulus legislation, if its provisions generally expire in a couple of years as expected, affects only slightly. In my recent article about the fiscal gap, what I considered the most reasonable projections (in terms of projected current policy for future years) from the perspective of mid-2008 placed it at $103 trillion, whereas a similar Auerbach-Gale estimate now places it at $118 trillion. This may not be entirely apples to apples, however. Current stimulus initiatives are trivial compared to this if they are indeed temporary.
(2) Paul Krugman and his acolytes like to say that we don’t really have a budget crisis, but rather a healthcare crisis. My common response has been – why would it be just one or the other, when clearly it’s both? The twin crises relate to each other like overlapping circles in a Venn diagram. Medicare, Medicaid, and other healthcare subsidies fit into both, but each also has lots of independent elements (e.g., Social Security and unsustainable tax cuts for the fiscal crisis, employer-provided plans’ long-term feasibility for the healthcare crisis). Against this background, Auerbach and Gale note that the Bush-era tax and spending changes added about as much to the fiscal gap as everything attributed to healthcare does. (This may involve counting Medicare prescription drugs towards both, as it was a Bush-era policy change.)
(3) Deficit accounting for TARP and other Fed or Treasury interventions presents an interesting topic that perhaps has received too little attention. Two alternative methods, as always when we are thinking about deficit accounting versus true long-term accounting, are cash flow on the one hand and economic accrual on the other. The Fed’s activities appear to be getting accounted for on the basis of whichever is lower as between the two. TARP is being accounted for on a present value basis, with only the present value subsidy being added to the deficit. This led to $461 billion of TARP outlays as being scored at only $184 billion, reflecting the present value of expected future recoveries. Fair enough, but the Fed has also extended more than $1 trillion in financial support to banks, corporations, etc., scored at zero on the view that these are just loans, but in fact exposing the Federal government to significant downside risks that presumably have a present value (these are not arm’s length commercial loans) and yet that are ignored for deficit measurement purposes.
(4) It’s stunning to read in Auerbach-Gale that the market for 5-year senior U.S. Treasury bonds is now, for the first time in known history, pricing in a non-trivial default risk. They estimate the market’s perceived default risk for Treasury bonds – within the next 5 years, mind you – at about 6 percent. This estimate admittedly reflects disputable assumptions, e.g., about the percentage recovery people expect in the event of a Treasury default. Arguably, the true figure is either higher or lower. But the world is changing faster than we thought if the prospect of a U.S. Treasury default is already starting to affect world financial markets.
At this point, nasty world capital market events such as a run on the dollar can no longer reasonably be considered impossible even within the relatively short term.
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
But seriously folks
The busier you are, the more you need to waste time. Today, facing numerous pressing tasks, I started from a link at aldaily.com and found my way to an ancient Greek joke book, the oldest known & extant one, which actually can be read on-line here.
Samples of ancient Greek humor, which certainly ought to make us feel better about our own comic tradition, include the following:
An Abderite saw a eunuch talking to a woman and asked if she was his wife. When he replied that eunuchs can’t have wives, the Abderite asked, ‘So is she your daughter then?’”
An egg-head doctor was seeing a patient. ‘Doctor’, he said, ‘when I get up in the morning I feel dizzy for 20 minutes.’ ‘Get up 20 minutes later, then.’
A student dunce is voyaging on a very stormy sea. When his slaves start to wail, he tells them; "Don't worry - in my will I set you all free!"
Cultural overlap notwithstanding (since the Greeks are our precursors), the human genome must have a sequence somewhere for corny jokes.
Samples of ancient Greek humor, which certainly ought to make us feel better about our own comic tradition, include the following:
An Abderite saw a eunuch talking to a woman and asked if she was his wife. When he replied that eunuchs can’t have wives, the Abderite asked, ‘So is she your daughter then?’”
An egg-head doctor was seeing a patient. ‘Doctor’, he said, ‘when I get up in the morning I feel dizzy for 20 minutes.’ ‘Get up 20 minutes later, then.’
A student dunce is voyaging on a very stormy sea. When his slaves start to wail, he tells them; "Don't worry - in my will I set you all free!"
Cultural overlap notwithstanding (since the Greeks are our precursors), the human genome must have a sequence somewhere for corny jokes.
Monday, February 23, 2009
Upcoming appearances
I was just interviewed regarding my new book Decoding the Corporate Income Tax for the NYU Law website. I'll post the link when it's up.
This Wednesday, I'll be at the American Enterprise Institute for a book panel from 9:00 to 10:30 concerning their newly published paper collection, Alan Viard (ed.), Tax Policy: Lessons from the 2000s. I'll be commenting on 3 articles, all good contributions to the literature, by (1) Viard and John Diamond concerning unfinanced tax cuts, (2) Dhammika Dharmapala concerning lessons learned from the response to the 2003 dividend tax cut, and (3) Alan Auerbach and Kevin Hassett concerning lessons learned from the dividend tax cuts and the temporary adoption of partial expensing for business equipment.
On Wednesday, March 11, I'll be at the Urban Institute for a book panel concerning Decoding. Further details soon.
This Wednesday, I'll be at the American Enterprise Institute for a book panel from 9:00 to 10:30 concerning their newly published paper collection, Alan Viard (ed.), Tax Policy: Lessons from the 2000s. I'll be commenting on 3 articles, all good contributions to the literature, by (1) Viard and John Diamond concerning unfinanced tax cuts, (2) Dhammika Dharmapala concerning lessons learned from the response to the 2003 dividend tax cut, and (3) Alan Auerbach and Kevin Hassett concerning lessons learned from the dividend tax cuts and the temporary adoption of partial expensing for business equipment.
On Wednesday, March 11, I'll be at the Urban Institute for a book panel concerning Decoding. Further details soon.
Gov. Bobby Jindal's family values
One is hardly surprised by Governor Jindal's eagerness to position himself for the 2012 Republican nomination contest by showily turning down a tiny piece of the stimulus funding. But it's sobering to think that there will likely be children going to bed hungry because he decided to grandstand with regard to unemployment benefits.
Sunday, February 22, 2009
Musical and literary update
I've been listening lately to Amy Rigby (among lots of other things), having come across reviews of her new album with Wreckless Eric, which I still don't have (though it's attractively priced as an Amazon mp3 download). Sampling her older stuff, initially I had to get past the fact that stylistically it really isn't anything new - Dylan '66/Byrds folk-rock and late-70s powerpop are among the obvious influences. But she's a great songwriter, witty and acid with a great voice (by which I don't mean her singing voice, although that's very good too). She's in the singer-songwriter genre, but is much less confessional than a portraitist giving a kaleidoscopic view of a demographic (woman in late 20s through 40s dealing with everything internal and external). Radically changing mood and outlook from one track to the next.
Reading for pleasure isn't always easy during a semester, what with the weekly demands of classes, faculty obligations, presentations and conferences, etcetera, but I've just finished, and greatly enjoyed, the Arthur Schlesinger diaries. If you know a fair amount about (and are interested in) the U.S. political scene from the 1950s through the end of the twentieth century, the diaries offer a really engaging inside look, intimate with and opinionated about lots of the big players, and freshened by the lack of foreshadowing since Schlesinger the diarist (unlike a historian writing after the fact) couldn't tell what was going to happen next.
Reading for pleasure isn't always easy during a semester, what with the weekly demands of classes, faculty obligations, presentations and conferences, etcetera, but I've just finished, and greatly enjoyed, the Arthur Schlesinger diaries. If you know a fair amount about (and are interested in) the U.S. political scene from the 1950s through the end of the twentieth century, the diaries offer a really engaging inside look, intimate with and opinionated about lots of the big players, and freshened by the lack of foreshadowing since Schlesinger the diarist (unlike a historian writing after the fact) couldn't tell what was going to happen next.
Saturday, February 21, 2009
Tax policy colloquium on Yoram Margalioth's "Employing Statistical Stigma as a Welfare Ordeal"
Last Thursday, we discussed Yoram Margalioth's "Employing Statistical Stigma as a Welfare Ordeal." In the welfare literature, stigma, leading to low take-up of benefits by eligible individuals, has been viewed as purely a bad thing, to be minimized, not only because it inflicts a bad experience on benefit claimants but because it discourages claiming by intended beneficiaries. The paper argues that a special type of stigma (whether or not that's the right name for it) can have desirable properties as a screening device, helping to focus claiming of benefits on the people who really ought to get them, thus permitting greater aid to those people.
Traditional stigma, in the paper's account, is the feeling of being a failure because one is unable to support oneself. As a matter of empirical description, I felt the paper overly viewed this as something purely internal, i.e., if I'm a prospective claimant I hate feeling like a failure, but exposure to others doesn't make it any worse. I would think that, as a common psychological matter, bad as it is to feel like you have failed, letting others know makes it far worse. Better to lick one's wounds in private.
The paper agrees that traditional stigma appears to have no good sorting functions in the form of discouraging claimants who ought to be ineligible but aren't given the imperfection of screening via eligibility rules. But it argues that another type, which it called "statistical stigma," can serve as a helpful screen. Suppose we have a benefit program for people with low earning ability but that some who don't need the benefits manage to con their way in. But suppose that people in the neighborhood both (a) have greater information about ability levels than the government can hope to get in screening for eligibility, and (b) will dislike false claimants, either directly for cheating in a government program or on the view that this is the evidence of broader dishonesty that might infect the claimant's other social dealings. Then being known locally as a claimant would tend to have positive screening characteristics, because those who truly were high-ability would tend to get stigmatized as suspected cheaters more, all else equal.
The point holds intellectually within its defined terms, and skepticism at the session focused mainly on the question of how well it applies to real world settings. We felt it was generally most likely to play a role in cases such as parking in disabled spaces in the shopping center. Among the issues potentially challenging its broader applicability were those of heterogeneity (in neighborhood values, in claimant temperament, etc.) and of traditional stigma's potentially outweighing statistical stigma in various welfare-type settings.
Traditional stigma, in the paper's account, is the feeling of being a failure because one is unable to support oneself. As a matter of empirical description, I felt the paper overly viewed this as something purely internal, i.e., if I'm a prospective claimant I hate feeling like a failure, but exposure to others doesn't make it any worse. I would think that, as a common psychological matter, bad as it is to feel like you have failed, letting others know makes it far worse. Better to lick one's wounds in private.
The paper agrees that traditional stigma appears to have no good sorting functions in the form of discouraging claimants who ought to be ineligible but aren't given the imperfection of screening via eligibility rules. But it argues that another type, which it called "statistical stigma," can serve as a helpful screen. Suppose we have a benefit program for people with low earning ability but that some who don't need the benefits manage to con their way in. But suppose that people in the neighborhood both (a) have greater information about ability levels than the government can hope to get in screening for eligibility, and (b) will dislike false claimants, either directly for cheating in a government program or on the view that this is the evidence of broader dishonesty that might infect the claimant's other social dealings. Then being known locally as a claimant would tend to have positive screening characteristics, because those who truly were high-ability would tend to get stigmatized as suspected cheaters more, all else equal.
The point holds intellectually within its defined terms, and skepticism at the session focused mainly on the question of how well it applies to real world settings. We felt it was generally most likely to play a role in cases such as parking in disabled spaces in the shopping center. Among the issues potentially challenging its broader applicability were those of heterogeneity (in neighborhood values, in claimant temperament, etc.) and of traditional stigma's potentially outweighing statistical stigma in various welfare-type settings.
Friday, February 20, 2009
Institutional Foundations of Hackery
The blog post title above is a backhand reference to the title of my recently published book, Institutional Foundations of Public Finance, co-edited with Alan Auerbach, and collecting the excellent papers from a 2006 conference at NYU Law School in honor of David Bradford. But the topic I have in mind is considerably less edifying than David's work or that of any of the authors in that volume. We in academics have it easy, what with tenure plus our internal review mechanisms and prestige competitions. Personal taste aside, I actually find that I have strong career incentives to be honest in following ideas and arguments wherever they properly lead. One earns more respect that way. In our biz, not just hackery, which deserves any punishment it ever gets, but predictability is sometimes penalized - perhaps unduly, since, while it's genuinely a fault, avoiding it through quirky, whimsical schtick can be even worse.
But in other parts of the policy-talk world, hackery can get entrenched like the battling armies at the Marne, grinding up anyone who dares to stick his head up or rather his neck out. (Sorry, too tired to think of a better metaphor.)
Getting to the point, I've been distressed lately by what I hear concerning Bruce Bartlett, who publishes regularly, and generally very interestingly, but has not had a think tank job since the National Center for Policy Analysis fired him in 2005 for daring to criticize George W. Bush.
Bruce is a strong traditional conservative, believing in Reagan-era principles such as free markets and limited government, who became convinced not just of the odiousness of the George W. Bush Administration (from conservative as well as liberal principles), but also of such heresies, from the standpoint of his "base," as the case for a VAT to prevent fiscal collapse and more recently the macroeconomic need for a large-scale stimulus program. Whether he's right or wrong - and I'd say he's usually right - you simply aren't allowed to say these things if you're otherwise on the conservative side. They may not kill you, but they certainly won't hire you.
In much of the media and think tank worlds - certainly on the conservative side, but I suspect it's not entirely limited thereto - the career path that pays is to be a hack, and to stick to the party line, never honestly evaluating issues but saying what you're expected to say.
I'm hoping and tend to believe it's better on the left, but it depends where one looks, and perhaps over time we will see. Certainly there are places where, for example, one might have to watch what one says about Social Security's long-term financing.
The institutionally entrenched command to obey top-down military discipline, or perhaps I should call it Maoist group conformity, not only is unedifying, but leads to debased and dishonest public discourse that literally risks destroying our country. Without honest debate one cannot consistently make sane choices, much less affirmatively good ones.
Perhaps Obama will make some good choices, though even then he'll have to sell them. But rational policymaking needs to have deeper roots than a particular president or it simply won't happen regularly enough.
But in other parts of the policy-talk world, hackery can get entrenched like the battling armies at the Marne, grinding up anyone who dares to stick his head up or rather his neck out. (Sorry, too tired to think of a better metaphor.)
Getting to the point, I've been distressed lately by what I hear concerning Bruce Bartlett, who publishes regularly, and generally very interestingly, but has not had a think tank job since the National Center for Policy Analysis fired him in 2005 for daring to criticize George W. Bush.
Bruce is a strong traditional conservative, believing in Reagan-era principles such as free markets and limited government, who became convinced not just of the odiousness of the George W. Bush Administration (from conservative as well as liberal principles), but also of such heresies, from the standpoint of his "base," as the case for a VAT to prevent fiscal collapse and more recently the macroeconomic need for a large-scale stimulus program. Whether he's right or wrong - and I'd say he's usually right - you simply aren't allowed to say these things if you're otherwise on the conservative side. They may not kill you, but they certainly won't hire you.
In much of the media and think tank worlds - certainly on the conservative side, but I suspect it's not entirely limited thereto - the career path that pays is to be a hack, and to stick to the party line, never honestly evaluating issues but saying what you're expected to say.
I'm hoping and tend to believe it's better on the left, but it depends where one looks, and perhaps over time we will see. Certainly there are places where, for example, one might have to watch what one says about Social Security's long-term financing.
The institutionally entrenched command to obey top-down military discipline, or perhaps I should call it Maoist group conformity, not only is unedifying, but leads to debased and dishonest public discourse that literally risks destroying our country. Without honest debate one cannot consistently make sane choices, much less affirmatively good ones.
Perhaps Obama will make some good choices, though even then he'll have to sell them. But rational policymaking needs to have deeper roots than a particular president or it simply won't happen regularly enough.
2-9/10 cheers for flu shots
I got one last fall. Late last week, I suddenly felt what seemed to be a cold coming on. Then it turned into a couple of days of wipeout, with low fever but well short of the three-alarm job I remember from 9 years ago. Given the relative mildness, I was wondering if it was actually a bad cold rather than the flu, since one really expects a bit more from the latter (pounding headaches, dizziness, loss of appetite, weeks of exhaustion, etcetera). Not that I'm complaining or anything. Still, the typology felt more flulike.
Today I read that (a) the Northeast has been having a flu resurgence in the last couple of weeks, and (b) the shot often gives a 70% reduction in severity, rather than making you immune. So now I feel confirmed that I had the flu after all, and that the shot, while short of perfection, may have saved me from a couple of really brutal weeks.
Make sure you get those shots next year, kids.
Today I read that (a) the Northeast has been having a flu resurgence in the last couple of weeks, and (b) the shot often gives a 70% reduction in severity, rather than making you immune. So now I feel confirmed that I had the flu after all, and that the shot, while short of perfection, may have saved me from a couple of really brutal weeks.
Make sure you get those shots next year, kids.
Bad weather ahead
From the abstract of the new Auerbach-Gale article, The Economic Crisis and the Fiscal Crisis: 2009 and Beyond:
"In 2009, the federal deficit will be larger as a share of the economy than at any time since World War II. The current deficit is due in part to economic weakness and the stimulus, and in part to policy choices made in the past. What is more troubling is that, under what we view as optimistic assumptions, the deficit is projected to average at least $1 trillion per year for the 10 years after 2009, even if the economy returns to full employment and the stimulus package is allowed to expire in two years.
"The longer-run picture is even bleaker. We estimate a fiscal gap – the immediate and permanent increase in taxes or reduction in spending that would keep the long-term debt/GDP ratio at its current level –about 7-9 percent of GDP, or between $1 trillion and $1.3 trillion per year in current dollars.
"Recent trends in credit default swap markets show a clearly discernable uptick in the perceived likelihood of default on 5-year U.S. senior Treasury debt, a notion that was virtually unthinkable in the past. While it is difficult to know exactly how to interpret these results, it is clear that – although fiscal policy problems are usually described as medium- and long-term issues – the future may be upon us much sooner than previously expected."
As Margo Channing (Bette Davis) put it in All About Eve: "Fasten your seatbelts. It's going to be a bumpy [ride]."
"In 2009, the federal deficit will be larger as a share of the economy than at any time since World War II. The current deficit is due in part to economic weakness and the stimulus, and in part to policy choices made in the past. What is more troubling is that, under what we view as optimistic assumptions, the deficit is projected to average at least $1 trillion per year for the 10 years after 2009, even if the economy returns to full employment and the stimulus package is allowed to expire in two years.
"The longer-run picture is even bleaker. We estimate a fiscal gap – the immediate and permanent increase in taxes or reduction in spending that would keep the long-term debt/GDP ratio at its current level –about 7-9 percent of GDP, or between $1 trillion and $1.3 trillion per year in current dollars.
"Recent trends in credit default swap markets show a clearly discernable uptick in the perceived likelihood of default on 5-year U.S. senior Treasury debt, a notion that was virtually unthinkable in the past. While it is difficult to know exactly how to interpret these results, it is clear that – although fiscal policy problems are usually described as medium- and long-term issues – the future may be upon us much sooner than previously expected."
As Margo Channing (Bette Davis) put it in All About Eve: "Fasten your seatbelts. It's going to be a bumpy [ride]."
A step towards more honest budgetary accounting
The Obama Administration deserves generous plaudits and hosannas for this.
Friday, February 13, 2009
Tax policy colloquium on Dorothy Brown's "Shades of the American Dream"
Yesterday we had a lively session, terminated by the clock when it was still going strong, on Dorothy Brown's "Shades of the American Dream."
The paper argues that the income tax rules for homeowners (exclude imputed rent, allow mortgage interest and real property deductions, disallow losses on sale but also exclude most gains) unfairly disadvantage African-Americans, who take less advantage of the rules than whites. They own comparatively fewer and less valuable homes, on average have lower marginal rates for the deductions, less frequently itemize deductions, and have disallowed losses a higher proportion of the time.
Home ownership differences remain even if one adjusts for income, though this appears to be mostly because, as between average African-American and white families with the same income for a given year, the latter is likely to have greater wealth.
There is a strong pre-2008 financial collapse flavor to the article (a problem for many of us if our articles are overtaken by events while in gestation), since it treats home ownership as a good thing that ought to be encouraged. I imagine that many of the lower-income people, both white and African-American, who bought homes in the last 10 years despite being pressed financially are now sorry that they did so.
Among the main issues that I raised was tax capitalization of the tax subsidy. If homes are more expensive by the full expected value of the tax benefits, then (a) all the whites who are getting these benefits actually aren't benefiting after-tax at all, (b) adding new tax benefits that non-affluent African-Americans could claim after buying a home might simply boost the price they would have to pay, potentially making them worse off if they faced liquidity problems (e.g., the need to pay 10 or 20% of the purchase price in cash).
I noted that marginal tax rate differences (along with itemizing versus non-itemizing) could lead to clientele effects that might change the analysis. For example, if I don't itemize or am in a low tax bracket and am bidding for a home against someone who gets more marginal value for the deductions, then all else equal that person will be willing to pay a higher price than I would. Given that homes are non-fungible assets being sold in what are often thin markets, this could lead to a reduction in the consumer surplus enjoyed by lower-bracket prospective home purchasers. E.g., one loses out on a home that otherwise one could have purchased at a favorable price, or alternatively one gets the home but has to pay a bit more. I thought Dorothy should consider and emphasize this issue a bit more, but I noted that housing markets may be sufficiently segmented by income to reduce its importance. E.g., even if people in the 15% tax bracket are buying homes, they probably aren't, much of the time, bidding on the same homes in the same neighborhoods as people in the 35% bracket.
In a similar vein, Alan Auerbach discussed how expected lack of home appreciation (e.g., buying housing stock in Rochester or Detroit when the city is well-known to be in long-term economic decline) may lower the purchase price, and permit one to receive a higher annual imputed rental value relative to the price than would have been available if appreciation were expected.
I was hoping Dorothy would engage more with these arguments than she did. They strike me as not implausible and also as pretty fundamental to the validity of the claims being made.
We also discussed a bit at the session what the financial meltdown tells us about the tax rules for home ownership. I think we've learned quite a lot. For decades, tax policy types thought we knew how bad the home ownership rules are. We recognized that they encourage enormous inefficiency in the form of substituting home consumption for other consumption simply because it's tax-favored by the exclusion of imputed rent plus the allowance of deductions for items (home mortgage interest and real property taxes) that are tax-arbitraged against it.
But we didn't know the half of it. We didn't fully realize how, when you throw in exclusion of nearly all sale gains plus a strong inducement to adopt maximum leverage, the tax system contributed to the real estate bubble and financial collapse of 2008. The wreckage is strewn everywhere, from the macro-economy to financial institutions to all the individuals who bought over-priced homes they can't afford and now have to deal with the back-end mess.
It's pretty clear to me how the tax rules ought to change, but unfortunately there is zero chance of this happening. Congress wants to shower new benefits (such as the first-time homebuyer credit) on homes that will keep prices too high and prevent rational adjustment. Obviously I don't want to exert strong downward pressure on homes right now, but that's the direction in which we ought to go with sufficiently deferred effective dates to permit adjustment for existing mortgage default problems.
The first big point is that, while there may be a modest rationale for encouraging home ownership relative to rental, there is absolutely no rationale for encouraging bigger or more expensive homes. The rationale for doing anything at all relates to positive externalities, e.g., caring more about the neighborhood and about upkeep that affects neighbors, although there also are arguments the other way (e.g., reduced mobility may increase adjustment costs partly borne by others when jobs migrate). The current tax rules fail to focus on just ownership because the benefits keep rising with home value until one reaches the $1.1 million ceiling on the debt principal that gives rise to deductible interest.
Step 1 would be to greatly lower the $1.1 ceiling. Step 2, convert it to a refundable fixed-percentage credit so that marginal rate differences between prospective buyers are eliminated. (Refundability aside, this is an old proposal - it was in the 1984 Bradley-Gephardt tax reform bill, and I believe it was also in the 2005 Tax Reform Commission's recommendations.) Step 3, sever the link to leverage, by making it a fixed dollar amount for each home (or for a percentage of purchase price up to a low ceiling) without regard to home mortgage interest paid.
But this leaves one other huge problem that the financial collapse reminds us is really important. A home is both a consumer asset and an investment asset. In theory, while a decline in home value from its being used ought to be non-deductible if we don't tax imputed rent (just as you don't to deduct the purchase price of a car for personal use that you eventually sell for scrap), investment gains and losses ought in principle to be fully taxed.
Thus, suppose you buy a home in 2006 for $200,000. Ignoring for simplicity its economic depreciation due to being used, suppose you end up selling it either for $300,000 in 2007 or for $100,000 in 2009. These $100,000 swings from the original purchase price are economic returns to investment that ought to be included, in the 2007 case, and deducted in the 2009 case.
It's common wisdom among tax policy types that, in some settings, having the income tax reach risk by including gains and deducting losses is potentially irrelevant. Thus, suppose I want to place a $100,000 bet with some counter-party on whether oil prices will rise or fall this year. It might make no difference whether the system took account of this bet or not. Thus, suppose we really want to bet $100,000, but that the gain is taxable and the loss deductible at 50%. Our response to exposing the risky outcome to the tax system might be that we simply double the nominal bet, from $100,000 to $200,000, so that after-tax we end up having the bet we really wanted.
Whatever one makes of this line of argument in other settings, it's largely inapplicable to home ownership. Here the problem is that lower and middle-income homeowners have a grossly under-diversified investment portfolio given how large a share they have sunk into home equity and the fundamental difficulties of hedging or diversifying that stake. So the insurance that the tax system could provide by including gains and deducting losses, rather than being irrelevant because people can achieve optimal hedging and diversification by themselves, actually responds to a market failure or missing market (or mistake in investment strategy by millions of people).
For a long time, this seemed less important because the real estate market was rising anyway. But now we have forcefully been reminded that there is downside as well as upside risk to home prices.
Allowing losses on home sales to be deducted while gains are not taxed strikes me as a huge mistake that could encourage new real estate bubbles in the future (or at a minimum continuing over-investment in home ownership). But taxing gains and allowing losses to be deducted upon the sale of a primary residence has a lot to be said for it. Given the lock-in problem for gains (and inducement to realization for losses), one could argue for doing it, on both sides, at capital gains rather than ordinary income rates, although this would reduce the insurance provided. One also might exempt it from the capital loss limitation (and also from having other capital losses allowed against it if a gain), given that it doesn't entirely fit the rationale for the capital loss limitation, which is that, without it, people would sell all the losers while holding all the winners in their asset portfolios. Finally, although this reintroduces some undesirable non-neutrality, one could consider permitting gain rollover when the sale price is promptly reinvested in a new home - the approach that the income tax law took before 1997, when it was changed to simply exempt up to $500,000 of gain. This in turn would increase the desirability of preventing the tax-free step-up in asset basis at death.
As a final detail, Richard Epstein, in his early days as a tax scholar rather than broad-ranging libertarian, wrote a Stanford Law Review article proposing to tax home gains and allow home losses with one adjustment, to capture the personal use element. This was to have home basis decline each year by the amount of tax depreciation typically allowed for real estate, only without the depreciation actually being deducted (given the tax arbitrage against excluded rental income). This annually declining basis would then be used to compute the fully allowable gain or loss on home sale.
There you have it: what I consider a pretty sound set of proposals for taxation of home ownership. I'd enact it today but with a deferred effective date or phase-in given the huge problems we now face with bad mortgages. The fact that it has so little chance of ever being seriously considered tells us something, I think, about the state of our political system and the broader likelihood that it is able to adopt sound policies that would bode well for our economic future.
The paper argues that the income tax rules for homeowners (exclude imputed rent, allow mortgage interest and real property deductions, disallow losses on sale but also exclude most gains) unfairly disadvantage African-Americans, who take less advantage of the rules than whites. They own comparatively fewer and less valuable homes, on average have lower marginal rates for the deductions, less frequently itemize deductions, and have disallowed losses a higher proportion of the time.
Home ownership differences remain even if one adjusts for income, though this appears to be mostly because, as between average African-American and white families with the same income for a given year, the latter is likely to have greater wealth.
There is a strong pre-2008 financial collapse flavor to the article (a problem for many of us if our articles are overtaken by events while in gestation), since it treats home ownership as a good thing that ought to be encouraged. I imagine that many of the lower-income people, both white and African-American, who bought homes in the last 10 years despite being pressed financially are now sorry that they did so.
Among the main issues that I raised was tax capitalization of the tax subsidy. If homes are more expensive by the full expected value of the tax benefits, then (a) all the whites who are getting these benefits actually aren't benefiting after-tax at all, (b) adding new tax benefits that non-affluent African-Americans could claim after buying a home might simply boost the price they would have to pay, potentially making them worse off if they faced liquidity problems (e.g., the need to pay 10 or 20% of the purchase price in cash).
I noted that marginal tax rate differences (along with itemizing versus non-itemizing) could lead to clientele effects that might change the analysis. For example, if I don't itemize or am in a low tax bracket and am bidding for a home against someone who gets more marginal value for the deductions, then all else equal that person will be willing to pay a higher price than I would. Given that homes are non-fungible assets being sold in what are often thin markets, this could lead to a reduction in the consumer surplus enjoyed by lower-bracket prospective home purchasers. E.g., one loses out on a home that otherwise one could have purchased at a favorable price, or alternatively one gets the home but has to pay a bit more. I thought Dorothy should consider and emphasize this issue a bit more, but I noted that housing markets may be sufficiently segmented by income to reduce its importance. E.g., even if people in the 15% tax bracket are buying homes, they probably aren't, much of the time, bidding on the same homes in the same neighborhoods as people in the 35% bracket.
In a similar vein, Alan Auerbach discussed how expected lack of home appreciation (e.g., buying housing stock in Rochester or Detroit when the city is well-known to be in long-term economic decline) may lower the purchase price, and permit one to receive a higher annual imputed rental value relative to the price than would have been available if appreciation were expected.
I was hoping Dorothy would engage more with these arguments than she did. They strike me as not implausible and also as pretty fundamental to the validity of the claims being made.
We also discussed a bit at the session what the financial meltdown tells us about the tax rules for home ownership. I think we've learned quite a lot. For decades, tax policy types thought we knew how bad the home ownership rules are. We recognized that they encourage enormous inefficiency in the form of substituting home consumption for other consumption simply because it's tax-favored by the exclusion of imputed rent plus the allowance of deductions for items (home mortgage interest and real property taxes) that are tax-arbitraged against it.
But we didn't know the half of it. We didn't fully realize how, when you throw in exclusion of nearly all sale gains plus a strong inducement to adopt maximum leverage, the tax system contributed to the real estate bubble and financial collapse of 2008. The wreckage is strewn everywhere, from the macro-economy to financial institutions to all the individuals who bought over-priced homes they can't afford and now have to deal with the back-end mess.
It's pretty clear to me how the tax rules ought to change, but unfortunately there is zero chance of this happening. Congress wants to shower new benefits (such as the first-time homebuyer credit) on homes that will keep prices too high and prevent rational adjustment. Obviously I don't want to exert strong downward pressure on homes right now, but that's the direction in which we ought to go with sufficiently deferred effective dates to permit adjustment for existing mortgage default problems.
The first big point is that, while there may be a modest rationale for encouraging home ownership relative to rental, there is absolutely no rationale for encouraging bigger or more expensive homes. The rationale for doing anything at all relates to positive externalities, e.g., caring more about the neighborhood and about upkeep that affects neighbors, although there also are arguments the other way (e.g., reduced mobility may increase adjustment costs partly borne by others when jobs migrate). The current tax rules fail to focus on just ownership because the benefits keep rising with home value until one reaches the $1.1 million ceiling on the debt principal that gives rise to deductible interest.
Step 1 would be to greatly lower the $1.1 ceiling. Step 2, convert it to a refundable fixed-percentage credit so that marginal rate differences between prospective buyers are eliminated. (Refundability aside, this is an old proposal - it was in the 1984 Bradley-Gephardt tax reform bill, and I believe it was also in the 2005 Tax Reform Commission's recommendations.) Step 3, sever the link to leverage, by making it a fixed dollar amount for each home (or for a percentage of purchase price up to a low ceiling) without regard to home mortgage interest paid.
But this leaves one other huge problem that the financial collapse reminds us is really important. A home is both a consumer asset and an investment asset. In theory, while a decline in home value from its being used ought to be non-deductible if we don't tax imputed rent (just as you don't to deduct the purchase price of a car for personal use that you eventually sell for scrap), investment gains and losses ought in principle to be fully taxed.
Thus, suppose you buy a home in 2006 for $200,000. Ignoring for simplicity its economic depreciation due to being used, suppose you end up selling it either for $300,000 in 2007 or for $100,000 in 2009. These $100,000 swings from the original purchase price are economic returns to investment that ought to be included, in the 2007 case, and deducted in the 2009 case.
It's common wisdom among tax policy types that, in some settings, having the income tax reach risk by including gains and deducting losses is potentially irrelevant. Thus, suppose I want to place a $100,000 bet with some counter-party on whether oil prices will rise or fall this year. It might make no difference whether the system took account of this bet or not. Thus, suppose we really want to bet $100,000, but that the gain is taxable and the loss deductible at 50%. Our response to exposing the risky outcome to the tax system might be that we simply double the nominal bet, from $100,000 to $200,000, so that after-tax we end up having the bet we really wanted.
Whatever one makes of this line of argument in other settings, it's largely inapplicable to home ownership. Here the problem is that lower and middle-income homeowners have a grossly under-diversified investment portfolio given how large a share they have sunk into home equity and the fundamental difficulties of hedging or diversifying that stake. So the insurance that the tax system could provide by including gains and deducting losses, rather than being irrelevant because people can achieve optimal hedging and diversification by themselves, actually responds to a market failure or missing market (or mistake in investment strategy by millions of people).
For a long time, this seemed less important because the real estate market was rising anyway. But now we have forcefully been reminded that there is downside as well as upside risk to home prices.
Allowing losses on home sales to be deducted while gains are not taxed strikes me as a huge mistake that could encourage new real estate bubbles in the future (or at a minimum continuing over-investment in home ownership). But taxing gains and allowing losses to be deducted upon the sale of a primary residence has a lot to be said for it. Given the lock-in problem for gains (and inducement to realization for losses), one could argue for doing it, on both sides, at capital gains rather than ordinary income rates, although this would reduce the insurance provided. One also might exempt it from the capital loss limitation (and also from having other capital losses allowed against it if a gain), given that it doesn't entirely fit the rationale for the capital loss limitation, which is that, without it, people would sell all the losers while holding all the winners in their asset portfolios. Finally, although this reintroduces some undesirable non-neutrality, one could consider permitting gain rollover when the sale price is promptly reinvested in a new home - the approach that the income tax law took before 1997, when it was changed to simply exempt up to $500,000 of gain. This in turn would increase the desirability of preventing the tax-free step-up in asset basis at death.
As a final detail, Richard Epstein, in his early days as a tax scholar rather than broad-ranging libertarian, wrote a Stanford Law Review article proposing to tax home gains and allow home losses with one adjustment, to capture the personal use element. This was to have home basis decline each year by the amount of tax depreciation typically allowed for real estate, only without the depreciation actually being deducted (given the tax arbitrage against excluded rental income). This annually declining basis would then be used to compute the fully allowable gain or loss on home sale.
There you have it: what I consider a pretty sound set of proposals for taxation of home ownership. I'd enact it today but with a deferred effective date or phase-in given the huge problems we now face with bad mortgages. The fact that it has so little chance of ever being seriously considered tells us something, I think, about the state of our political system and the broader likelihood that it is able to adopt sound policies that would bode well for our economic future.
Tuesday, February 10, 2009
My latest book is now available
My latest book, Decoding the Corporate Tax, is now available here on the Urban Institute Press website.
Not to lay it on too thick, but the cover blurbs are as follows. From David Weisbach:
"Decoding the U.S. Corporate Tax is a concise and clearly written review of the corporate tax structure and its economic and distributional consequences. The book covers perennial issues (such as corporate integration) as well as issues raised by the recent increases in capital mobility, the interaction of the corporate tax and corporate governance, and more. Reform of the corporate tax will be central to any significant long-term reform of our tax system. Shaviro provides a roadmap."
Joel Slemrod says:
"Right out of the blocks, Decoding the U.S. Corporate Tax by Daniel Shaviro is the indispensable guide to this most complex and politically divisive tax. It addresses the key issues with sophisticated economic and legal reasoning and a keen knowledge of how the world really works, yet makes its points clearly—and often amusingly—with a minimum of jargon. Start here to understand where corporate tax policy should head in a world marked by increasing globalization and financial innovation, and where it probably will end up instead.”
Harvey Rosen says:
“Daniel Shaviro has produced a clearly written, insightful, and comprehensive discussion of the economic and legal issues surrounding corporate taxation. It is sure to become a highly valued resource for both students and researchers.”
And Kevin Hassett says:
"Daniel Shaviro is a giant in the tax community because his analysis is always novel and always convincing. He understands that to develop a smarter and more efficient code, we must fully understand the code we have and why it emerged. Yes, the tax code is a horrific and comical mess, but a mess that has often been made for practical reasons. Decoding the U.S. Corporate Tax is a priceless addition to the literature and just cause for optimism—the hard work of fixing the tax code just got a lot easier.”
One reason I wrote this book was so I could assign it to students in Tax Policy and Corporate Tax classes, as otherwise there was nothing available that concisely and clearly explains the important economic models in the area, including why they're all over the map and why (though none of their alternative assumptions fully hold) they matter. Another reason was to argue that corporate integration, though all very well in principle, probably isn't the best place to focus corporate tax reform efforts these days, for reasons that readers of the full text (and particularly the last couple of chapters) can evaluate for themselves.
You can see the introduction here and the table of contents here.
Not to lay it on too thick, but the cover blurbs are as follows. From David Weisbach:
"Decoding the U.S. Corporate Tax is a concise and clearly written review of the corporate tax structure and its economic and distributional consequences. The book covers perennial issues (such as corporate integration) as well as issues raised by the recent increases in capital mobility, the interaction of the corporate tax and corporate governance, and more. Reform of the corporate tax will be central to any significant long-term reform of our tax system. Shaviro provides a roadmap."
Joel Slemrod says:
"Right out of the blocks, Decoding the U.S. Corporate Tax by Daniel Shaviro is the indispensable guide to this most complex and politically divisive tax. It addresses the key issues with sophisticated economic and legal reasoning and a keen knowledge of how the world really works, yet makes its points clearly—and often amusingly—with a minimum of jargon. Start here to understand where corporate tax policy should head in a world marked by increasing globalization and financial innovation, and where it probably will end up instead.”
Harvey Rosen says:
“Daniel Shaviro has produced a clearly written, insightful, and comprehensive discussion of the economic and legal issues surrounding corporate taxation. It is sure to become a highly valued resource for both students and researchers.”
And Kevin Hassett says:
"Daniel Shaviro is a giant in the tax community because his analysis is always novel and always convincing. He understands that to develop a smarter and more efficient code, we must fully understand the code we have and why it emerged. Yes, the tax code is a horrific and comical mess, but a mess that has often been made for practical reasons. Decoding the U.S. Corporate Tax is a priceless addition to the literature and just cause for optimism—the hard work of fixing the tax code just got a lot easier.”
One reason I wrote this book was so I could assign it to students in Tax Policy and Corporate Tax classes, as otherwise there was nothing available that concisely and clearly explains the important economic models in the area, including why they're all over the map and why (though none of their alternative assumptions fully hold) they matter. Another reason was to argue that corporate integration, though all very well in principle, probably isn't the best place to focus corporate tax reform efforts these days, for reasons that readers of the full text (and particularly the last couple of chapters) can evaluate for themselves.
You can see the introduction here and the table of contents here.
My two favorite cartoons concerning the stimulus battle
One is by David Horsey, and the other is by Ed Stein.
Monday, February 09, 2009
Tax policy colloquium on Amy Finkelstein's “EZ-Tax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates”
Last Thursday, we discussed Amy Finkelstein's very interesting above-named article, which shows that adoption of EZ-Pass appears to lead to higher tolls, as well as to reduced consumer elasticity of response to the tolls, because not paying cash at the tollbooth reduces one's awareness of the charge. Oddly, EZ-Pass users appeared to over-estimate rather than under-estimate the toll they were paying, which might seem to make the empirical response backwards, except that it's consistent with the notion that people under-measure CHANGES in the toll. Also, more from our colloquy than from the paper itself, it seems that people simply were not thinking much about the toll because they didn't have to pay it in cash - one had to prod them to get an estimate of its likely level (raising a question of whether they were really thinking in terms of the cost estimates they eventually furnished).
Tentative conclusions: hard to doubt that EZ-Pass is good for us on balance as consumers, especially since its use as voluntary. Is it good for us as voters? (A key motivation of the paper was to test the Milton Friedman idea, a la withholding, that making tax payments less salient or noticeable leads to a bigger government.) Here the problem is that political choice has so many flaws (aggregation problems, externalities, collective action) that anyone trying to say whether one more defect, in the form of reduced understanding of one specific element, makes things better or worse faces severe second-best problems. Easy to be concerned about it if one has Milton Friedman-James Buchanan type priors, in which government systematically is too big and does too much. But public choice defects apply to supplying valuable public goods in addition to everything else, so unless one has the Friedman-Buchanan prior (or, rather, settled faith) it's hard to know where EZ-Pass-type reduced salience sends us relative to the optimum.
Tentative conclusions: hard to doubt that EZ-Pass is good for us on balance as consumers, especially since its use as voluntary. Is it good for us as voters? (A key motivation of the paper was to test the Milton Friedman idea, a la withholding, that making tax payments less salient or noticeable leads to a bigger government.) Here the problem is that political choice has so many flaws (aggregation problems, externalities, collective action) that anyone trying to say whether one more defect, in the form of reduced understanding of one specific element, makes things better or worse faces severe second-best problems. Easy to be concerned about it if one has Milton Friedman-James Buchanan type priors, in which government systematically is too big and does too much. But public choice defects apply to supplying valuable public goods in addition to everything else, so unless one has the Friedman-Buchanan prior (or, rather, settled faith) it's hard to know where EZ-Pass-type reduced salience sends us relative to the optimum.
Sunday, February 08, 2009
Hypocrisy?
After complaining about ineffective stimulus or non-stimulus proposals in the House bill, the Senate has not only eliminated some of the most unambiguously effective stuff, such as $40 billion to head off state and local government spending cuts (by definition "shovel-ready") - it has also put in a $70 billion alternative minimum tax (AMT) patch for 2009.
As anyone even minimally expert on these issues already knows, that is about as ineffective a stimulus provision as one could possibly have. The money goes mainly to upper-income individuals, who are unlikely to change their consumer spending much in consequence of it.
No doubt the House will accept it, however, in exchange for genuinely stimulative spending provisions.
The only principled defense one could offer of it is that it makes the true stimulus bill smaller, arguably reducing the deficit relative to having a full-size stimulus bill plus the AMT fix to boot (since no doubt it would have been adopted anyway). I happen to think that a smaller stimulus bill is wrong on the merits despite the long-term fiscal problem. But couldn't they try to make the case directly if that's what they believe?
As anyone even minimally expert on these issues already knows, that is about as ineffective a stimulus provision as one could possibly have. The money goes mainly to upper-income individuals, who are unlikely to change their consumer spending much in consequence of it.
No doubt the House will accept it, however, in exchange for genuinely stimulative spending provisions.
The only principled defense one could offer of it is that it makes the true stimulus bill smaller, arguably reducing the deficit relative to having a full-size stimulus bill plus the AMT fix to boot (since no doubt it would have been adopted anyway). I happen to think that a smaller stimulus bill is wrong on the merits despite the long-term fiscal problem. But couldn't they try to make the case directly if that's what they believe?
Wednesday, February 04, 2009
Sad news
This made me quite sad. I didn't know him personally, and never bought one of his fabled peelers, but he was a riotous and delightful presence at the Union Square Greenmarket, which I haunt so incessantly during the summer and fall months (mainly for fresh fruit) that I'm worried they'll start charging me rent.
Tuesday, February 03, 2009
AALS call for papers on property & tax law intersections
Nancy Staudt of Northwestern Law School, an old friend who happens to have been the second-ever presenter at the NYU Tax Policy Colloquium (way back in January 1996), asked me to post the following item:
CALL FOR PAPERS
The Property and Taxation Sections of the AALS are seeking to co-sponsor a half day session at the annual AALS meeting next year (January, 2010) in New Orleans. If you are working on the intersection of these two areas of law and would like to present a paper--we would love to hear from you by February 28, 2009. Specifically, please send us a working title, a brief description of your paper, and a draft if one is available.
The papers will be published in Northwestern Law School's Journal of Law and Social Policy; therefore, we will only consider unpublished pieces for possible inclusion in the AALS panels.
If you are interested, please contact Professor Carol Brown, University of North Carolina Law School (carol_brown@unc.edu) and Professor Nancy Staudt, Northwestern University Law School (n-staudt@northwestern.edu). Please be sure to include both of us on your e-mail submissions.
[END OF POSTED ITEM] One obvious example of what they might have in mind involves takings law, which (as the literature shows) implicitly raises tax policy as well as property issues because it concerns who pays for government programs under particular circumstances (with myriad incentive, distributional, and political economy effects that should be familiar to writers in both areas.)
CALL FOR PAPERS
The Property and Taxation Sections of the AALS are seeking to co-sponsor a half day session at the annual AALS meeting next year (January, 2010) in New Orleans. If you are working on the intersection of these two areas of law and would like to present a paper--we would love to hear from you by February 28, 2009. Specifically, please send us a working title, a brief description of your paper, and a draft if one is available.
The papers will be published in Northwestern Law School's Journal of Law and Social Policy; therefore, we will only consider unpublished pieces for possible inclusion in the AALS panels.
If you are interested, please contact Professor Carol Brown, University of North Carolina Law School (carol_brown@unc.edu) and Professor Nancy Staudt, Northwestern University Law School (n-staudt@northwestern.edu). Please be sure to include both of us on your e-mail submissions.
[END OF POSTED ITEM] One obvious example of what they might have in mind involves takings law, which (as the literature shows) implicitly raises tax policy as well as property issues because it concerns who pays for government programs under particular circumstances (with myriad incentive, distributional, and political economy effects that should be familiar to writers in both areas.)
Monday, February 02, 2009
New York Times on-line forum on Geithner's and Daschle's tax problems
I was invited today to participate in an on-line New York Times forum concerning Geithner's and Daschle's tax problems. As you can see if you go there, the participant responses had a range that would do the movie Rashomon proud, ranging from "No Moral Turpitude" to "Fundamentally Corrupt."
I myself rated what they did as pretty bad - highly self-serving "mistakes" though short of fraud - and suggested that they voluntarily pay the Treasury what in effect would be self-imposed penalties.
I myself rated what they did as pretty bad - highly self-serving "mistakes" though short of fraud - and suggested that they voluntarily pay the Treasury what in effect would be self-imposed penalties.
Glamorous 5:30 am slot
I just did a 3 or 4-minute live radio slot on KCBS out of San Francisco, concerning the alternative minimum tax (AMT) patch in the Senate stimulus bill. Time of the appearance was a humane 8:30 am here in the East Coast, but as it was 5:30 am in the broadcast area I doubt there were all that many millions of listeners.
The topic was a $70 billion, one-year indexing patch to the AMT that news articles say the House is likely to accept.
I noted that the growth of the AMT is a big problem that everyone in theory wants to deal with (although no one wants to pay for it), that whatever its merits it really isn't stimulus, and that the continual one-year patches Congress uses to "fix" the AMT are like someone buying an expensive car on financing and pretending that all he has to worry about is this month's payment.
The topic was a $70 billion, one-year indexing patch to the AMT that news articles say the House is likely to accept.
I noted that the growth of the AMT is a big problem that everyone in theory wants to deal with (although no one wants to pay for it), that whatever its merits it really isn't stimulus, and that the continual one-year patches Congress uses to "fix" the AMT are like someone buying an expensive car on financing and pretending that all he has to worry about is this month's payment.
Friday, January 30, 2009
Tax policy colloquium with Ed Kleinbard on the JCT's tax expenditures pamphlet
Yesterday we had our third session of the year, with Ed Kleinbard (Chief of Staff at the Joint Committee on Taxation) concerning the recent JCT pamphlet(s) on tax expenditure analysis.
This is a topic I've written and thought about a lot, such as in Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 Tax Law Review 187 (2004) (draft version available here), reworked (and shortened) as chapter 8 of my recent book Taxes, Spending, and the U.S. Government's March Toward Bankruptcy. In brief, my main points include the following:
(1) The distinction between taxes and spending is purely formal rather than economically meaningful. Hence, a tax rule can't "really" be spending, as tax expenditure analysis posits.
(2) Since, however, people mistakenly treat it as meaningful, tax expenditure analysis can improve information by addressing labeling games, the canonical illustration of which (for me) is David Bradford's joke about making the government $50 billion smaller by replacing $50 billion of military spending with the $50 billion "weapons supplier tax credit" ("WSTC") thereby causing both taxes and spending, as conventionally measured, to drop by that amount even though absolutely nothing has changed in substance. As we discussed in the session, if you look at recent legislation, the WSTC idea looks prescient rather than like a joke.
(3) In the context of a general, distributionally motivated "tax" system such as the income tax, the way to come up with a coherent framework for improving information despite the underlying fiscal language problem is to identify allocative provisions that have been stuck into this mainly (in its rationale) distributional system. E.g., no one would think that the WSTC is an aspect of adjusting relative burdens based on ability; rather, it serves to affect economic activity, i.e., by permitting the government to acquire the specified weapons.
Following our interdisciplinary philosophy at the colloquium, Alan Auerbach was the lead commentator on this law-based paper (obviously well within his expertise, of course), whereas next week I will be the lead commentator on a very interesting econometrics paper, Amy Finkelstein's EZ-Tax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates. Ed Kleinbard was, as always, a lively, delightful, and illuminating discussant, although given his current eminence at JCT I need to treat his remarks as off the record. It did seem clear, however, that there is a relationship between how the JCT proposed to revise tax expenditure analysis (links below) and my analysis, although for institutional reasons the two must and do look significantly different. This puts me in the position of being an ungrateful whelp, so to speak, if I cavil and carp at exactly how they did it, although this of course was also my duty as a commentator.
Recent JCT publications on the subject, all worth a look, include the following:
A Reconsideration of Tax Expenditure Analysis (the piece we discussed at the colloquium)
Tax Expenditures for Healthcare (using the new structure to illuminate the issues in a much contested area)
Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2008-2012 (using the new approach in lieu of the hoary old one).
This is a topic I've written and thought about a lot, such as in Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 Tax Law Review 187 (2004) (draft version available here), reworked (and shortened) as chapter 8 of my recent book Taxes, Spending, and the U.S. Government's March Toward Bankruptcy. In brief, my main points include the following:
(1) The distinction between taxes and spending is purely formal rather than economically meaningful. Hence, a tax rule can't "really" be spending, as tax expenditure analysis posits.
(2) Since, however, people mistakenly treat it as meaningful, tax expenditure analysis can improve information by addressing labeling games, the canonical illustration of which (for me) is David Bradford's joke about making the government $50 billion smaller by replacing $50 billion of military spending with the $50 billion "weapons supplier tax credit" ("WSTC") thereby causing both taxes and spending, as conventionally measured, to drop by that amount even though absolutely nothing has changed in substance. As we discussed in the session, if you look at recent legislation, the WSTC idea looks prescient rather than like a joke.
(3) In the context of a general, distributionally motivated "tax" system such as the income tax, the way to come up with a coherent framework for improving information despite the underlying fiscal language problem is to identify allocative provisions that have been stuck into this mainly (in its rationale) distributional system. E.g., no one would think that the WSTC is an aspect of adjusting relative burdens based on ability; rather, it serves to affect economic activity, i.e., by permitting the government to acquire the specified weapons.
Following our interdisciplinary philosophy at the colloquium, Alan Auerbach was the lead commentator on this law-based paper (obviously well within his expertise, of course), whereas next week I will be the lead commentator on a very interesting econometrics paper, Amy Finkelstein's EZ-Tax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates. Ed Kleinbard was, as always, a lively, delightful, and illuminating discussant, although given his current eminence at JCT I need to treat his remarks as off the record. It did seem clear, however, that there is a relationship between how the JCT proposed to revise tax expenditure analysis (links below) and my analysis, although for institutional reasons the two must and do look significantly different. This puts me in the position of being an ungrateful whelp, so to speak, if I cavil and carp at exactly how they did it, although this of course was also my duty as a commentator.
Recent JCT publications on the subject, all worth a look, include the following:
A Reconsideration of Tax Expenditure Analysis (the piece we discussed at the colloquium)
Tax Expenditures for Healthcare (using the new structure to illuminate the issues in a much contested area)
Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2008-2012 (using the new approach in lieu of the hoary old one).
Thursday, January 29, 2009
So far, so good?
The stimulus bill as it passed the House does, it's true, contain the rule extending carrybacks for NOLs to 5 years. As I discussed here, this is probably a bad idea on balance, although the Tax Policy Center was generous enough to give it a B.
But at least the thoroughly silly proposal to reward private equity firms for buying back their debt at a discount instead of boosting employment did not make it into the House bill.
Nor did the even sillier proposal to enact another dividend repatriation tax holiday, only 5 years after the last one. (These are supposedly one-time-only special deals, although only the exceptionally naive would ever view them as such.)
If ever there was a proven policy failure, it is the 2004 dividend repatriation tax holiday. A leading paper analyzing it concludes: "Repatriations did not lead to an increase in investment, employment, or R & D - even for the firms that lobbied for the tax holiday stating these intentions. Instead, a $1 increase in repatriations was associated with an increase of approximately $1 in payouts to shareholders."
But that arguably is all the more reason to expect its repetition. After all, if insiders don't capture the benefits from it, instead of having these benefits diffused via generally stimulative extra economic activity, why on earth would they lobby for its repetition? So the fact that Holiday 2 did not make it into the House bill arguably is a surprise.
But not to despair, if you are irredeemably cynical and thus perversely welcome news of Congress living down to your lowest expectations. There is always the chance, I suppose, that these provisions will be added later on, such as on the floor of the Senate.
But at least the thoroughly silly proposal to reward private equity firms for buying back their debt at a discount instead of boosting employment did not make it into the House bill.
Nor did the even sillier proposal to enact another dividend repatriation tax holiday, only 5 years after the last one. (These are supposedly one-time-only special deals, although only the exceptionally naive would ever view them as such.)
If ever there was a proven policy failure, it is the 2004 dividend repatriation tax holiday. A leading paper analyzing it concludes: "Repatriations did not lead to an increase in investment, employment, or R & D - even for the firms that lobbied for the tax holiday stating these intentions. Instead, a $1 increase in repatriations was associated with an increase of approximately $1 in payouts to shareholders."
But that arguably is all the more reason to expect its repetition. After all, if insiders don't capture the benefits from it, instead of having these benefits diffused via generally stimulative extra economic activity, why on earth would they lobby for its repetition? So the fact that Holiday 2 did not make it into the House bill arguably is a surprise.
But not to despair, if you are irredeemably cynical and thus perversely welcome news of Congress living down to your lowest expectations. There is always the chance, I suppose, that these provisions will be added later on, such as on the floor of the Senate.
Monday, January 26, 2009
My tax & accounting article comes out
The Georgetown Law Journal has now officially published my article, The Optimal Relationship Between Taxable Income and Financial Accounting Income. Here is the link, and the abstract is as follows:
The persistence of the book-tax gap, or excess of companies’ reported financial accounting income over their taxable income, suggests that accounting manipulation and tax sheltering remain significant problems, even in the aftermath of the “Enron era.” Some have therefore suggested making the United States a “one-book” country, in which the same income measure would be used for both purposes. This Article offers the first systematic exploration of the optimal relationship between the two income measures, based on the distinct purposes they serve and the significance of two distinct sets of incentive problems: those pertaining to corporate managers and those pertaining to the political decisionmakers who make the rules.
Absent these incentive problems, the two ideal measures would differ, reflecting that allocating tax burdens is not the same exercise as informing investors. The incentive problems cut in favor of uniformity, however, by supporting the creation of a “Madisonian” offset between managers’ and politicians’ twin quests for high accounting income and low taxable income. But this offset has more promise as a device to constrain managers than politicians, given the difficulty of binding Congress and the existing partial insulation of accounting rules from direct political influence. In light of the political incentive issues, pure one-book and two-book approaches may both be inferior to partial conformity, such as that which would result from generally requiring a 50% adjustment by large, publicly traded companies of taxable income towards financial accounting income.
The persistence of the book-tax gap, or excess of companies’ reported financial accounting income over their taxable income, suggests that accounting manipulation and tax sheltering remain significant problems, even in the aftermath of the “Enron era.” Some have therefore suggested making the United States a “one-book” country, in which the same income measure would be used for both purposes. This Article offers the first systematic exploration of the optimal relationship between the two income measures, based on the distinct purposes they serve and the significance of two distinct sets of incentive problems: those pertaining to corporate managers and those pertaining to the political decisionmakers who make the rules.
Absent these incentive problems, the two ideal measures would differ, reflecting that allocating tax burdens is not the same exercise as informing investors. The incentive problems cut in favor of uniformity, however, by supporting the creation of a “Madisonian” offset between managers’ and politicians’ twin quests for high accounting income and low taxable income. But this offset has more promise as a device to constrain managers than politicians, given the difficulty of binding Congress and the existing partial insulation of accounting rules from direct political influence. In light of the political incentive issues, pure one-book and two-book approaches may both be inferior to partial conformity, such as that which would result from generally requiring a 50% adjustment by large, publicly traded companies of taxable income towards financial accounting income.
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